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International Economic Sanctions:
Improving-the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime
Barry E. Cartert
The United States has resorted increasingly to economic sanctions as a
major tool in its foreign policy. Recent targets include Panama, South
Africa, Nicaragua, Libya, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Iran. These
sanctions encompass controls on government programs (such as foreign
aid), US. exports, imports, private financial transactions, and assistance
by international financial institutions.
In this Article, Professor Carter demonstrates that the present US.
legal regime governing the use of sanctions for foreign policy reasons is
haphazard and in need of reform. Current US. laws provide the President
with nearly unfettered authority to cut off government programs and
exports, but very little nonemergency authority in other areas, such as the
regulation of imports and private financial transactions. This imbalance
either skews presidential decisionmaking toward the use of easily imposed
sanctions that might not be in the best interests of the United States, or
encourages presidential declarations of dubious national emergencies to
invoke his sweeping emergency powers.
Professor Carter proposes thoroughgoing but selective reform of the
present legal regime. He recommends correcting the disparity in the Presi-
dent's nonemergency authority by substantially increasing the President's
authority over imports and private financial transactions, while reducing
the control over exports. He also proposes trimming the President's ability
to employ emergency powers for imposing economic sanctions.
t Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1964, Stanford
University; M.P.A. 1966, Princeton University; J.D. 1969, Yale Law School. This Article had its
genesis in a course entitled "International Economic Coercion and the Use of Force," which Arthur
T. Downey and I created and taught together. In 1988, Cambridge University Press will publish my
book with the same title as this Article. It will contain a more detailed discussion of current U.S.
laws and a chapter on the laws of several major U.S. allies.
I wish to thank the many people who have read all or parts of various drafts of this Article and
offered thoughtful comments. Among those who have been especially helpful are Kenneth Abbott,
Madeleine Albright, Kathleen Ambrose, Samuel Dash, Arthur Downey, John Jackson, David
McCarthy, Paula Newberg, L. Edward Shaw, and Phillip Trimble. Thanks also go to several law
students for their research, analysis, and editing skills. They include Hugh Grambau, Marian
Hagler, David Laufman, Anthony Majestro, Ines Radmilovic, and Craig Zimmerman.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Against a wide range of target countries, the United States is resort-
ing with increasing frequency to economic pressure as a major tool in its
foreign policy. Recent examples include:
-a variety of trade and investment sanctions against South Africa;
-financial and other sanctions against Panama;
-- wide-ranging measures against Libya;
-the trade embargo against Nicaragua;
-continuing controls on high-technology exports;
-sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union, including the grain
embargo and the ill-fated attempt to stop exports of pipeline equip-
ment; and
-the ban on trade and the freezing of assets during the hostage crisis
in Iran.
Other countries have also used economic sanctions for foreign policy
purposes, although the United States employs them most often.
This frequent use reflects the special utility of economic sanctions, at
least on first impression. Sanctions do not involve the violence and
destruction of armed force, yet they provide a nation's leader with the
appearance, and often the reality, of taking decisive steps. They are also
more acceptable in the international community than the use of force.
Yet they are usually more concrete than diplomatic protests or other dip-
lomatic moves.
Considerable debate continues over the effectiveness of economic
sanctions. Today's conventional wisdom questions whether they work.
Despite significant failures, however, detailed studies suggest that sanc-
tions have been successful in some situations.1 For example, U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions helped to topple Haiti's Duvalier in 1986, Uganda's Idi
Amin in 1979, Chile's Allende in 1973, and the Dominican Republic's
Trujillo in 1961. The threat of U.S. sanctions also helped to discourage
South Korea from buying a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France
in 1975-76. While the evidence is still unclear, comprehensive U.S. sanc-
tions probably helped free the hostages from Iran in 1981. Similarly,
sanctions against South Africa, by the United States and other countries,
appear to be having an impact on the economy and on the political cli-
mate there.
Although the use of sanctions has been studied extensively, there
has not yet been a comprehensive analysis of U.S. laws governing the
imposition of sanctions. This Article presents such an analysis. An
1. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 29.
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important starting point is to delimit the broad range of possible
economic sanctions. They can roughly be grouped into five categories, as
limits on: (1) U.S. government programs, such as foreign assistance and
landing rights; (2) exports from the United States; (3) imports; (4) private
financial transactions; and (5) international financial institutions.
In the absence of a declared national emergency, present U.S. laws
for imposing economic sanctions are at best haphazard. For example, the
President has nearly unfettered legal authority to limit the government's
bilateral programs, such as by cutting off economic assistance to a for-
eign country. The President also has broad discretion to stop almost all
exports. On the other hand, restricting imports is legally much more
difficult. Similarly, the President has little legal control over foreign
loans by private U.S. banks, and even less control over international
financial institutions.
Since passing new legislation in a timely fashion is often difficult or
even impossible, existing laws can strongly influence the President's
choice of sanctions, frequently in a way that is not in the best interests of
the United States. For instance, if the President wants to impose eco-
nomic sanctions for foreign policy reasons, current laws encourage him
to resort to export controls where he has relatively unfettered authority,
rather than to impose import controls or restrict U.S. bank lending
where his powers are limited. Yet, in certain situations, import sanctions
or restraints on private credit would be more effective against the target
country and cause less harm to U.S. industry and workers than export
controls. Indeed, export controls can often amount to the economic ver-
sion of shooting oneself in the foot.
The President can prevent the laws from skewing his choice of sanc-
tions by declaring a national emergency under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).2 This statute gives him sweeping
powers over exports, imports, and private financial transactions.
Congress passed IEEPA in 1977 to reduce casual resort to "national
emergencies." That goal, however, has not been realized. The criteria
for invokiig IEEPA are vague, and the major provision for Congres-
sional review was gutted by an adverse Supreme Court decision.'
IEEPA's flaws have become increasingly evident in light of President
Reagan's questionable declarations of national emergencies and use of
the Act's powers against Nicaragua, South Africa, and Libya.
The present bias toward either applying export controls under the
nonemergency laws or declaring a dubious national emergency under
2. Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(1982)); see infra text accompanying notes 272-336.
3. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see infra text
accompanying notes 315-23.
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IEEPA is not the only possible legal approach. Many present laws were
passed primarily for other purposes and without serious consideration of
the best legal regime for imposing economic sanctions. Many import
laws, for example, aim to protect U.S. industries, while the banking laws
seek to protect domestic depositors, borrowers, and investors.
The analysis of the laws that follows strongly suggests the need for
constructive change. Moreover, recent developments demonstrate that
reform is possible. For example, the 1985 Export Administration
Amendments Act4 places a few limits on the President's broad discretion
over exports. Also, the 1985 foreign aid law5 included provisions that
authorize the President to prohibit almost all imports from Libya or
other countries that support terrorism. Finally, the 1986 sanctions
against South Africa,6 passed over President Reagan's veto, contain a
variety of specific restrictions on certain U.S. exports, imports, loans, and
investments involving South Africa. These developments, however, are
all very limited in scope. Comprehensive legislative changes are still
needed.
Since present U.S. laws for international trade and finance serve
many purposes, reform must be undertaken carefully to avoid unin-
tended results. For instance, if the President's authority to impose
import sanctions were expanded, would domestic industry pressure the
President to use the new laws for protectionist purposes? Also, could
certain proposed sanctions-such as limits on private bank credit-be
effectively enforced? For example, if the President were able to prohibit
new loans to Poland, would the money simply pass through Western
European banks to Poland at a slightly higher interest rate?
To address these issues, Part II briefly discusses the use of sanctions
and analyzes their possible purposes and effectiveness. Part III then
examines present U.S. laws governing economic sanctions in nonemer-
gency situations. Of special note are recent changes in the export laws
that, in very limited situations, protect existing contracts, compensate
injured exporters, and prohibit certain controls on agricultural products
lasting more than sixty days, absent congressional approval. Such provi-
sions suggest possible approaches for more comprehensive reform.
Part IV analyzes present U.S. laws covering a declared national
emergency, including the recent uses of IEEPA. The possible powers of
the President beyond the statutes are briefly considered in Part V.
4. Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985) (codified in scattered sections, primarily at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1985)); see infra text accompanying notes 96-130.
5. Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 504(a), 99 Stat. 221 (1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2494aa-8(a) (Supp.
III 1985)); see infra text accompanying notes 163-65.
6. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086
(codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5001-5116 (West Supp. 1987)); see infra text accompanying notes 254-71.
1987] 1165
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Part VI builds on the previous parts to address major alternatives
for reform. The wisest course among the possible options would be to
increase, in carefully structured ways, the President's nonemergency
authority to limit imports and private financial transactions, while
decreasing his authority to control exports. This approach would allow
the President to select sanctions based on their expected effectiveness,
rather than to choose those easiest to invoke under present laws. This
should also reduce the President's incentive to resort casually to national
emergency powers, and would thus pave the way toward trimming the
use of those sweeping powers.
Scope of the Article
Economic sanctions can be defined as coercive economic measures
taken against one or more countries to attempt to force a change in poli-
cies, 7 or at least to demonstrate the sanctioning country's opinion of
another's policies. The terms "economic boycott" and "embargo" are
often used interchangeably with "economic sanction."8 The nation that
imposes the sanctions is sometimes termed the "sender," while the object
of the sanctions is sometimes called the "target."
This Article focuses on the use of economic sanctions for foreign
policy purposes. Foreign policy is defined broadly here, to include
national security considerations.9 As a result, this Article addresses eco-
nomic sanctions with goals ranging from influencing the target country's
specific policies (such as on human rights, terrorism, or nuclear non-
proliferation) to destabilizing a government or stopping a military
adventure.
The definition of foreign policy used here does not, however, include
economic policies. In trade disputes or negotiations, the United States
(like other countries) often takes, or threatens to take, economic steps to
protect itself or to enhance its bargaining power. For example, the
7. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 2008-09 (1981) ("sanctions");
see also D. LOSMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANcTIONS: THE CASES OF CUBA, ISRAEL, AND
RHODESIA 1-3 (1979).
8. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S, supra note 7, at 264 ("boycott"), 738-39 ("embargo"); D. LOSMAN,
supra note 7, at 2. The word boycott has an interesting history. It came into use during the
nineteenth century when absentee English landlords owned much property in Ireland. Captain
Charles C. Boycott was an agent in County Mayo, Ireland who collected the rents for absentee
landlords. When he refused to reduce the rents, the community retaliated by completely ostracizing
him, economically and socially. He could not endure his isolation and returned to England. Id. at
2-3.
9. The 1979 and 1985 Export Administration Acts, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), tried carefully to define and distinguish between "foreign policy controls" and
"national security controls." That distinction, however, does not appear in every law authorizing
economic sanctions, and is still not entirely clear even in U.S. export laws. Both types of export
controls will therefore be subsumed in this Article's broad definition of foreign policy. See
discussion of these Acts, infra text accompanying notes 96-130.
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United States recently imposed import sanctions against certain Japanese
goods in retaliation for Japanese violation of a trade agreement regarding
sales of semiconductor chips. I° While interesting and important, the use
of sanctions for economic purposes is beyond the scope of this Article. It
brings in a host of other situations, raises new and difficult issues, and
often involves different laws. Consequently, this Article analyzes only
those economic sanctions used for noneconomic foreign policy
purposes. t
In considering these particular sanctions, the emphasis is on the rel-
evant U.S. laws. These include international agreements in which the
United States is involved, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). The discussion also addresses possible presidential pow-
ers beyond those granted by statute. This Article, however, does not
analyze the question of the legality of economic coercion under custom-
ary international law."z
As Part II indicates, there is already a substantial body of literature
on the history of sanctions and extensive empirical scholarship regarding
their effectiveness. The literature, however, does not include a compre-
hensive overview and analysis of the U.S. laws governing the imposition
of a range of possible economic sanctions, or a consideration of alterna-
tive legal regimes. 13 Presumably this results partly from the traditional
10. See, eg., 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 754 (June 10, 1987); id. at 428, 467 (April 1, 1987).
11. This Article does, however, occasionally consider the use of economic sanctions against
expropriation of U.S. businesses abroad. This is because expropriation cases are often part of a
larger political dispute between the United States and another country, as was the case with Chile
under Salvador Allende.
12. The frequent use of these sanctions by many countries constitutes persuasive evidence that
no clear norm exists against them in customary international law. See, e.g., Shihata, Destination
Embargo ofArab Oil: Its Legality under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 625-26 (1974).
But cf Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. 405, 411-13 (1985).
In its case against the United States before the World Court, Nicaragua asserted that the United
States had violated the principle of nonintervention by cutting off economic aid, by reducing
Nicaragua's sugar quota by 90 percent, and through a comprehensive trade embargo. While the
World Court ruled that the United States had violated customary international law by training and
arming the anti-government contras, the majority nevertheless concluded on the economic sanctions:
"[Tihe Court has merely to say that it is unable to regard such action on the economic plane as is
here complained of as a breach of the customary-law principle of non-intervention." Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126.
13. There are only brief references to the comprehensive approach. For example, Professor
Kenneth Abbott discusses laws other than export laws in the introduction to his excellent article on
export laws. Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970s
and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REv. 739, 741 n.1 (1981). Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott have two short
references to the statutory framework in their impressive empirical analysis of economic sanctions.
G. HUFBAUER & J. ScHor, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT
POLICY 28, 59-60 (1985). The U.S. General Accounting Office presents a list of alternatives to the
use of foreign policy export controls in its report, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPORT
CONTROLS: ASSESSMENT OF COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS
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focus by legal scholars, government officials, and practitioners on indi-
vidual parts of the puzzle-government programs, export laws, import
laws, or banking laws-rather than on the whole.
Given the already formidable task of analyzing the U.S. federal law
on economic sanctions, this Article does not delve into state and local
laws that seek to use economic regulation for foreign policy purposes.14
These laws often differ substantially from federal laws in both their
approach and coverage, and raise unique constitutional issues.1 5
This Article also does not consider in any depth alternatives to eco-
nomic sanctions. Sanctions fall somewhere in the middle of a spectrum
of possible actions for promoting U.S. foreign policy interests. The spec-
trum ranges from the coercive use or threat of military force,16 to covert
action, to economic sanctions, and finally to diplomatic measures, such
as expulsion of some of the target country's diplomatic personnel, recall
of the ambassador, or suspension of cultural exchanges. 17
II
THE PURPOSES AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes have had a long and
controversial history. They were employed in ancient Greece, 18 and have
12-13 (Aug. 1986) [hereinafter EXPORT CONTROLS], based partly on the analysis that I provided to
the report's authors in an interview.
14. State and local governments have a long and active history of trying to influence other
countries through laws or other steps, such as the efforts against the Arab boycott and more recently
against apartheid in South Africa. These laws often include restrictions on a public entity
purchasing goods from the target country (even from U.S. companies doing business there) and
restrictions on the public entity investing its cash reserves or pension funds in U.S. banks or
corporations that have operations in the target country. Indeed, state and local efforts appear to
have been a significant factor in the decision by many U.S. banks and corporations to change their
business practices, or even to reduce or terminate their activities, in South Africa. See, e.g., Wash.
Post, Oct. 24, 1986, at Fl, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
15. See Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal Power
in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813 (1986). While containing much useful information, this note
does not thoroughly analyze the variety or the constitutionality of state and local activity.
16. See, e.g., C. VON CLAUSEWlTZ, WAR, POLITICS, AND POWER 254-68 (Gateway ed. 1962)
(war should be a continuation of state policy by another means); see also, G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF
DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971); B. BLECHMAN & S. KAPLAN, FORCE
WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 11-20 (1978). The boundaries
between the different types of sanctions-military, economic, and diplomatic-are often unclear.
For example, see the discussion of arms sales, infra text accompanying notes 136-50.
17. See, e.g., W. CHRISTOPHER, DIPLOMACY: THE NEGLECTED IMPERATIVE (1981); Maynes,
Logic, Bribes, And Threats, 60 FOREIGN POL'Y 111 (Fall 1985).
18. The best known example was Pericles' decree of 432 B.C., limiting the entry of products
from Megara into the markets of Athens in response to Megara's territorial expansion and its
kidnapping of three women. At least one scholar has noted Aristophanes' suggestion that the decree
played a major role in starting the Peloponnesian War. See Fornara, Plutarch and the Megarian
1168 [Vol. 75:1159
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been a U.S. tradition since the colonial era. 19 Sanctions were employed
both as a substitute for force2 ' and as a complement to it.
2 I
Since World War II, economic sanctions have been used frequently
and for a variety of purposes. Indeed, countries employed economic
sanctions for foreign policy reasons in at least ninety-one cases from 1945
Decree, 24 YALE CLASSICAL STUD. 213-14, 219-20 (1975); see also R. ELLINGS, EMBARGOES AND
WORLD POWER: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 17-18 (1985).
19. In one of the well-known steps leading to the American Revolution, the colonists resorted
in 1765 to a boycott of English goods in response to the Stamp Act, and raised the famous cry of
"No taxation without representation." J. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 123,
150, 109-163 (1957). The British repealed the Stamp Act the next year, but followed in 1767-70 with
the Townshend Acts, designed to tax the salaries of colonial governors and judges. The colonists
again retaliated with a boycott that eventually led to the Boston Tea Party of 1774. Id. at 268-73,
345-50.
The new United States of America soon resorted to economic sanctions as an instrument of
foreign policy. Hoping to avoid war with England or France in late 1807, President Thomas
Jefferson successfully urged Congress to enact a trade embargo that was as thoroughgoing as any
known trade sanction. The embargo prohibited American ships from leaving for foreign ports and
banned the carriage of American goods by other vessels. Encountering virulent domestic opposition,
the embargo was ended in March 1809.
In 1811, however, the United States stopped trade with Great Britain in response to British
orders limiting U.S. trade with France. The British revoked their orders, but, unaware of the
revocation, the United States declared war two days later, starting the War of 1812. 1 S. MORISON
& H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 394-402 (1962); R. RENWICK,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 4-7 (1981) (Paper 45, Harvard Studies in International Affairs).
20. For example, the creation of the League of Nations after World War I generated
considerable hope and enthusiasm for economic sanctions as an alternative to force. Article 16 of
the League's charter provided that all League members were to cease all economic intercourse with
any other member that resorted to war. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16. See generally F.
NORTHREDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES 1920-1946, at 59 (1986). While
trying to convince the American people of the need for the League, President Woodrow Wilson
proclaimed:
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic,
peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy.
It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation
which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.
WILSON'S IDEALS 108 (S. Padover ed. 1942). Two early successes by the League in the 1920's
against smaller powers, Yugoslavia and Greece, further encouraged supporters of sanctions. G.
HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 13, at 124-3 1.
Nevertheless, the League itself, and hopes for the peace-keeping powers of economic sanctions,
were severely damaged by the League's weak response to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in October
1935. While the League approved an arms embargo and other trade and financial sanctions, it
failed, after much-publicized vacillating, to embargo the vital exports of petroleum, coal, steel, and
pig iron. Moreover, non-League countries such as the United States and Soviet Union did not
adhere to the sanctions, and many League members were less than punctilious in observing them.
As a result, the selective sanctions did not deter Italian aggression. Addis Ababa fell to Mussolini in
May 1936, and the League discontinued its sanctions in July. See H. FEIS, SEEN FROM E.A.; THREE
INTERNATIONAL EPISODES 195-283 (1947); R. RENWICK, supra note 19, at 9-24.
21. For instance, economic sanctions proved useful during World War II. The trade embargo
against Europe and Japan and the Allies' preemptive buying of strategic materials from neutral
countries played at least a modest role in defeating the Axis countries. Japan, especially dependent
on imports, was particularly vulnerable. See G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTr, supra note 13, 155-70; K.
KNORR, THE POWER OF NATIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
140 (1975); 2 W. MEDLICOT, THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE (1959).
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through 1984, according to Hufbauer and Schott's excellent, comprehen-
sive study.22 The United States leads the world in resorting to economic
sanctions for foreign policy purposes. Of the study's ninety-one cases,
the United States employed sanctions sixty-two times, either alone or
with other countries.23 Other frequent users include the United King-
dom, the Soviet Union, and the Arab League.2 4
The remainder of this Article focuses on the U.S. uses of sanctions
since World War II. These recent cases generally offer more lessons for
the present and future than do older examples. Moreover, these sanc-
tions were invoked under laws that are the same as or similar to current
laws, and therefore help illustrate the haphazard nature of the present
U.S. legal regime.
A. The Purposes of Sanctions
There are three broad rationales for imposing sanctions:
- seeking to influence a country to change its policies or even its
government;
- punishing a country for its policies; and
- symbolically demonstrating opposition against the target country's
policies to many possible audiences, including constituencies in the
sender country as well as audiences in the target country, other
potential target countries, or allied countries.25
22. G. HUFBAUER & J SCHOTT, supra note 13. This 753-page study has several overview
chapters and then abstracts of the authors' analyses of 103 cases of economic sanctions for foreign
policy goals. These cases begin with the economic blockade of Germany in World War I. The
study's definition of "foreign policy goals" is similar to the use of "foreign policy reasons" in this
Article. Compare id. at 2 with supra text accompanying note 9.
The study recognizes, for understandable reasons, that it "probably omits many uses of
sanctions imposed between powers of the second and third rank." Id. at 3. The study also "may
have overlooked instances where sanctions were imposed by major powers in comparative secrecy to
achieve relatively modest goals." Id.
In addition, the United States has resorted to economic sanctions several times since the study's
1984 cutoff. Examples include: a suspension of U.S. assistance to Haiti that began in November
1987 and had not been lifted as of February 1988, in addition to the prior suspension of aid to that
country in early 1986; a ban on almost all imports from Iran that began in October 1987 and remains
in effect; the current freeze on most U.S. foreign assistance to Panama that began in July 1987 and
the other, more recent sanctions; and steps to limit travel to Greece and Lebanon after the 1985
hijacking of a TWA airliner. Moreover, the continuing U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua, South
Africa, and Libya in 1985-88 are expansions of "episodes" in the study.
23. See id. at 7, 13-20. The totals at page seven of the study are adjusted to include only post-
World War II sanctions (i.e., 91 of 103 total cases, and 62 of 68 U.S. cases have occurred since
World War II).
24. For example, the 12 British uses include: the trade and financial embargo against
Argentina during the war over the Falklands Islands; financial and trade sanctions against Idi
Amin's Uganda from 1972 to 1979 in cooperation with the United States; financial and trade
sanctions against Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979 in cooperation with the United Nations. The 10
Soviet episodes were often against recalcitrant satellites. The Arab League and its members used its
petroleum power four times. Id.
25. E.g., EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 13, at 5; Abbott, supra note 13, at 798-857.
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More than one rationale can be involved in the decision to employ a
sanction or set of sanctions in a particular situation. For example, the
widening U.S. sanctions against South Africa stem from a mix of all the
above considerations. The sanctions involve an effort to influence South
Africa to change its apartheid policy, a dose of punishment, and a sym-
bolic statement of U.S. opposition to apartheid.26
Besides these broad rationales, a sender country generally has more
specific foreign policy motives for imposing sanctions. Hufbauer and
Schott characterized these objectives as follows:
(1) "Change target country policies in a relatively modest way
(modest in the scale of national goals, but often of burning importance to
participants in the episode)." These goals include slowing nuclear
proliferation, promoting human rights, fighting terrorism, and resolving
expropriation claims;
(2) "Destabilize the target government," and thus change its
policies;
(3) "Disrupt a minor military adventure," as illustrated by the
United Kingdom's sanctions against Argentina over the Falkland Islands
dispute;
(4) "Impair the military potential of the target country," as illus-
trated by sanctions against the Warsaw Pact by the United States and its
allies; and
(5) "Change target country policies in a major way," as illustrated
by U.S. efforts and those of other countries against South Africa's system
of apartheid.27
Again, more than one specific foreign policy objective can underlie a
set of sanctions. For example, the recent U.S. efforts against Nicaragua
are ostensibly designed to promote human rights, destabilize the
Sandinista government, and disrupt the Nicaraguan support of rebels in
El Salvador.
B. Effectiveness of Sanctions
It is difficult to measure the success of sanctions because of the fre-
quent ambiguity of the rationales and objectives behind their use. Even if
the real goal is discernible, it still may be difficult to determine the extent
to which the sanctions contributed to the desired outcome.
2 8
26. Delineating the exact rationales behind sanctions can be problematic. In the United States,
the sanctions might be imposed by the President based on his existing statutory discretion, through a
new law passed by Congress and signed by the President, or under a new law enacted by Congress
over the President's veto. It is very difficult to divine the intentions of Congress, with its many
members, and it becomes still more difficult to decipher the intentions of Congress and the President
acting together. It may even be difficult to determine the President's exact rationale when he acts
alone.
27. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTr, supra note 13, at 29.
28. Many questions can arise. For example, if a sanction is designed to influence a country to
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Numerous studies have examined the effectiveness of one or more
recent uses of sanctions.29 The Hufbauer-Schott study is the most com-
prehensive. It evaluated the effectiveness of sanctions against the five
specific foreign policy objectives listed above.3" To measure "success,"
the study examined two issues: (1)"the extent to which the policy out-
come sought.., was in fact achieved," and (2)"the contribution made by
sanctions to a positive outcome."31 These policy outcomes were mea-
sured "against the stated foreign policy goals of the sender country.
3 2
The study did not consider domestic political purposes.33
Despite the difficulty of measuring effectiveness, the study indicates
that economic sanctions have been "successful" more often than current
conventional wisdom recognizes. For the sixty-two cases since 1945
where the United States was one of the sender countries, the study found
a success rate of about 40%. 3 ' This success rate has declined somewhat
in recent years, notably in the realm of sanctions seeking modest policy
results. Target countries are perhaps becoming more immune to sanc-
tions because of two factors. First, the recent targets have been less
dependent on trade with the United States. Second, other countries, such
as the Soviet Union, have stepped forward more often to assist the target
states.35
change its human rights policy, is the sanction successful if the target country releases 10 political
prisoners, but leaves 10 more in jail, and only partly modifies its state of emergency?
29. Some of the better studies include: G. HuFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 13; D.
LOSMAN, supra note 7; M. DoXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
(1987) R. ELLINGS, supra note 18; R. RENWICK, supra note 19; ECONOMIC COERCION AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLICATIONS OF CASE STUDIES FROM THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (S.
Weintraub ed. 1982).
30. When a use of sanctions was found to have more than one objective, the sanction was
categorized according to the most difficult objective. Where two objectives were judged equally
important, however, the case was analyzed under both categories. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT,
supra note 13, at 29.
31. Id. at 32.
32. Id. (emphasis in original). Hufbauer and Schott employed a numerical calculation for
measuring success. To measure the policy outcome, they assigned values on a scale of I (failure) to 4
(success). To measure the contribution of the economic sanctions, they assigned values on a scale of
1 (zero or negative contribution) to 4 (significant contribution). They then multiplied the two
assigned numbers together, giving values ranging from I to 16. A score of 9 or higher was viewed as
a "successful" outcome. Id. at 33.
33. The authors concluded that it was impossible to evaluate these domestic motives
systematically. See id. at 3, 32.
34. See id. at 80. As noted earlier, the study did not include the U.S. actions against Haiti in
1987-88 and early 1986, Iran in 1987-88, Panama in 1987-88, and Greece and Lebanon in 1985. See
supra note 22. Also, the sanctions against Ethiopia were rated unsuccessful, but the outcome now
appears to be successful. See infra text accompanying note 38. The success rate for all 103 cases in
the study (from 1914 on) was 36 percent, very close to the post-1945 rate for the United States. Id.
35. Id. at 81.
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1. Effectiveness as a Function of Purpose
The success rate varies according to the foreign policy objective
being pursued. Sanctions designed to destabilize a government (objective
2) have been especially effective. Examples include the toppling of Haiti's
Duvalier in February 1986,36 Uganda's Idi Amin in 1979, Chile's
Allende in 1973, and the Dominican Republic's Trujillo in 1961. Indeed,
it would appear that in the study's fourteen cases since 1954 where the
United States applied economic sanctions for destabilization purposes, it
was successful in ten episodes and unsuccessful in two. 37 The outcome of
two cases is still uncertain, as U.S. sanctions continue against Libya and
Nicaragua.
U.S. sanctions designed to achieve more narrow policy goals-such
as dealing with expropriation of U.S. corporations, nuclear proliferation,
terrorism, or human rights abuses (objective 1)-have been effective
about 40% of the time, though the rate varies according to the particular
goal.
The United States has been successful in as many as eight out of
nine uses of sanctions against expropriation. The continuing effort
against Cuba is the only unsuccessful case. The most recent success was
against Ethiopia. In December 1985, the United States and Ethiopia
signed an agreement providing that Ethiopia pay $7 million to settle
claims by U.S. nationals.3 8
The impact of U.S. sanctions against Iran during 1979-81 in resolv-
ing an expropriation dispute and in obtaining the release of the American
hostages remains uncertain, though most observers rate them a success.
The comprehensive sanctions, including a freeze on about $12 billion in
Iranian assets, presumably had some influence, particularly since Iran
had been attacked by Iraq and was in need of money to finance its war
effort. It is not yet clear, however, what finally led Ayatollah Khomeini
36. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at A3, col. 1.
37. The other six successful efforts were: Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979; Ian Smith in Rhodesia
in 1979; Goulart in Brazil in 1964; Diem in South Vietnam in 1963; Prince Souvanna Phouma and
General Phoumi in Laos in 1960-62; and Mossadegh in Iran in 1951-53. The two failures were
Sukarno in Indonesia in 1963-66 and Castro in Cuba from 1960 to the present. G. HUFBAUER & J.
SCHOTT, supra note 13, at 6, 43-44, 50-53. Other measures, such as covert action and military
operations, have usually accompanied economic sanctions seeking to destabilize a government, and
thus could affect the above results. As of early March 1988, the U.S. effort against General Manuel
Noriega of Panama was just commencing in earnest, and is not included in the tables here. See supra
note 22.
38. The Compensation Agreement and related documents are reproduced at 25 I.L.M. 56
(1986). For a history of the episode, see Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military
Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 616 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Mich. 1985). Other successful cases
include Chile in 1970-73, Peru in 1968-74, Brazil in 1962-64, Ceylon in 1961-65, Egypt in 1956, and
Iran in 1951-53. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTr, supra note 13, at 236-40 (Iran), 269-75 (Egypt), 324-
29 (Ceylon), 340-46 (Brazil), 430-45 (Peru), 439-44 (Chile).
11731987]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
to come to terms with the United States.39
Economic sanctions have also been used on occasion to further non-
proliferation policy. For example, in 1975-76, the United States and
Canada threatened financial and export sanctions to persuade South
Korea not to buy a French reprocessing plant that could produce weap-
ons-grade nuclear materials.4
In the area of human rights, sanctions such as cutting back on U.S.
military and economic assistance usually have not been successful in
stopping the target countries' gross violations of internationally recog-
nized rights.4
The United States has also used economic sanctions-such as
restricting various financial assistance programs and imposing export
controls-against countries designated as supporting terrorism. It does
not appear, however, that these selective sanctions had much effect in the
1980's on the policies of two of the principal target countries-Syria and
Libya.42
The study of efforts to destabilize governments or to achieve nar-
rower policy goals (objectives 1 and 2) leads to the further conclusion
that those sanctions having an immediate impact are the most effective.
It also helps to target a country with a much smaller economy. More-
over, a government already plagued by significant economic problems
and political turmoil is more easily destabilized.43
The use of sanctions to disrupt military adventures (objective 3) has
39. See Carswell and Davis, Crafting the Financial Settlement, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN
IRAN 232 (P. Kreisberg ed. 1985); Saunders, Beginning of the End, in id. at 290-92; see also G.
HUFBAUER & J. ScHo'rr, supra note 13, at 635 (noting, however, that the sanctions were
"painstakingly slow" and costly to the United States both economically and politically).
40. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTr, supra note 13, at 505-07. Similarly, the United States delayed
shipments of nuclear power reactors to stop the Taiwanese from reprocessing spent fuel. Id. at 540-
43. But, U.S. restrictions on the export of nuclear fuel and technology to South Africa, India,
Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan were unsuccessful in convincing those countries to accept full
multilateral safeguards, and the restrictions sometimes caused serious diplomatic repercussions. For
the relevant case studies, see id. at 523-29 (South Africa), 587-91 (Brazil), 592-97 (Argentine), 598-
602 (India), 636-43 (Pakistan).
41. Sanctions in 1977-84 did contribute to increased respect for human rights in Brazil. Id. at
579-82. On the other hand, the effects were limited in at least 10 other cases, including South Korea
in 1973-77, Paraguay in 1977-81, Guatemala from 1977 on, and Poland in 1981-84. For the relevant
case studies, see id. at 473-78 (South Korea), 550-53 (Paraguay), 554-59 (Guatemala), 683-95
(Poland). Some observers have argued that the lack of success on human rights was partly because
the Carter administration did not try hard enough. E.g., Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security
Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 264 (1982).
42. Sanctions, however, did encourage Greece in 1985 to take steps to limit terrorist activities
within its borders. After the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, the United States issued a travel advisory
warning of inadequate security at the Athens airport. The advisory, coupled with publicity of the
hijacking, led thousands of American tourists to cancel flight reservations to and from the airport.
Greek officials then agreed to make major improvements in security. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1985, at
A3, col. 1.
43. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 13, at 83, 86.
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generally been unsuccessful, as in the case of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus
in 1974."
The effectiveness of U.S. sanctions to impair the military potential of
a target country (objective 4) is controversial. 45 The principal example of
U.S. sanctions of this sort is the continuing export controls that the
United States and its CoCom46 allies have imposed since 1948 on strate-
gic materials (including high-technology products) to the Soviet Union
and other Warsaw Pact countries. Hufbauer and Schott's conclusion
that these sanctions are "distinctly unsuccessful"'47 is disputed by other
studies. Estimates of the cost and effectiveness of these sanctions both to
the Soviet Union and to the United States vary widely.48 Some experts
have also noted that export controls on high technology can have a chil-
ling effect on innovation and the flow of ideas in the United States.49 On
balance, putting aside the specific issue of "success," high-technology
44. Successes include U.S. opposition to the British-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 and
deterring the Netherlands in 1948-49 from forcibly resisting Indonesian independence. Failures
include, among others, U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union over its invasion of Afghanistan in
1980-81; against India and Pakistan over Bangladesh in 1971; and against China from 1949-70 for
extending its control over the mainland and for invading Korea. See id. at 187-93 (Netherlands),
221-30 (China), 275-79 (France and United Kingdom), 445-52 (India and Pakistan), 655-65 (Soviet
Union).
45. While most economic sanctions are intended in some general sense to weaken the target
country, a distinction usually can be made between those sanctions that seek to achieve political
goals like combating nuclear proliferation or destabilizing the government, and sanctions that seek to
limit the long-term military potential of the target country. This distinction is similar to the one
between national security controls and foreign policy controls written into the recent Export
Administration Acts. See infra text accompanying notes 96-130.
46. CoCom, the abbreviation for the Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls, was created secretly in 1949. It now consists of 16 countries-the
NATO countries (except Spain and Iceland) and Japan.
47. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 13, at 68.
48. For example, Hufbauer and Schott estimate that the average annual cost to the Soviets of
the CoCom controls was about $1.2 billion in 1970-81 and that the added U.S. controls on oil and
gas technology and equipment in 1981-82 cost the Soviets a further $500 million. Id. at 218, 663,
708. A Pentagon study estimates the denial of Western technology to the Soviet Union would cost
the Soviet military during 1986-96 and would save the United States and its allies $5 to $13.2 billion
in defense expenditures during that period. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
PROGRAM 11 (1986). For a careful recent study of U.S. export controls for national security
reasons, including an expert's cost calculations, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES PANEL ON
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1987) [hereinafter NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES PANEL].
Recent developments have reinforced questions about the effectiveness of the CoCom controls.
Most prominent have been the large sales of propeller-milling equipment to the Soviet Union by
Toshiba Corporation of Japan and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk of Norway. U.S. officials have said
that the propellers produced by this high-technology equipment have allowed Soviet submarines to
run more quietly, and thereby make detection more difficult. Companies in other western countries
were apparently involved in these and other high-technology sales to the Soviets. See, e.g., 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1317 (Oct. 28, 1987); N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1987, at D2, col. 5; N.Y. Times, June
12, 1987, at Al, col I.
49. For example, scholarly articles and intellectual interchange at conferences between U.S.
experts and foreigners can generate new developments, yet such sharing of ideas could well be
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controls do seem to impose costs on the Soviet Union and to reduce
demands on U.S. defense spending. Moreover, U.S. concerns about the
Soviet military threat ensure that U.S. policy will require these controls,
or at least some variant of them, for the foreseeable future."
U.S. sanctions in the catchall category of other major policy changes
(objective 5) include measures against South Africa for its apartheid poli-
cies and against the Arab League for its boycott of Israel. While
Hufbauer and Schott concluded that these sanctions were also "distinctly
unsuccessful,"'" this conclusion further demonstrates some of the limita-
tions of others' measures of "success." Although the sanctions have not
yet contributed significantly to a positive policy outcome, they have been
important for other reasons.
Sanctions have made South Africa pay an economic price for its
policy of apartheid and for its refusal to grant independence to Namibia.
Even the pre-1985 sanctions cost South Africa over $270 million per
year, or about 2.8% of its gross national product. 2 More recently, South
Africa has encountered serious financial problems as a result of credit
restrictions that were first imposed by several private banks for a variety
of reasons, and then by the U.S. and other governments. Moreover, the
U.N. and U.S. sanctions provide the world, including the people of South
Africa, with an important symbol of opposition. The debate over these
limited by strict controls. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SECURIrY 41 (1982).
50. There are considerable pressures, though, for some lessening of U.S. export controls on
high-technology goods, as exemplified by the 1987 report of the NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES PANEL,
supra note 48. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 127 (Feb. 4, 1987); N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1987, at Dl,
col. 3. Controls on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union were relaxed in January
1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 2500 (1987) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 371, 373, 376, 379, 385, 399). Other
controls, including those on personal computers, were relaxed in January 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 2582
(1988); see N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1988, at Al, col. 5. What impact the serious and widely reported
diversion by Toshiba and Kongsberg, discussed supra note 48, will have on U.S. controls is still
uncertain at this time.
Major trade bills are pending in Congress. House Resolution 3 passed both houses in 1987,
though in much different versions. See Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of
1987, H.R. 3, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (as passed by the House) [hereinafter 1987 House Trade Bill];
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (as passed by the
Senate) (formerly S. 1420, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)) [hereinafter 1987 Senate Trade Bill]. As of
February 1988, the two bills were in a House-Senate conference. See 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 17,
18 (Jan. 6, 1988). These trade bills include several proposed reforms of export controls, including
those on high-technology goods. See, e.g., 1987 House Trade Bill, supra, § 332 (entitled "National
Security Controls"); 1987 Senate Trade Bill, supra, §§ 1030-1033 (including mandatory sanctions
against Toshiba and Kongsberg). In the meantime, the continuing resolution passed by Congress
and signed by the President in December 1987 did impose some limits on purchases by the U.S.
Department of Defense from Toshiba and Kongsberg and any of their subsidiaries. See 5 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 17, 18 (Jan. 6, 1988).
51. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 13, at 68. Similar steps were taken against Poland
in 1981-84, seeking to end martial law and obtain internal reforms.
52. Id. at 355.
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sanctions also serves to educate the American public about apartheid,
and may generate still greater opposition to the policy. 3
Similarly, the broad limits on participation by U.S. individuals and
other entities in the Arab boycott against Israel demonstrates U.S. sup-
port for Israel and opposition to religious and ethnic discrimination.
Moreover, it has apparently led some Arab countries to be less energetic
in enforcing their boycott. 4
2. Effectiveness of Sanctions by Type
An analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions must also consider
whether certain types of sanctions are more effective than others in
achieving their objectives. Relative effectiveness may, of course, also
depend on the circumstances of particular situations.
For example, if the United States were to impose sanctions against
South Korea for human rights violations, import controls might be more
effective economically than export controls, given the importance of U.S.
purchases to South Korean trade. The United States imports about 39%
of all of South Korea's foreign sales. In contrast, U.S. exports total
about 21% of South Korea's foreign purchases. 6 Product breakdowns
reveal more subtle differences. The amount and type of the principal
U.S. imports from South Korea (manufactured articles and clothes) sug-
gest that South Korea cannot easily change long-established business
relationships and find willing buyers in other countries.5 7 At the same
time, South Korea would probably have less trouble and incur fewer
additional costs finding other suppliers for present U.S. exports to it,
such as machinery, crude materials, and chemical products. These are
generally available in world markets. 8
Even for countries where the United States plays about the same
role in percentage terms as an exporter and as an importer, import con-
trols might, for similar reasons, still be more effective than export con-
trols. For example, the United States imports about 40% of Guatemala's
foreign sales and exports about 40% of its purchases. 59 Guatemala, how-
53. For a discussion of these sanctions, see infra text accompanying notes 254-71.
54. For a discussion of these laws, see infra text accompanying notes 244-53.
55. This analysis ignores for the moment legal and diplomatic problems stemming from the
conflict between GATT and U.S. laws. See infra text accompanying notes 192-206.
56. See infra Figure 1 at 1178.
57. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1985, at Fl, col. 6; id., Sept. 23, 1985, at DI, col. 4; id., May 1,
1985, at D15, col. 1.
58. Generally, the competitive nature of export markets makes import restrictions more
effective than export controls. R. RENWICK, supra note 19, at 80. The goods the United States
exports to South Korea face substantial competition in the world markets. See, e.g.. Weaker Dollar
Hasn't Helped Chemical Trade, 65 CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 9 (March 30, 1987)
(chemicals); 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 68 (Jan. 8, 1986) (construction machinery).
59. See infra Figure I at page 1178.
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FIGURE 1
ILLUSTRATIVE POTENTIAL TARGET COUNTRIES
Country
U.S. Exports
as % of
Country's
Imports,
Principal U.S.
Exports2
Chile 20% machinery and
transport equipment
(MTE), chemicals,
manufactured goods
Ecuador 32% MTE, chemicals,
manufactured goods
Guatemala 40% chemical products,
MTE, oil & gas
Honduras 45% MTE,
manufactured
goods, chemical
products
Mexico 67% MTE,
manufactured
goods, chemical
products
Panama 17% MTE,
manufactured
goods, chemical
products
Philippines 25% MTE, food,
chemical products
South Korea 20% MTE, crude
materials, chemical
products
Taiwan5  24% MTE, crude
materials, chemicals
U.S. Imports
as % of
Country's
Exports'
22%
Principal U.S.
Imports'
metals, vegetables
& fruits
50% oil, coffee, fish
40% coffee, vegetables
& fruits, sugar
48% sugar, coffee, fish
67% oil, machinery
(electronic)
54% fish, vegetables &
fruits, coffee
36% manufactured
articles, clothes
39% manufactured
articles, clothes
48% clothing,
manufactured
articles
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics: Yearbook (1987). The percentages,
rounded to the nearest 1%, are calculated from statistics for 1986, which are based on dollar
values.
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Exports (Pub. FT455/1986 Dec. and
Annual 1986). Data is for 1986; items are ranked in order of dollar value according to the
Bureau's categories.
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. General Imports (Pub. FT155/1986 Dec.
and Annual 1986). Data is for 1986; items are ranked in order of dollar value according to the
Bureau's categories.
These percentages for the end of June 1986 were obtained by analyzing published data for total
external bank claims and total U.S. bank claims for each country (including both public and
private creditors). Country totals were taken from Bank for International Settlements and
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics on External Indebtedness:
Bank and Trade-Related Non-Bank External Claims on Individual Borrowing Countries and
Territories at End-June 1986, Table I at 5-8 (Jan. 1987). U.S. bank claims are from Office of the
Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, (Summer 1986). The data does not include
lending from the international financial institutions, such as the World Bank.
The 1985 Trade figures for Taiwan, rounded to the nearest 1%, are from Council for Economic
Planning and Development, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book at 214, 216 (1986).
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U.S. Banks'
Claims as
% of Total
Bank Claims4
47%
48%
33%
N.A.
43%
36%
17%
26%
24%
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ever, might have serious difficulty selling elsewhere, at comparable
prices, the coffee, sugar, bananas, and other vegetables and fruits that
constitute its principal U.S. sales, because trade barriers against agricul-
tural products are widespread.6°
Similarly, the United States imports a large amount of Chile's cop-
per production, an important revenue earner for that country. Chile
would probably find it more difficult to change its long-established rela-
tionships with U.S. copper purchasers than to find new suppliers for the
goods it buys from the United States.6' Thus, U.S. import controls
would likely be more effective than export restrictions.
An analysis of the relative effectiveness of sanctions should also
assess the possible contribution of controls on private financial transac-
tions. For example, as Figure 1 indicates, U.S. banks now make a large
share of the foreign loans to borrowers in certain countries, such as
South Korea (26%), Guatemala (33%), and Chile (47%). Controls on
financial transactions might be effective, but there are many potential
problems that are discussed below. 6
2
History provides several concrete examples of the effectiveness of
controls on imports and private financial transactions. Increased U.S.
duties on the Dominican Republic's sugar imports in 1961-62 helped top-
ple the Trujillo regime.63 U.S. threats to deny most-favored-nation
(MFN) status to Romania seem to have encouraged it to relax its emigra-
tion restrictions. 64 As for financial controls, the freeze on $12 billion in
Iranian deposits in 1979-81 probably had the greatest impact among all
the comprehensive sanctions. 65  Similarly, the private decisions by sev-
eral U.S. banks not to roll over South Africa's short-term loans helped
create a financial crisis there in August-September 1985. The official
U.S. sanctions later included a ban on new loans to that government, and
then on new investment in that country. These financial controls have
probably created more problems for South Africa than any of the other
recently imposed sanctions.66
60. Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
61. For a history of the Chilean relationship with U.S. copper companies, see T. MORAN,
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE (1974).
Finding a replacement for the U.S. market would be difficult with the present oversupply of copper.
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1986, at D1, col. 6. U.S. exports to Chile are similar to those exported to South
Korea and thus would be relatively easy to replace. See sources cited supra note 58.
62. For a detailed discussion of these problems, see infra text accompanying notes 430-49.
63. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTr, supra note 13, at 302-07.
64. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1983, at A3, col 4; See also Note, An Interim Analysis of the Effects of
the Jackson- Vanik Amendment on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian Example, 8 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 193, 206-07 (1976).
65. Christopher, Introduction, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN supra note 39, at 24;
Carswell & Davis, in id. at 231-34.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 206-28, 254-71.
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In short, each use of sanctions should be rooted in a careful analysis
of the vulnerabilities of the target country. In terms of effectiveness,
export controls do not have any natural advantage over import controls
or financial controls. Indeed, one of the most interesting conclusions of
the Hufbauer and Schott study was that "[t]he multiple regression analy-
sis suggests that financial controls are marginally more successful than
export controls, but that import controls are the most successful of all
types.",
67
The relative effectiveness of import controls and at least some finan-
cial controls suggests that these potential sanctions should be available
for use if the circumstances warrant. Under present U.S. laws, however,
export controls are generally much easier to impose than import controls
or restraints on private financial transactions, thus skewing the Presi-
dent's options in selecting the most effective sanctions.
3. Costs to the Sender Country
It is also important to recognize that economic sanctions usually
involve some costs to the sender country. The type and amount of these
costs depend, of course, on the particular situation and on the type of
sanctions imposed. Many costs stem from the indirect effects of sanc-
tions, such as the loss of sales by a supplier when the manufacturer is
prevented from making an export sale to a target country. Other costs
result from long-term changes in business patterns, which often occur
when the target country seeks to minimize the financial effects of future
sanctions.
These myriad domestic costs are rarely calculated in any detail or
with much reliability. Cost calculations might not be important to U.S.
policymakers, particularly when the United States is imposing sanctions
against a country with a much smaller economy, like Nicaragua. More-
over, there may be considerable incentives for the government not to cal-
culate domestic costs. Careful estimates might highlight those costs and
exacerbate political problems with domestic constituencies hurt by the
sanctions.
Despite the complexities, a few general observations about U.S.
costs are worth mentioning. First, terminating or reducing bilateral pro-
grams, such as foreign assistance, can initially save money. Such meas-
ures may, however, involve indirect costs, as in lost sales for U.S.
67. G. HUFBAUER & J. ScHorr, supra note 13, at 89. This conclusion was for all the study's
103 cases. It also appears to apply equally well to the 62 cases of U.S. economic sanctions since
1945.
This study regrettably lumped into the general catch-all phrase of "financial controls" three of
this Article's categories of sanctions-U.S. government programs, private financial transactions, and
international financial institutions. As detailed below, the U.S. laws for these three categories vary
greatly. The study's approach reflects the fact that it did not examine U.S. laws.
1180 [Vol. 75:1159
1987] INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
companies. Foreign recipients of U.S. programs often spend much of
their aid on U.S. goods and services, sometimes because U.S. laws
require them to do so.68
Second, restrictions on imports and private financial transactions
often cost less than export controls, though all these sanctions have
domestic costs. Export sanctions directly cause lost sales and lost jobs.
The immediate impact might be reduced by finding other customers, but
complete substitutability is not assured, and such alternative sales would
presumably be on less favorable terms (or they would have occurred
before the controls were imposed). Export restrictions also create long-
term problems for U.S. sales abroad, as they jeopardize the reputation of
U.S. businesses as reliable suppliers.69
Import controls generally involve smaller costs. Since new foreign
policy sanctions are usually applied against only one country or a few
countries, alternative foreign suppliers frequently exist. As a result, the
U.S. purchaser does not have to do without a good, but faces only the
68. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2354 (1982). "The truth is that 70% of the money appropriated for
bilateral foreign assistance is spent in the United States, not abroad." Address by Under-Secretary
of State Michael H. Armacost, Regional Foreign Policy Conference, in Kansas City (Sept. 11, 1985),
reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1985, at 56.
69. For example, the U.S. agricultural embargo against the Soviet Union in 1980 hurt the
future export sales of U.S. farmers. A careful study concluded that the U.S. share of the world
market for grains and soybean products declined, as consuming countries expanded their sources of
supply and U.S. competitors expanded their production. In particular, the U.S. share of the Soviet
imports of grain declined sharply from 74% in 1978-79 to 19% in 1982-83. The Soviets not only
increased imports from Canada, Argentina, and Brazil, but entered into new five-year agreements
with each country. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1461, U.S. EMBARGOES ON AGRICULTURAL
EXPORTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY AND U.S. EXPORTS (Dec. 1983); see
also SUBCOMM. ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
97TH CONG., 1ST SESs., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
TRADE DIPLOMACY IN THE 1980s at 47-52 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter HOUSE AFGHANISTAN
REPORT]. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, EMBARGOES, SURPLUS DISPOSAL, AND U.S.
AGRICULTURE (1986) (extensive study of impact of embargoes).
Since U.S. farmers rely heavily on exports, the decline in their overseas market has contributed
to the present plight of U.S. agriculture. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra, at viii-xi; see BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 67 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS S-17 (Sept.
1987); 66 id. at S-17 (May 1986) (indicating that U.S. exports of agricultural products declined from
$37.8 billion in 1984 to $29.2 billion in 1985 to $26.1 billion in 1986).
In another dramatic example, the Caterpillar Tractor Company lost sales and markets as a
result of the on-again, off-again restrictions on sales of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union. In
1978, the company had 85% of the Soviet market for pipelayers, tractors, and special hoists for
laying pipelines. Those sales helped Caterpillar dominate the world market. Its exports totalled
between $50 and $100 million per year. After the 1982 pipeline sanctions (see discussion infra text
accompanying notes 125-30), Caterpillar's share of the Soviet market dropped to 15% and the share
ofits principal competitor, Japan's Komatsu, rose to 85%. That business helped Komatsu challenge
Caterpillar in the world market. See 130 CONG. REC. S1712 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Danforth); see also HOUSE AFGHANISTAN REPORT, supra, at 72. Other factors also had an
impact, such as the then increasing value of the U.S. dollar.
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increased costs that must be paid to a higher-priced supplier.70 While
this increased cost might mean that the U.S. purchaser has to raise its
prices and thus lose some sales of its own product, the cost differences are
often so small that the resulting losses are marginal. 71
Moreover, the initial U.S. purchaser should be able to pass on much
of the added costs to its customers by raising its own prices.72 While
these customers will then bear some of the costs, their individual burden
will probably be a small share of the total domestic costs of import sanc-
tions, because the costs may be spread among many purchasers at differ-
ent levels of the distribution process. 73
A more indirect, but still potentially significant, cost of import con-
trols is the impact on the world trading system, and on GATT in particu-
lar. As discussed below,74 this is a problem, though steps can be taken to
minimize it.
Controls on private financial transactions also entail costs. The type
and amount hinge on the type of financial control involved-whether it
be on trade financing (for either exports or imports), on general exten-
sions of credit (such as large loans to a government), or on foreign depos-
its or other property in the possession of U.S. entities. Given the
complexity of financial controls, their potential costs can best be dis-
cussed below where alternative proposals to govern their use are
considered.75
Economic sanctions, then, are often effective. And, controls on
imports and private financial transactions might in some cases be more
70. Some U.S. suppliers would benefit from those import controls that lead U.S. purchasers to
switch to domestic suppliers.
71. For example, the restrictions on U.S. imports of Libyan oil in 1982 and of Iranian oil in
1979 had only minimal impact on the supplies or price of oil in the United States. See U.S. Import
Weekly (BNA) 576 (March 17, 1982); Id. at 509 (March 3, 1982) (both on Libya); see also N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1979, at D1, col. 4; id., Nov. 16, 1979, at A17, col. 5; id., Nov. 13, 1979, at Al, col.
6 (all on Iran). And the 1983 reduction of the Nicaraguan sugar quota was easily offset by increased
imports from other countries at no increased price to U.S. consumers, because the United States
imports sugar at preferential prices above the world market price. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1983, at
A12, col. 3.
72. This is especially so if the purchaser's competitors also have to turn to higher-priced
sources of supply.
73. This is not to say that import controls are never costly to domestic consumers. They
sometimes are, especially if the controls are on important items. For example, the so-called
"voluntary restraints" by the Japanese on automobiles shipped to the United States limited imports
to 2.3 million cars per year from 1985 through March 1989. See 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 139 (Feb.
3, 1988). A study by Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution estimated that the restraints cost
the American consumer $26.6 billion in 1985, adding $2,500 to the price of a Japanese car and
$1,000 to a U.S. car. Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1986, at 1, col. 1. American manufacturers obviously
benefitted through larger sales and higher prices.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 192-206.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 207-28. For a more extensive discussion of the costs of
such sanctions to the sender country, see, for example, G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOrr, supra note 13, at
64-69; D. LOSMAN, supra note 7, at 7-19.
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effective than export controls, and impose fewer costs on the United
States. Yet, as the following sections demonstrate, the present U.S. legal
system is decidedly not structured to facilitate the President's use of these
various types of sanctions according to their relative effectiveness and
cost. Rather, the existing laws either skew the President's choice of sanc-
tions or encourage him to declare a dubious national emergency.
III
THE NONEMERGENCY LAWS
In the absence of a national emergency, a wide variety of U.S. laws
authorize or require the President to impose economic sanctions for for-
eign policy reasons. As noted earlier, the laws governing sanctions can
be divided into five categories. These are limits on: (1) U.S. government
programs, such as foreign assistance and landing rights; (2) exports from
the United States; (3) imports; (4) private financial transactions; and (5)
international financial institutions.
The order of these categories roughly reflects the relative degree of
authority the President has to impose such sanctions under present U.S.
law. Generally, he has the most control over the government's own pro-
grams, and he has broad discretion to cut off almost all exports. It is
much more difficult, however, for the President to limit imports. Also,
the U.S. government usually has little legal control over the foreign lend-
ing decisions of private U.S. banks, and even less control over interna-
tional financial institutions.
The following analysis of the U.S. laws governing each type of sanc-
tion illustrates the haphazard nature of the present legal regime. Reform
is possible, however, as indicated by passage of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986.76 With its wide range of sanctions against South
Africa, the Act demonstrates the possibility of creating a comprehensive
statutory framework. The Act, however, is geographically limited to
South Africa, provides very little discretion to the President, and
required years of efforts in Congress and well-publicized events in South
Africa to become law.77
Turning to other nonemergency laws for imposing economic sanc-
tions, the differences in the President's authority to impose sanctions are
striking. (See Figure 2 on page 1184.)
A. Bilateral Government Programs
A wide variety of U.S. government programs can be used as bases
76. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5001-5116 (West Supp.
1987)).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 254-71.
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FIGURE 2
PRESENT U.S. LAWS
Presidential Discretion in Absence
of a National Emergency
Bilateral
Government
Programs
Exports Imports Private
Financial
Transactions
International
Financial
Institutions
This chart attempts, in a roughhewn way, to summarize and highlight visually the
variations in the President's authority. Each column represents one type of activity.
- The enclosed area of each column represents all of the possible transactions for that
activity. For example, column 2 represents all U.S. exports and column 3 represents all
U.S. imports.
- The shaded area in each column represents a crude estimate of the percentage of the
dollar value that the President has discretion to terminate or otherwise limit. For example,
given the President's great discretion over exports, almost all of column 2 is shaded. In
contrast, very little of the import column is shaded because of the President's sparse
authority.
It should be emphasized that this chart is meant to be a rough, visual approximation of
the President's authority. Column 1, for example, includes a wide variety of government
programs and assigning values to them is very imprecise.
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for economic sanctions serving foreign policy purposes. The principal
programs include: bilateral foreign assistance, low-interest credit, loan
guaranties, special insurance programs, fishing rights, port access, air-
craft landing rights, and passports.
78
The United States has often restricted more than one of these gov-
ernment programs in a sanctions episode.79 It has also frequently com-
bined limitations on bilateral programs with other types of sanctions,
such as controls on exports or imports.
The President usually has nearly unfettered discretion to terminate
or curtail government programs. Present statutes authorize him, for for-
eign policy reasons, to deny access to the large programs providing low-
interest credit, loan guaranties, and special insurance.8"
The President also has essentially open-ended discretion to restrict
or eliminate a foreign country's fishing rights in U.S. waters,81 or its
access to U.S. ports.8 2 Similarly, the President has broad authority to
suspend or cut back on the rights of foreign airlines to land in the United
States, and even to suspend the right of any airline that flies in the United
States to use a particular foreign airport.83 The President can also
78. This potpourri of programs all depends on U.S. government funding, or at least requires
some critical government approval. Conceivably, some of these programs, such as travel advisories
and passports, could be put in the miscellaneous category discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 244-72. How these programs are categorized, however, is not decisive for any of
the general conclusions of this Article, which focus on exports, imports, and private financial
transactions.
79. For example, the United States cut off foreign aid and low-interest credit to Allende's Chile
in 1970-73, and curtailed Soviet fishing and landing rights after the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.
See G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 13, at 439-44 (Chile), 655-65 (Soviet Union).
80. The principal agencies for these programs are the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
The President appoints the top officials in these agencies, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and they serve at his pleasure. 12 U.S.C. § 635a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Eximbank); 15 U.S.C.
§ 714g(a) (1982) (CCC); 22 U.S.C. § 2193 (1982) (OPIC). Moreover, the President has broad
discretion, through his appointees, to curtail these programs. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(B)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Eximbank), 15 U.S.C. §§ 714-714p (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 7 C.F.R.
§ 1493.3(b) (1987) (CCC), and 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1982) (OPIC). U.S. statutes impose a few specific
limitations on the activities of Eximbank and OPIC for foreign policy reasons, but none is major.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 635, 635e (Eximbank).
The Eximbank has recently undergone major reforms, but these do not change the President's
discretion. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 331 (Mar. 11, 1987).
81. See The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1882 (1982). Note especially the so-called "basket clause" at section 1821(e)(l)(E)(viii),
which generally allows the Secretary of State to determine a foreign state's fishing allocation based
upon "such other matters as the Secretary of State ... deems appropriate." The United States may
regulate within a 200-mile "fishery conservation zone" established by section 1811. This is
consistent with the 200-mile exclusive economic zone provided for in Part V of the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, although the United States is not a party to the Convention. See 17 U.N.
CLOS III GAOR at 164, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 52/122 (1984).
82. See 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1982).
83. The Secretary of Transportation, a presidential appointee, can amend or cancel foreign air
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attempt to limit travel by using his broad discretion to impose geographic
restrictions on the use of U.S. passports.84
U.S. bilateral foreign assistance programs have long been used as
foreign policy tools, besides serving humanitarian purposes. Increases in
economic and military assistance may serve as the proverbial carrot, and
reductions or cutbacks as the stick. Assistance may be used as a sanction
in two ways. First, aid to a specific country may simply be cut off or
reduced. Or, the legislation itself may include policy prohibitions that
terminate aid if certain events occur, such as when a country harbors
international terrorists or expropriates U.S. property.
The President's discretion to use these government programs as
sanctions has been most limited in the area of bilateral foreign assistance
(both economic and military), but even here his discretion is consider-
able. Congress can theoretically thwart the President's efforts to invoke
sanctions by opposing his decision not to spend authorized funds, or by
carrier permits "whenever [he] finds such action to be in the public interest." 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1372(f)(1), 1461(a) (1982) as modified by 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(b) (Supp. III 1985). Special
statutory provisions give the President additional powers if a foreign country harbors hijackers or
fails to take adequate security measures at one of its airports. Most wide-reaching is the President's
authority to prohibit all air carriers from providing service between the United States and any other
foreign airport which is even indirectly served by aircraft using another airport which the Secretary
of Transportation has determined lacks adequate security. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1515(e)(2)(D) (Supp. III
1985).
The President can also have the Secretary of State issue a "travel advisory," warning travelers
about a dangerous foreign airport. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1515a (Supp. III 1985).
The United States often has bilateral executive agreements with countries regarding fishing
rights, port access, or air service. These agreements, however, do not hamstring presidential
authority because Executive Branch officials negotiate the agreements, and the President has the
power to terminate or suspend the agreements on behalf of the United States if he deems it
necessary. See, e.g., Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 374, 379-84 (1982) (discussing the Reagan administration's suspension of
an executive agreement regarding Polish airline privileges in the United States due to the Polish
government's handling of the Solidarity movement); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 339(b) (to be published April 1988).
84. While the law now prohibits these restrictions in general, it allows major exceptions for
"war. . . . armed hostilities ... or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the
physical safety of United States travellers." 22 U.S.C. § 21 la (1982). Cf Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 300-01 (1981) (upholding the Secretary of State's authority to revoke individual passports for
national security reasons and citing failure of Congress in 1978 amendments to restrict that
authority as indicating congressional approval); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding a
restriction against travel to Cuba under a 1926 statute, amended in 1978 by section 21 Ia). The
Reagan administration invoked section 211a in 1981 to restrict the use of passports for travel to
Libya. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,712 (1981), renewed, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,876 (1987). Similarly, the use of
passports for travel to Lebanon was restricted in February 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 3730 (1987).
The practical impact of such passport restrictions is marginal, however, since a U.S. citizen can
easily circumvent them. If an off-limits country is amenable, a U.S. citizen can still enter that
country without a passport. Americans regularly traveled in this way to Libya after 1981 and before
the financial controls under IEEPA. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at A8, col. 1. More effective are
financial controls on travel expenditures, such as those the President has imposed under IEEPA. See
hifra text accompanying notes 272-336.
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authorizing new funds that he does not want. Political realities make
this congressional opposition unlikely, however, since the President is
presumably proposing sanctions because the target country has done
something objectionable to U.S. interests. Congress would be under con-
siderable political pressure not to appear to support some foreign country
over the President.
Congress can also seek to impose its own aid sanctions by resisting
the President's aid requests, but it has rarely done so in recent years.8 6
Moreover, experience indicates that it is difficult in practice for Congress
to limit effectively the President's discretion by including policy prohibi-
tions.87  In fact, the recent trend had been toward giving the President
85. In these two situations, the President would have to decide whether to try to rescind or
defer the authorization. In doing so, he must consider the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in scattered sections of 1, 2 and 31
U.S.C.). The Act imposes major restraints on the President's authority to impound authorized
funds. The President may not rescind these funds unless Congress expressly approves the rescission.
2 U.S.C. § 683(b) (1982).
Whether the President can defer expenditures is a more difficult question at present. While the
President may defer expenditures to meet contingencies or to achieve greater efficiency in the
administration of programs under 31 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982), the Chief Executive may not use this
deferral authority to impose his own policy preferences. 31 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (1982) (amending
the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970)). See City of New Haven v. United States,
809 F.2d 900, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (distinguishing between policy and programmatic deferrals). See
generally Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part IL Judicial and Legislative Responses,
63 GEO. L.J. 149, 180 (1974) (and sources cited there) (deferrals to meet economic and policy
objectives are an abuse of impoundment authority, according to Congress).
A separate provision of the 1974 Act allowed policy deferrals subject to the legislative veto by
either house of Congress. 2 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1982); 31 U.S.C. § 1513 (1982). However, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the legislative veto was void in light of Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). City of New Haven, 809 F.2d at 905. It then
concluded that the veto provision could not be severed from the deferral mechanism because
Congress would not have given the President such unchecked deferral powers. Id. at 909. Although
the mechanism for policy deferrals was therefore held invalid, the court expressly indicated that
programmatic deferrals under 31 U.S.C. § 1512 were not affected by its ruling. Id.
86. In 1975-78, over the objections of President Ford, Congress did cut off most military
assistance to Turkey because of its invasion of Cyprus. T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN
POLICY BY CONGRESS 34-35 (1979).
More recently, however, Congress has often backtracked. For example, Congress voted to
repeal its 1976 Clark Amendment, which prohibited assistance to anti-government groups in
Angola. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83,
§ 811, 99 Stat. 190, 264 (1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2293 (Supp. III 1985)). Nicaragua is the
most-publicized recent example of congressional foot-dragging. Nevertheless, after limiting the
President in 1985 to $27 million in humanitarian assistance for the contras, id. § 722, 99 Stat. at 249,
Congress then appropriated $100 million in 1986 and attached fewer conditions. Act of Oct. 30,
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591; see Madison, Triumph and Challenge, 18 NAT'L J., 2492-93 (1986). For
an example of recent certifications under the statute, see 52 Fed. Reg. 9107 (1987) (further assistance
to Nicaraguan resistance). Recent disclosures, however, about funding the contras out of profits
from arms sales to Iran could well cause Congress to resurrect the ban on, or at least impose stricter
limits on, further U.S. assistance to the contras. See Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
87. For example, in 1981-83, the President was able to make several certifications about
progress in El Salvador on human rights, land reform, and other matters based on questionable facts.
See International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 728, 95
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greater discretion over U.S. foreign assistance. 88
While Congress has generally refrained from directly challenging
the President's authority over U.S. government programs, Congress has
not ceded all the influence in foreign affairs that it gained during the era
of Vietnam and Watergate. (It is still too early to tell whether the con-
gressional and public outcry against the Reagan Administration's sale of
arms to Iran and diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan contras will gener-
ally halt or even reverse the recent trend of greater discretion to the Pres-
ident.) For example, Congress continues to add detailed reporting
requirements to foreign assistance,89 and it occasionally seeks to limit
just how the funds will be used.9" Moreover, Congress has sometimes
pursued its own foreign policy initiatives, approving assistance9' or
Stat. 1519, 1555-57 (1981) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); Christopher,
Ceasefire Between the Branches: A Compact in Foreign Affairs, 60 FOREGN AFF. 989, 1002 (1982);
cf Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987) (challenge to President's "pocket veto" of new bill
conditioning continuance of military aid to El Salvador on semiannual certification held moot since
bill had expired by its own terms). Also, there have only been limited complaints about President
Reagan ignoring human rights provisions in foreign assistance laws. For military assistance and
arms sales, the key human rights provision is 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982).
88. See paragraphs two and three of note 86. Also, Congress has authorized the President to
furnish up to $50 million in foreign assistance to a country, without regard to the aid laws, if he
determines "that to do so is important to the security interests of the United States" and if he
consults in advance with appropriate congressional committees. 22 U.S.C. § 2364 (1982 & Supp. III
1985). The ceiling is higher if the "country is a victim of active Communist or Communist-
supported aggression." Id.
While Congress did include some policy-based restrictions on the President's discretion to grant
aid in recent foreign assistance legislation, such as restrictions on his authority to grant aid to
countries supporting terrorism, or ones posing a threat of nuclear proliferation, the provisions leave
the President significant latitude to evade the restrictions. See, eg., International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, § 503 (prohibiting aid to countries supporting international
terrorism as determined by the President, and allowing him to waive restrictions for national security
or humanitarian reasons), § 902 (prohibiting aid to Pakistan unless the President certifies that
Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon and that the proposed aid will significantly reduce the
threat that it will acquire one). On Pakistan, see Oberdorfer, US. Aid to Pakistan Ends as Waiver of
Nuclear Laws Expires, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1987, at A23, col 1.
Congress added even more discretion in the continuing resolution for fiscal year 1987, which
empowered the President not to spend the appropriated funds for a country if he finds that it "is
engaged in a consistent pattern of opposition to the foreign policy of the United States." Act of Oct.
30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, §§ 101(f), 528 (b), 100 Stat. 334.
89. One example is the provision regarding assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean.
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, § 709; see also id. § 702(c)-(d) (El
Salvador).
90. For example, in the massive continuing resolution that Congress passed and the President
signed in December 1987 for fiscal year 1988, Congress cut off most foreign assistance to Haiti unless
certain democratic processes were followed there. It also conditioned most assistance to Panama
upon a certification by the U.S. President that, inter alia, there was progress toward civilian control
of that government and that due process of law was being restored. Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1988, Pub]. L. No. 100-202, § 569 (Haiti),
§ 570 (Panama) (Dec. 11, 1987) (enacted language can be found in 133 CONG. REC. H12,431,
H12,444 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987)) [hereinafter 1988 Appropriations Act).
91. For example, it took the initiative on humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan
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enacting sanctions92 that the President has not requested. Nevertheless,
these congressional steps do not seriously constrain the President's exten-
sive discretion to use U.S. government programs to impose economic
sanctions.
B. Exports from the United States
The President's power over government programs is almost
matched by his broad authority over exports. Congress initially contin-
ued into peacetime the President's World War II authority to impose
controls.93 While there has since been some whittling away of the Presi-
dent's discretion, he still has sweeping powers to cut off almost all U.S.
exports, or any segment of them.
The Export Administration Act provides the principal statutory
framework for controlling U.S. exports of goods, which totalled about
$253 billion in 1987. 91 Also relevant for certain exports are the Atomic
Energy Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Through use of these statutes, the United
States has shown itself to be the country most willing to resort to export
controls as an economic sanction, rather than relying on import controls
or limits on private credit.95
1. The Export Administration Act
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) 96 does not establish
a right to export. 9 7 On the contrary, the EAA prohibits, with few excep-
tions, all exports from the United States unless they are licensed by the
Department of Commerce.9"
and Cambodia. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, §§ 904-05, 99
Stat. at 268.
92. Congress mandated, for instance, the recent cutoff of air service between the United States
and South Africa. See infra text accompanying note 257.
93. See Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 791, 791-92 (1967) (a classic article on export controls).
94. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 198 (Feb. 17, 1988) (citing U.S. Dept. of Commerce statistics).
95. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 13, at 59-60; see also id. at 70-77.
96. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
97. This is recognized in the EAA's legislative history. S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
3-4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1147, 1150; see Murphy & Downey,
National Security, Foreign Policy and Individual Rights: The Quandary of United States Export
Controls, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 791, 823 (1981); cf. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493
(1904) (upholding an import statute, noting that "no individual has a right to trade with foreign
nations").
98. For a detailed review of the EAA statutory scheme, see Abbott, supra note 13, at 745-56;
Murphy & Downey, supra note 97, at 823-26.
The principal exceptions to the statute are: (1) most exports to Canada for consumption there;
(2) certain exports to the U.S. armed forces; and (3) exports regulated by another U.S. agency,
including defense articles under the authority of the Arms Control Export Act. See 15 C.F.R.
§§ 370.3(a), 370.10 (1987).
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The licensing requirement is not burdensome for most exports,
which can be shipped under "general licenses." 99 The Executive Branch
can decide, however, that greater control is appropriate over certain
exports pursuant to the statutory grounds of national security, foreign
policy, or short supply." In this case, the Executive Branch will issue
regulations requiring the specific prior approval of the Department of
Commerce, such approval generally known as a "validated license."''
If Commerce denies an application for a validated license, the
exporter's right to administrative and judicial review is sharply lim-
ited.10 2  Moreover, an exporter who ships goods without the required
license is subject to a wide range of penalties-including civil fines, forfei-
ture, denial of future privileges to export or import, and felony criminal
charges.'
0 3
Since World War II, Congress has changed the export laws on sev-
eral occasions, partly in response to changing perceptions about the
Soviet threat, the U.S. need to export, and the President's specific uses of
his statutory authority. The EAA divided national security and foreign
policy controls into two categories, established different consultation and
reporting requirements for them, and implicitly encouraged the President
99. These Department of Commerce licenses allow the export of specified goods and
technology to certain destinations without any special authorization. 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.1-.22 (1987).
100. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (1982) provides:
It is the policy of the United States to use export controls only after full consideration of
the impact on the economy of the United States and only to the extent necessary-
(A) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant
contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries
which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States;
(B) to restrict the export of goods and technology where necessary to further significantly
the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations; and
(C) to restrict the export of goods where necessary to protect the domestic economy from
the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of
foreign demand.
As noted above, this Article includes both the statutory grounds of national security and foreign
policy within its broad definition of foreign policy. The short supply controls are generally not
invoked for foreign policy purposes.
101. 15 C.F.R. §§ 372.1-.13 (1987).
102. The denied applicant may appeal certain issues to an administrative law judge and may
request a hearing. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(e) (Supp. III 1985). The applicant is generally not
accorded the protections of the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. § 2412(a); cf 15 C.F.R. § 389
(1987) (sets forth procedures whereby any person directly and adversely affected by an action taken
under EAA may appeal). The judge's determination is reviewable by the Secretary of Commerce,
whose decision is "final and is not subject to judicial review." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(e) (Supp. III
1985). The applicant might try a judicial challenge to a denial on grounds that the agency's action is
ultra vires or otherwise somehow not appropriate under the EAA. See discussion of the Dresser
litigation, infra note 129 and accompanying text.
103. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The EAA, as amended in 1985, allows the
use of import sanctions against any person who violates any national security export control. 19
U.S.C. § 1864(a) (Supp. III 1985). Given the availability of many other serious penalties, the use of
import sanctions might well be rare. But this new provision opens a tiny window for greater use of
import controls for national security reasons.
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to choose between the two categories. 104
The effectiveness of these provisions was called into question when
President Carter imposed an agricultural embargo against the Soviet
Union in 1980. The President cited as justification both national security
and foreign policy.'05 This dual justification was contrary to the clear
purpose of the EAA, which distinguished between the two grounds.
Moreover, the national security basis for limiting all agricultural exports,
including chickens and truffles, seemed somewhat strained.1
0 6
President Carter's decision to impose the grain embargo, which was
very unpopular with U.S. farmers, prompted Congress to pass some of
the most important of the present limitations on the President's authority
to restrict exports. The first such limitation was a 1981 provision requir-
ing farmers to be compensated at a generous rate in the event of another
agricultural embargo against a major foreign purchaser.107 A 1982 law
then provided that the President cannot curtail the export of any agricul-
tural product under an existing sales contract that requires delivery
within 270 days of the embargo's start, absent declaration of a national
emergency.'08
When the EAA lapsed in 1983, Congress was deadlocked for two
years before passing the Export Administration Amendments Act of
1985 (1985 EAAA).'0 9 While it essentially extends the EAA, the 1985
law imposes additional limitations on the President's power. The most
important of these, as discussed below, are the time limit on agricultural
embargoes, the tougher steps for imposing foreign policy controls, and
the new provision on "contract sanctity."
a. Agricultural Embargoes
Under the 1985 EAAA, the President may not impose export con-
104. See supra note 100 (presenting the text of the statute); articles cited supra note 98
(discussing the legislative history of the act).
105. President's Message on Shipments of Agricultural Commodities to the Soviet Union, 16
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 32 (Jan. 7, 1980).
106. It is unlikely that chickens and truffles "would make a significant contribution to the
military potential" of the Soviet Union. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (1982). The basic criterion for
foreign policy controls is whether they could be used "to restrict the export of goods and technology
where necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its
declared international obligations." Id. § 2402(2)(B). Indeed, the Carter administration's own
elaborations mainly rested on foreign policy grounds. See Murphy & Downey, supra note 97, at 818.
107. Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, 7 U.S.C. § 1736j (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Farmers
would be paid the amount necessary to achieve 100% of parity, usually a very attractive price.
108. Futures Trading Act of 1982, 7 U.S.C. § 612c-3 (1982).
109. Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985) (codified in scattered sections, primarily at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1985)). During the deadlock, the EAA was extended at
different times by joint resolutions and the EAA regulations were kept in effect by President Reagan
declaring national emergencies and invoking IEEPA. See Harris & Bialos, Congressional Balancing
Act Benefits Exporters, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 1985, at 17.
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trols on any agricultural commodity for more than sixty days, unless
Congress enacts a joint resolution authorizing the action.11 The provi-
sion does not apply, however, when the agricultural controls "are
imposed with respect to a country as part of the prohibition or curtail-
ment of all exports to that country." 11' Congress apparently was trying
to protect farm interests from being singled out as a tool for embargoes,
while also protecting the President's discretion to impose a more compre-
hensive embargo.
b. Foreign Policy Controls
The 1985 EAAA also tightens up the steps that the President must
take before using foreign policy controls. This change reflects concerns
that export controls were invoked too frequently, were often ineffective,
and created unnecessary burdens on exporters. 1 2 Among the changes,
the Act imposes stricter criteria on the President's exercise of discre-
tion.1 3 More importantly, the Act requires the President to consult with
Congress and submit a detailed report before imposing the foreign policy
controls.' This is in contrast to the 1979 provisions requiring consulta-
tion "in every possible instance" and a less detailed report only after
imposing controls.'" 5
It remains to be seen whether mandatory consultation and reporting
provisions will significantly limit the President's discretion. The Execu-
tive Branch can still undermine the provisions' substantive impact by
undertaking consultation only after making its policy decisions.
c. Contract Sanctity
The "contract sanctity" provision" 6 was perhaps the most "strongly
110. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(g)(3)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Act prohibits the use of
national security controls for agricultural products. Id. § 2404(q). Imposition of foreign policy or
short supply controls over agricultural products requires congressional approval after 60 days, Id.
§ 2406(g)(3)(A)-(B).
111. Id. § 2406(g)(3)(B)(ii).
112. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983).
113. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This subsection requires the President to
determine, among other considerations, that: (1) the "controls are likely to achieve the intended
foreign policy purpose"; (2) "the reaction of other countries to the ... controls is not likely to
render the controls ineffective"; and (3) "the United States has the ability to enforce the proposed
controls effectively." Id.
The criteria in the 1979 EAA were phrased in a considerably more tentative way. For example,
the President was to consider "the probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign
policy purpose," rather than the current requirement that the controls "are likely to achieve" the
purpose.
114. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(f) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
115. See H.R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEWS 108, 119.
116. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(m) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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contested" 1 17 section of the 1985 EAAA. This provision allows the Pres-
ident to impose export controls that abrogate existing contracts. Con-
tract sanctity became a widespread issue when preexisting contracts were
overridden by the 1980 agricultural embargo and President Reagan's
1982 pipeline sanctions.
The compromise language adopted in the 1985 EAA prohibits the
President from imposing foreign policy controls on the export or re-
export of goods or technology under existing contracts or validated
licenses, unless the President determines and certifies to Congress that:
(1) "a breach of the peace poses a serious and direct threat to the strate-
gic interest of the United States"; (2) "the prohibition or curtailment...
will be instrumental in remedying the situation posing the direct threat";
and (3) "the export controls will continue only so long as the direct
threat persists." 1
18
This provision requires a "cause and effect" relationship between the
proposed contract-breaking control and that control's remedial effect on
a situation that directly threatens U.S. strategic interests. The congres-
sional conferees judged "that this constraint significantly narrows, but
does not entirely eliminate, the authority of the President to impose con-
trols on exports subject to" existing contracts." 19
While the concept of contract sanctity is new to export laws, this
particular provision is likely to have limited impact, especially if the
President is determined to circumvent it. First, it applies only to foreign
policy controls and not to national security controls. 120 Second, the cer-
tification requirement is worded so broadly that it could be interpreted to
leave the President ample room to abrogate contracts. In contrast to the
restrictive language of the conference report, other authoritative state-
ments call for a broad interpretation of the "breach of the peace"
exception.' 2'
The contract sanctity provision has yet to be tested. Nevertheless,
some commentators have concluded that "Congress has given the busi-
117. H.R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 108, 120.
118. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(m)(2)(A)-(C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
119. H.R. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 59, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 108, 120. In a separate statement, one of the provision's strongest supporters,
Senator John Heinz (R.-Pa.), declared that the provision would ban retroactive controls "except in
the most extreme circumstances." 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 856, 857 (July 3, 1985).
120. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). As demonstrated earlier with the
Soviet grain embargo, the President might invoke national security grounds even when
inappropriate.
121. Congressman Howard Berman (D.-Ca.), an author of this exception, would construe it
expansively to encompass a "violation or disturbance of the public tranquility and order." 130
CONG. REC. H12,167 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984); accord, 131 CONG. REC. S8926 (daily ed. June 27,
1985) (Sen. Proxmire (D.-Wis.) endorsing the Berman view).
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ness community a symbolic victory largely bereft of substance."'' 22
d. Extraterritoriality
The EAA affords the President considerable discretion to assert
extensive jurisdiction in imposing export controls on companies and
goods outside U.S. territory. In spite of recent controversy over the
extraterritorial use of these controls, drafters of the 1985 EAAA ignored
the matter, probably because the issues seem intractable.
The EAA authorizes the President to control the export of any
goods and technology "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or
exported by any person subject to... [U.S.] jurisdiction."' 123 Tradition-
ally, the United States has imposed controls on three categories of for-
eign exports: (1) reexports by a foreign company of goods or technology
of U.S. origin; (2) reexports of U.S.-origin parts even if included in for-
eign-made goods; and (3) exports of foreign-origin goods that are the
direct products of U.S.-origin technology.' 24 Although these controls are
extraterritorial, they have generally not been controversial because they
are limited in scope and were used for national security reasons.
In the 1982 pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union,' 25 President
Reagan announced two controls that went beyond any previous assertion
of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the EAA's foreign policy provi-
sions. 26 First, the controls prevented foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms
from exporting certain equipment and technology, even of wholly foreign
origin. Second, the controls restricted independent foreign companies
from exporting foreign-origin products that were made with technology
acquired through licensing agreements with U.S. companies. 27 For
example, these controls covered compressors built by Creusot-Loire, a
French company, under a licensing agreement with a U.S. company.' 28
The U.S. policy against the pipeline clashed with that of major
122. See, e.g., Harris & Bialos, supra note 109, at 19.
123. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). There is similar language in IEEPA.
This act gives the President authority with respect to "any person, or with respect to any property,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 50 U.S.C. app. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982).
124. 15 C.F.R. §§ 374.1, 376.12, 379.8 (1986). In March 1987, the Department of Commerce
clarified and eased the requirements for obtaining the needed U.S. authorization for shipping foreign
products with U.S.-origin content. 52 Fed. Reg. 9147 (1987).
125. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982). For a discussion of the history of and the complex reasons for
the control, see B. JENTLESON, PIPELINE POLITIcs: THE COMPLEX POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EAST-
WEST TRADE 172-214 (1986).
126. The extraterritorial use of IEEPA and its predecessor for national emergencies, the
Trading with the Enemy Act, have occasionally been controversial. See infra text accompanying
notes 281-92, 297.
127. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982); see Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign
Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1, 70 (1983).
128. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 127, at 70.
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European countries who were not opposed to its construction. Indeed,
some were contracting to buy gas from the pipeline, and many countries
were encouraging their companies to participate in the construction. 129
President Reagan rescinded the regulations because of this strong
allied opposition, pressures from the U.S. business community and Con-
gress, and the controls' ineffectiveness when European companies contin-
ued to perform under their contracts. 130  Possibly chastened by the
experience, the Reagan administration has not asserted such broad extra-
territorial jurisdiction since 1982, not even in the IEEPA controls against
Nicaragua, South Africa, and Libya. Nevertheless, the broad statutory
authority remains unchanged.
2. The Atomic Energy Act
Exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology are subject
to the extensive regulatory regime established by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954,131 as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
(NNPA). 132 The President's authority to stop these exports is essentially
unlimited, reflecting concern that such exports could facilitate the con-
struction of dangerous power plants abroad, or result in the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, thereby upsetting the military balance in many
regions. 133
129. See B. JENTLESON, supra note 125, at 183-97. The U.S. government initially persisted in
its policy and placed companies that did not comply with the U.S. orders on a "temporary denial"
list, which prohibited all U.S. exports to these companies. E.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 38,170 (1982), as
amended by 47 Fed. Reg. 39,708 (1982) (sanctions against Dresser). Dresser Industries and its
wholly-owned subsidiary, Dresser-France, attacked the export controls and the penalties against it in
the Commerce Department and the courts. Commerce denied Dresser's petition. 47 Fed. Reg.
51,463 (1982). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia twice denied Dresser's request
for a temporary restraining order. Dresser Industries v. Baldridge, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Nov. 4,
1982) (denying request for temporary restraining order); 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982). Before
the court could rule on the merits, President Reagan rescinded the regulations.
While no U.S. court ruled definitively on the extraterritorial reach of the controls, at least one
European court ruled against it. Compagnie Europeenne Des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland
B.V., Dist. Ct. at the Hague, Netherlands (Sept. 17, 1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983). The
court decided that Sensor, a Dutch subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, could not be excused from
performing a sales contract under Dutch law because of the U.S. export regulations. See also infra
note 297 (U.K. court rules against extraterritorial reach of IEPPA controls against Libya).
130. 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982); see Moyer & Mabry, supra note 127, at 71-73. In January
1987, the Reagan administration also ended other U.S. controls on the export of oil and gas
equipment to the Soviet Union which had been in existence since 1978. 52 Fed. Reg. 2500 (1987).
131. Atomic Energy Act, ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 921 (1954) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296
(1976) (prior to amendment by Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act).
132. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-242, § 2, 92 Stat. 120 (1978) (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (1979) and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982)). See generally Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(presenting a thorough discussion of the history and purposes of the NNPA).
133. A prospective exporter must apply to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for an
export license. The NRC is an independent commission responsible for a variety of nuclear licensing
and regulatory functions formerly handled by the Atomic Energy Commission. The NRC has five
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Very concerned with nonproliferation issues in the 1970's, Congress
attempted in the 1978 NNPA to impose some limitations on the Presi-
dent's authority to allow exports. (This can be viewed as an effort by
Congress to require the U.S. government to impose sanctions in certain
situations.) The statute added new criteria for the Executive Branch to
consider in export licensing decisions, with an emphasis on limiting
nuclear proliferation.
Probably the most important provision of the NNPA was its prohi-
bition on exports of nuclear fuel and reactors to nations that did not
accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards for those
exports. While the President could waive this prohibition in certain situ-
ations, Congress was able to override a waiver by passing a concurrent
resolution within sixty days. 134 Whatever the past importance of this
provision, the demise of the legislative veto 135 reduced congressional
influence over the presidential determination. Other strict criteria of the
NNPA remain, but they limit the President's authority to allow exports.
His ability to prevent exports remains sweeping.
3. The Arms Export Control Act
As with nuclear exports, the President has essentially unfettered
power to stop all arms exports under the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA). 136  The Act authorizes the President to "control the import
and the export of defense articles and defense services. 11 37 The AECA,
however, does impose some limits on the President's authority to allow
arms sales.
Congress restricts the President's authority to allow arms exports by
authorizing him to approve sales only under certain conditions. 138 How-
commissioners who are appointed for five-year terms by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(b) & (c) (1982). The NRC is prohibited from granting an export
license unless the Secretary of State notifies it that the proposed export "will not be inimical to the
common defense and security." Id. § 2155(a)(1). In the legislative history and in actual practice,
this phrase has been generally understood to give the President broad discretion. See, e.g.. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 647 F.2d at 1364.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2158 (1982).
135. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See hfra text
accompanying notes 138-41, 317-20.
136. Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976) (codified in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C. (1982)). See generally A. PIERRE, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF ARMS SALES
(1982) (an excellent study of the world's arms trade).
137. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982). The President is authorized to designate those items that shall be
considered defense articles and defense services. These items constitute what is called the Munitions
List. Id.
138. The principal conditions are: (1) the recipient country agrees not to transfer the arms to a
third country without prior U.S. approval; and (2) the recipient country agrees to maintain the
security of the arms. Id. § 2753. There are also limits on the sale of arms to any government
designated as supporting terrorists. See infra text accompanying notes 143-44. In December 1987,
Congress added a special restriction on the sale of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to any country in the
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ever, legislative veto provisions gave Congress its only real tool to enforce
these conditions. 13 9 Since legislative vetoes have been held unconstitu-
tional, these AECA provisions are now interpreted as "report and wait"
requirements-if Congress does not forbid the export by passing a new
law within thirty days, the license may be issued. This approach now
applies to exports of defense articles or services of more than $50 million,
and exports of "significant" military equipment in excess of $14
million. 14
While this waiting period does leave Congress the power to respond
to proposed arms exports, it also "ups the ante." Rather than being able
to stop a sale with a majority vote of both houses on a concurrent resolu-
tion (which cannot be vetoed), Congress needs a two-thirds vote to over-
ride the likely presidential veto of the joint resolution. This process is
obviously more difficult for Congress, but not impossible.14 1
The highly controversial arms sales to Iran in 1985 and 1986 stand
as a fascinating example of the possible impact of the AECA. Since the
Secretary of State has designated Iran as a country supporting terror-
ism,'42 the Act requires that the President first find that the sale is neces-
sary for national security, and then report this finding to the Speaker of
the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 143 A 1986
amendment to the AECA, effective August 1986, similarly prohibits the
Persian Gulf region, except to Bahrain if the President makes a special certification. 1988
Appropriations Act, supra note 90, § 573.
139. The veto provisions required the President to report proposed sales or transfers of defense
equipment or defense services above certain dollar amounts, which Congress could block if it
promptly passed a concurrent resolution disapproving the transfer. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2776(b)(1),
(c)(2)(B), 2753(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1987).
140. 22 C.F.R. § 123. 10(e) (1986). Serious questions have been raised about whether the invalid
legislative veto provision is severable from the rest of the AECA. See, e.g., Franck & Bob, The
Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law After the Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912,
931 n.127 (1985). Nevertheless, both the Executive Branch and Congress are proceeding as if the
rest of the Act is still valid. Cf Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987) (legislative veto
provision of Airline Deregulation Act held severable).
141. For example, in early 1986, after the Reagan administration informed Congress of a
proposed $1.5 billion arms sale to Jordan, congressional leaders told the White House that Congress
would have the necessary two-thirds vote to oppose the sale in both houses. The President
postponed the sale indefinitely. Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 1986, at A14, col. 1. Later in 1986, when the
administration proposed to sell $354 million worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, a two-thirds majority
proved more difficult to muster. After the House and Senate initially passed a joint resolution
opposing the sale by margins of more than two-thirds, the President vetoed it. The House then voted
to override the veto, but the Senate fell short by a single vote. The sale went through. N.Y. Times,
June 6, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
In another recent case, the Reagan administration withdrew the proposed sale of 1600 Maverick
air-to-ground missiles to Saudi Arabia after 67 senators sponsored a resolution disapproving the sale.
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1987, at Al, col. 3; see Wash. Post, June 15, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
142. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d)(1) (1987).
143. 22 U.S.C. § 2753(f)(2) (Supp. III 1985). As discussed supra text accompanying note 140,
the President would also be required to report under the normal reporting provisions if the exports
were of "significant" military equipment in excess of $14 million.
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export of arms to a country designated as supporting terrorism unless the
President waives this prohibition for U.S. national interests and "submits
to the Congress a report justifying that determination and describing the
proposed export." '144 The Reagan administration, however, failed to
notify Congress of these arms sales until November 1986, after reports of
the sales appeared in the press. This secretiveness seems to violate the
reporting requirements of the AECA and possibly other export laws. 4 5
Apparently the administration believed that the sales could be justi-
fied as part of a covert intelligence activity, and thus be exempt from the
export laws. 146 Yet, the key reporting statute for intelligence activities,
section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, requires in subsection
(a) that certain members of Congress be kept "fully and currently
informed of all intelligence activities." 47 If for some reason the required
report were not given in advance, then subsection (b) directs that the
"President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely fash-
ion."' 48 Given the Reagan administration's nondisclosure to Congress
144. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 509,
100 Stat. 853, 874 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2780 (Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter 1986 Omnibus Act].
145. Besides the AECA, the Export Administration Act requires the Executive Branch to notify
certain congressional committees "at least 30 days before any license is approved for the export of
goods or technology" above a designated amount to any country which the Secretary of State has
determined supports international terrorism. 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050) (Supp. III 1985). From 1985
through August 27, 1986, the minimum amount was $7 million. This was lowered to $1 million in
August 1986 by the 1986 Omnibus Act, supra note 144, § 509(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 24050)(1) (Supp. 1987)).
The U.S. government reportedly was involved in one arms sale to Iran in October-November
1986. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD 111-19 (1987) [hereinafter TOWER
COMMISSION REPORT]. The 500 TOW antitank missiles were worth more than $1 million, but there
was no prior notification to Congress. Id. However, the applicability of the EAA to the Iranian
arms sales might be questioned on the ground that a sale by the U.S. government does not require an
export license.
146. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
AND SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN
OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 418 [hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA
REPORT]; see also TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at B-57 to B-67.
147. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1982). See also 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982) (funds expended by or on
behalf of the CIA in foreign countries considered a "significant anticipated intelligence activity"
under 50 U.S.C. § 413).
148. 50 U.S.C. § 413 (b). The Senate report accompanying the 1980 amendments to the
reporting requirements said about subsection (b):
The Senate Select Committee and the Executive branch and the intelligence agencies have
come to an understanding that in rare extraordinary circumstances if the President
withholds prior notice of covert operations, he is obliged to inform the two oversight
committees in a timely fashion of the action and the reasons for withholding of such prior
notice.
S. REP. No. 730, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980). What constituted a "rare extraordinary circum-
stance" was not defined. The House and Senate committees investigating the Iran-Contra affair con-
cluded that the congressional notification provisions of the National Security Act were abused by the
President's delay in notifying Congress. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 146, at 415-16. But see
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more than fourteen months from the start of the operation, it seems clear
that the administration also failed to adhere to these reporting
requirements.
Instead, President Reagan made a "finding" in January 1986. Not-
ing that the arms sales to Iran were "important to the national security of
the United States," he instructed his Director of Central Intelligence not
to report to Congress "due to ... [the operation's] extreme sensitivity
and security risks." '14 9 The administration has not formally offered any
more detailed legal rationale for its refusal to report.
When news of the arms sales became public, the resulting brouhaha
led President Reagan to announce that he was instructing his staff to
prepare an executive order that clarified his plans for future notification.
He stated that "[i]n all but the most exceptional circumstances, timely
notification to Congress under section 501(b) . . . will not be delayed
beyond two working days of the initiation of a [covert] activity." 150
Even with President Reagan's promised reforms, the controversy
over the arms sales should at a minimum encourage Congress to tighten
the statutory reporting requirements. One possible measure would be to
mandate reports in advance of sales or within a specified time period.
The requirements could even be backed by penalties for noncompliance.
Congress might pass still other provisions to ensure that it is informed
and has an opportunity to express its views.
In sum, the 1985 amendments to the Export Administration Act
were intended to limit somewhat the President's authority to prevent
exports. Nevertheless, the President in practice retains the discretion to
stop almost all U.S. exports to a particular country. Even attempts by
Congress to constrain the President's discretion to allow exports of
nuclear items and arms have had mixed success in practice.
C. Imports
Import controls under U.S. laws differ markedly from export con-
trols. First, While export controls are largely a post-World War II devel-
id. at 544-45 (minority report) (concluding that the "vague" language of § 501 allows the President
to decide how long to wait before notifying Congress).
149. TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at B-60. Note, however, that no finding
existed at the time of the U.S. sale of 504 TOW missiles and only a retroactive finding existed for the
November 1986 sale of HAWK missiles. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 146, at 418. Also,
Israel transferred HAWK and TOW missiles to Iran in 1985 that Israel had obtained from the
United States under the AECA. The Reagan administration failed to follow the required AECA
procedures for allowing the Israeli transfer to Iran. 22 U.S.C. § 2753(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see
IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 146, at 418.
150. Letter from President Reagan to Senator David L. Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (Aug. 7, 1987), quoted in N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1987, at A5, col. 1; see
Wash. Post, Aug 8, 1987, at 1, col. 6. As of February 20, 1988, a new Executive Order had not yet
been signed.
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opment and grant the President broad discretion under general
guidelines, import controls-particularly tariffs-have always been sub-
ject to detailed congressional direction.'
Second, while export controls are designed primarily for foreign pol-
icy purposes, import controls are created for many reasons. These
include the need to raise revenue (a rationale of declining importance),
the continuing interest in protecting U.S. industries, and the desire for
leverage in negotiations with other countries. The objective of protecting
industries and jobs is supported by powerful domestic constituencies that
historically wield major clout with Congress, and that often believe the
Executive Branch will not sufficiently protect their interests.15 2
Congress' reluctance to allow the Executive Branch broad discretion
over imports and the multiple reasons for import controls have generated
myriad laws. Most are triggered by economic concerns, such as injury to
domestic industries, discriminatory pricing, or subsidies.
The President has no general statutory authority to restrict imports
for foreign policy reasons. Instead, his authority is scattered among sev-
eral statutes, allowing a mixed bag of limited actions. For example, the
President may restrict imports of critical defense materials, or imports
that relate to a particular country (such as South Africa or Libya), prod-
uct (such as sugar), or policy issue (such as emigration). Overall, his
discretion is very circumscribed.
1. Section 232 and National Security: Does It Only
Cover Foreign Oil?
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 t 11 provides the
President with broad authority to limit imports for foreign policy rea-
sons. It permits him to "adjust the imports" of an article if it "is being
imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circum-
stances as to threaten to impair the national security."1 54
The broad phrase "national security" is not defined in the statute.
Nevertheless, the accompanying statutory language,' 5 the legislative his-
151. For example, the second law passed by Congress was the Tariff Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 24
(July 4, 1789). For a history of import controls, see 6 A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 100 (1983).
152. See generally I. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS (1986); I.
DESTLER, MAKING FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 129-49 (1980); A. LOWENFELD, supra note 151, at
99-142.
153. Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (1962) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982)).
154. The section is triggered when the Secretary of Commerce commences an investigation.
Within one year, the Secretary must report his findings and recommendations to the President, who
"shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary," including the option of taking no
action at all. Id.
155. This language lists factors that the President "shall ...give consideration to." These
factors include the "domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements" and
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tory, 1 6 the uses of the statute, and the sparse case law indicate that sec-
tion 232 is designed to limit imports of critical defense materials,
especially in order to protect the domestic production base or to protect
against an embargo by an important foreign supplier.
During the thirty-one-year history of section 232 and its predecessor
statute, the President has used this authority sparingly. Controls have
only been imposed to restrict petroleum imports. 57
In response to considerable political pressure, President Reagan has
threatened to expand the use of section 232 to limit imports of machine
tools. Manufacturing of machine tools is an important domestic industry
that arguably falls within a narrow reading of the statute. After Presi-
dent Reagan announced in May 1986 that he would defer a formal deci-
sion under section 232 for six months, voluntary restraint agreements
generally address whether the United States will have "the industries and the capacity.., to meet
national security requirements." Id. § 232(c).
156. See Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 562-71 (1976) (noting
legislative history and interpretation of "national security" in section 232); see also H.R. REP. No.
50, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-31 (1955) (minority views); S. REP. No. 232, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1955); 101 CONG. REc. 5297-98 (1955) (statements of Sens. Barkley and Flandors).
157. Relief was first granted in 1959 when President Eisenhower invoked the 1958 version of the
statute to impose a system of quotas on imports of petroleum and petroleum products. 24 Fed. Reg.
1781 (1959). The statute was then used by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford to
maintain oil quotas. See Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 552-55.
President Carter used section 232 to terminate all crude oil imports from Iran on November 12,
1979, shortly after the seizure of the American hostages. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,581 (1979). Two days
later he declared a national emergency and exercised his IEEPA powers, but the section 232
embargo on oil continued. Iran was an important supplier of a critical commodity and had become
decidedly unreliable.
Carter also used section 232 to impose a gasoline conservation fee on imports of crude oil and
gasoline. As discussed below, this effort ran afoul of the courts, and Congress then terminated the
program. See infra note 160.
President Reagan's oil embargo against Libya in 1982 appears to be the only use of section 232
that was primarily for broader foreign policy purposes. It was primarily a response to Libyan
involvement in terrorist activities and efforts to promote instability in the region. 82 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 68 (June 1982) (Department Statement of Mar. 10, 1982); Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1982, at Al,
col. 1. Imports of Libyan oil were then only about 3% of total U.S. energy imports. Id. Even in this
case though, the product involved was again petroleum and the supplier was potentially unreliable.
The President, his Cabinet officers, and private entities have formally requested that the
possibility of import control be investigated in other cases. Sixteen investigations were conducted
between 1964 and early 1985. Letter from Paula Stem, chairwoman of the International Trade
Commission, to Sen. Lloyd M. Bensten 3 (Apr. 15, 1985) (listing trade statutes and their uses by the
President). Besides petroleum, these investigations have included products such as watches,
movements, and parts (1965); nuts, bolts, and large screws of iron and steel (1978), see id.; glass-
lined chemical processing equipment (1981), see 46 Fed. Reg. 45, 977 (1981); chromium, manganese,
and silicon ferroalloys (1981), see U.S. Import Weekly (BNA), No. 137, at A-1 (July 21, 1982); and
machine tools, see infra text accompanying note 158. In the ferroalloy investigation, press reports
indicate that the Commerce Department determined that there was injury to an industry critical to
the national security. U.S. Import Weekly (BNA), No. 142, at 640 (Aug. 25, 1982). However,
President Reagan determined that ferroalloy imports did not threaten to impair national security,
and thus formally denied relief under section 232. 9 U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) 1032 (May 23,
1984).
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were reached with two major suppliers, Japan and Taiwan, but not with
West Germany and Switzerland. He then threatened in December 1986
to "take unilateral action" under U.S. law (presumably section 232)
against these two countries if their exports of machine tools to the United
States exceeded specified limits. The White House also promised retalia-
tion against any other major foreign supplier undermining the Presi-
dent's program to strengthen the domestic industry. 158
Relevant judicial interpretation of section 232 is sparse. The leading
case is Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. 5 9 In a
unanimous-though narrow-opinion, the Supreme Court upheld
license fees imposed under the oil quota systems of Presidents Nixon and
Ford. The Court did not consider, however, when section 232 can prop-
erly be invoked, nor did it define "national security."16
While pressures to expand use of the statute will surely continue,16 1
the statutory language and history argue strongly that the section should
be invoked only in the very limited context of restricting imports of criti-
cal defense materials.
2. Specific Countries
For foreign policy reasons, other U.S. laws either mandate import
controls or allow the President the discretion to act against particular
countries or specific products, or for specific policy objectives. For exam-
ple, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, discussed below, 162
mandates sanctions against South Africa on a potpourri of products.
In 1985, Libya joined Cuba as the only other specific country from
which the President has broad discretion to prohibit imports. 1 63 Another
158. 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1654 (Dec. 16, 1986); 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1537
(Dec. 24, 1986).
159. 426 U.S. 548 (1975).
160. The Court did note that "national security" was a narrower criterion than "national
interest." Id. at 569-70. The effect of this construction is unclear.
In Independent Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1980),
the court struck down President Carter's Petroleum Import Adjustment Program. Established
pursuant to section 232(b), the program imposed a license fee on imported crude oil and gasoline.
The primary purpose was conservation-to lower domestic gas consumption by raising the retail
price of all gasoline (domestic and imported) by $.10 per gallon. The court concluded that since
"[a]ny impact on imports will be indirect," id. at 618, it could not be justified under section 232.
(This ground for invalidating a regulation seems different from any that might be raised by a use of
section 232 to limit imports for foreign policy reasons.) The government appealed. The matter was
rendered moot, however, when Congress passed a law over the President's veto that repealed the
program with its politically unpopular effect of raising prices. See 126 CONG. REc. 13,524, 13,593
(1980).
161. Amendments designed to facilitate use of section 232(b) have passed both houses of
Congress. 1987 Senate Trade Bill, supra note 50, § 501; 1987 House Trade Bill, supra note 50, § 191.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 254-71.
163. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1982) (Cuba). The provision for Libya reads: "Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the President may prohibit any article grown, produced, extracted, or
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1985 provision authorizes the President to ban imports "from any coun-
try which supports terrorism or terrorist organizations or harbors ter-
rorists or terrorist organizations." '  These two provisions trace their
roots to the increasingly strong public reaction against terrorism and
countries like Libya that support it. Limited only by country, these pro-
visions represent a potentially seminal step by Congress to authorize
broad import controls for foreign policy reasons in nonemergency
situations. 165
3. Specific Products: A Strange Mix
The President has varying degrees of authority to limit the imports
of a variety of specific products. Because nuclear items, arms, and other
defense goods are so important to national security and safety, the Presi-
dent has sweeping authority over their import as well as their export.1 66
Import quotas or flat prohibitions on importing other products can
also provide a basis for foreign policy sanctions. Import quotas are
imposed today on a wide range of commodities-from peanuts to cat-
tle. 1 67 The purposes are primarily economic, such as to protect U.S. agri-
culture or industry, or to carry out trade agreements. The statutes and
past history, however, indicate that the quotas for sugar and meat,
among others, may be used for foreign policy purposes.
168
manufactured in Libya from being imported into the United States." International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, § 504(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-8(a) (Supp. III 1985). Section
504(b) contains similar authority regarding exports.
164. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 § 505, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2349aa-9(a). The President must report the circumstances that cause him to act. He is also
required to consult regularly with Congress while the authority is being used. Id. § 2349aa-9(c).
165. President Reagan has been quick to invoke these provisions. He cited both as bases for his
1986 embargo of Libya, but he also declared a national emergency and cited IEEPA. Exec. Order
12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986). He needed the additional IEEPA authority since sections 504 and
505, which deal with trade, would not have been sufficient statutory support for some of the financial
controls that the President imposed.
Then, in October 1987, President Reagan relied on section 505 to cut offalmost all imports of
Iranian goods and services. Exec. Order 12,613, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (1987).
Congress seems inclined to resort more to statutory provisions like these which allow the
President to stop imports from, as well as exports to, specific countries, rather than to provisions that
give the President broad authority to stop imports. For example, the 1987 trade bill passed by the
Senate has such provisions aimed at Iran and at other states in the Persian Gulf if they attack U.S.
vessels, facilities, or personnel in the Persian Gulf region. 1987 Senate Trade Bill, supra note 50,
§§ 963-966. The same bill would also authorize the President to prohibit the import or export of
goods to Afghanistan, except for trade with the resistance groups there. Id. § 958.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 131-50 (discussing the Atomic Energy Act and the
Arms Export Control Act).
167. See Quotas and Restraints, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), U.S. Import Weekly Reference File
43:0101 (1986).
168. For sugar, see Tariff Schedules of the United States 1986, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. III
1985) (sched. 1, pt. 10, subpt. A, headnote 2); cf United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block,
683 F.2d 399, 402 n.5, 404 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (finding broad discretion under the statute). President
Reagan used this authority in 1983 to reduce sharply the sugar quota for Nicaragua and to reallocate
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A mandatory prohibition exists against imports of seven animal
skins-including ermine, fox, and mink-from the Soviet Union. 6 9 This
was imposed in 1951 for foreign policy reasons-to protest Moscow's
role in the Korean War. The restriction is known as the one against "the
seven deadly skins."
4. Policy Issues: Emigration and Others
The United States extends most-favored-nation (MFN) status to
many countries, either through bilateral agreements or under GATT. In
addition, it extends special tariff benefits to some developing countries
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI). U.S. laws provide the President with some discre-
tion to extend or deny these MFN, GSP, or CBI benefits to countries for
various policy reasons. The following are important foreign policy areas
where the President exercises discretion over benefits.
a. Opening the Doors: Emigration
The Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President, under certain cir-
cumstances, to extend MFN treatment to a so-called "nonmarket econ-
omy country" that did not at the time of the Act enjoy MFN status in its
trade with the United States.t 70
it to three neighboring countries (El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica). Proclamation No. 5104,
48 Fed. Reg. 44,057 (1983). A 1987 law imposed a prohibition on sugar imports from Panama,
unless the President certifies that constitutional guarantees have been restored to the Panamanian
people. 1988 Appropriations Act, supra note 90, § 571.
For meat, see 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (available when "action is required by overriding ... national
security interests"). The President apparently has not exercised this authority for foreign policy
reasons.
169. Tariff Schedules of the United States 1986, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (sched. I, pt. 5, subpt. B,
headnote 4). Why the full list includes weasel, but not sable, is a question this Article will leave for
other researchers.
The 1987 trade bills passed by the House and Senate have taken diametrically opposite positions
on continuation of this embargo. The House bill would end the ban. 1987 House Trade Bill, supra
note 50, § 815. The Senate bill strongly urges the continuation of the prohibition, noting the many
unsubsidized fur farms that would be injured by Soviet imports and ominously warning that the
"United States fur deficit will rise." 1987 Senate Trade Bill, supra note 50, § 899B.
170. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. IV, 88 Stat. 1978, 2056-66 (1975) (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
The statute reopened the possibility of MFN treatment to communist countries. When the
Cold War had been especially chilly, Congress had directed the President to deny or suspend to any
country "dominated or controlled by" communism (except Yugoslavia) the benefits of lower tariffs
negotiated through trade agreements. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, § 5, 65
Stat. 72, 73. As a result, their imports became subject to the high rates set by the 1930 Smoot-
Hawley Tariff.
Poland qualified specially for MFN treatment in 1960 when it entered into an agreement with
GATT. President Reagan, however, suspended Poland's MFN status in 1982-87 because it
outlawed the independent trade union Solidarity. The President's rationale was unique. He cited
Poland's 1967 protocol of accession to GAT', which required that it increase the total value of its
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A key statutory provision is that no nonmarket country is eligible to
receive MFN treatment (or certain other benefits) under the Act if the
President determines that the country denies its "citizens the right or
opportunity to emigrate" or imposes more than a nominal tax on emigra-
tion. The President can waive these conditions if he determines that the
waiver will substantially promote free emigration, and if he has received
assurances to that effect. The waiver extends for twelve months, and
must then be renewed. 71 Such waivers, and thus eligibility for MFN
treatment, have been accorded Romania, Hungary, and the People's
Republic of China.' 72
Notwithstanding the power to grant waivers, the President's discre-
tion is effectively limited. He must report his decision to Congress, and
much of the data on emigration involves relatively public, objective
facts. 173
b. Limiting the GSP and CBI
Subject to several absolute and conditional limits, the laws grant the
President considerable discretion to grant or withdraw, for foreign policy
reasons, extensive tariff benefits to less developed countries under the
GSP and CBI. 74
For example, the GSP program includes a prohibition against
designating certain developed or communist countries-such as EEC
members, the Soviet Union, and Poland-as eligible for benefits. Condi-
tional limitations include foreign-policy-based restrictions against coun-
imports from GATT Contracting Parties by 7% a year. Reagan claimed that Poland had been in
violation of this GATT agreement since 1978 by failing to meet this commitment. Proclamation No.
4991, 3 C.F.R. 100 (1982); see 7 U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) 161 (Nov. 3, 1982). Reagan revoked
the suspension in February 1987. Proclamation No. 5610, 52 Fed. Reg. 5425 (1987) (to be codified
at 3 C.F.R. 5425). The President said the reinstatement to MFN status was a reward for Poland's
release of political prisoners and other steps toward reconciliation with Solidarity members and the
Catholic Church. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
171. Trade Act of 1974, § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1982).
172. Exec. Order No. 11,854, 3 C.F.R. 987 (1971-1975) (Romania); Exec. Order No. 12,051, 3
C.F.R. 173 (1979) (Hungary); Exec. Order No. 12,167, 3 C.F.R. 453 (1980) (China).
These waivers have been renewed regularly, though not without occasional controversy. The
renewal of Romania's waiver in June 1987 was termed "exceptionally difficult" by a White House
handout. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 763 (June 10, 1987); see also 1987 Senate Trade Bill, supra
note 50, §§ 932-934; 1987 House Trade Bill, supra note 50, § 1501 (provisions that would increase
the requirements for renewal of Romania's waiver).
173. Closely monitoring the situation are powerful political groups that have a strong interest in
Jewish emigration or that are generally opposed to improved trade with communist countries.
174. For background on the GSP, see GSP Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, tit. V, 98
Stat. 3018 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (Supp. III 1985)); Dep't of State Bureau of Public
Affairs, Generalized System of Preferences, GisT (Feb. 1985). On CBI, see Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-87, 97 Stat. 384 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706
(Supp. III 1985)); Farnsworth, The "Good Neighbor" Offers Little Aid, Less Trade, N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1987, at F6, col. 1.
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tries that expropriate or grant sanctuary to international terrorists. 7 5
Once a country is designated, the President has almost unlimited author-
ity to withdraw, suspend, or limit the designation. The GSP law requires
him only to "consider" certain factors, which are essentially economic
ones, and to report his decision to Congress.176 Although the purpose of
the statute is primarily economic, Presidents have used their discretion
under the GSP to advance foreign policy goals. 1
7 7
5. Possible End Runs with Other Economic-Based Statutes: A Whiff
of Ammonia
Numerous other laws allow the President to restrict imports for eco-
nomic reasons-such as injury to domestic industries, the sale of mer-
chandise for less than fair value, or illegal subsidies. None of these
economic-based statutes, however, provides the President with any nota-
ble authority to impose import sanctions for foreign policy reasons.
These statutes vary widely according to the type of economic crite-
ria that allows presidential action, the precision of the criteria, and the
administrative restrictions on the President. These criteria usually make
it difficult to utilize these import sanctions for foreign policy purposes.
For the present analysis, the statutes can be grouped roughly into two
categories-those where the International Trade Commission (ITC) has
some jurisdiction, and those where it does not. The latter category
allows more presidential discretion.
ITC participation is important because the ITC is an independent
agency that has often differed from the President on trade matters. Help-
ing to ensure the ITC's independence are the staggered, long terms of the
Commissioners and a requirement of political diversity. 171
a. Where the ITC Has Jurisdiction
Most of the economic-based statutes give the ITC at least some
175. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1982).
176. Id. § 2464(a), (c).
177. For example, in 1980, President Carter withdrew GSP status from Ethiopia because it
expropriated U.S. investments. H.R. Doc. No. 197, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1979). Carter also
designated Uganda as a beneficiary country, Exec. Order No. 12,204, 3 C.F.R. 245 (1981), a status
that it had been denied in 1975 because of Idi Amin's human rights policies. H.R. REP. No. 395,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1979); Exec. Order No. 11,888, 3 C.F.R. 1038 (1971-1975).
In January 1987, President Reagan withdrew or suspended the GSP eligibility of Romania,
Nicaragua, and Paraguay because they were not taking steps to afford internationally recognized
rights to workers there. Chile's GSP eligibility was suspended indefinitely on the same grounds in
December 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,137 (1987).
178. Established in 1916 as the U.S. Tariff Commission, the present ITC has six commissioners,
who are appointed for staggered nine-year terms. The chairperson, who is generally responsible for
administering the Commission, and the vice-chairperson are designated by the President for two-
year terms. No more than three commissioners may be members of the same political party. 19
U.S.C. §§ 1330-1331, 2231-2232 (1982).
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jurisdiction. These include the often-used statutes governing dumping
and countervailing duties, 179  laws allowing import controls against
"unfair method of competition" or interference with U.S. agricultural
programs,' 80 the section 201 escape clause,181 and section 406 of the 1974
Trade Act.
182
The effective use of these statutes for foreign policy sanctions is very
unlikely, and very chancy. This was illustrated by President Carter's
unsuccessful attempt to limit imports of ammonia. It was brought under
section 406, the least stringent of these statutes because the criteria for
obtaining relief under it are relatively relaxed. 83
In 1979, the ITC had investigated the possibility of "market disrup-
tion" caused by large imports of Soviet ammonia. By a 3-2 vote, the
Commission found market disruption and recommended a three-year
quota to President Carter.184 The President, however, was not per-
suaded, and denied relief in early December because it was not in the
"national economic interest" of the United States. 85 Carter was also
apparently influenced by his desire to keep detente alive and to obtain the
Senate's advice and consent to the SALT II Treaty.1 86
179. "Dumping" is a form of international price discrimination. It is defined under U.S. law as
selling of foreign merchandise in the United States "at less than its fair value," usually measured by
comparing (with adjustments) the price in the United States with that in the home market, at the
same stage of the production process. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677-1677b (1982). Such sales must cause or
threaten "material injury" to a U.S. industry, or materially retard the establishment of an industry.
Id. § 1673. The ITC is charged with making the essential determination regarding injury. Id.
§§ 1673b, 1673d.
"Countervailing duties" can be imposed on foreign merchandise if the foreign manufacture,
production, or export of that merchandise is being subsidized, directly or indirectly. These duties,
which attempt to offset the net subsidy, are in addition to any other duties imposed. Id. §§ 1303,
1671. For most cases, there is a requirement of real or threatened injury similar to that under the
dumping laws, and the ITC is again charged with making this determination.
180. For "unfair methods of competition," see id. § 1337. The principal statute on interference
with agricultural programs is section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§ 624 (1982).
181. The section 201 "escape clause" allows temporary relief from imports if the ITC
determines that "an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to
be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an
article like or directly competitive with the imported article." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982).
182. Id. § 2436.
183. See id. This provision authorizes the President to impose import controls if the ITC
determines that imports from a communist country are causing "market disruption." Market
disruption occurs whenever imports of an article, "like or directly competitive" with a domestic
article, are "increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause of
material injury, or threat thereof, to such domestic industry." Id. § 2436(c)(2).
184. 44 Fed. Reg. 61,270 (1979).
185. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Transmitting a Report,
15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2221 (Dec. 11, 1979).
186. Cf J. CARTER, KEEPING THE FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 264-65 (1982)
(President Carter worked hard to obtain Senate advice and consent to the SALT II Treaty, until the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused him to ask the Senate to postpone action on the Treaty).
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Then, in late December, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and
installed a client government. The President and the American public
were understandably outraged. Carter responded with a partial embargo
on agricultural and other exports. 187 He also decided that it was then
appropriate to limit Soviet ammonia imports. In January 1980, Carter
requested a new section 406 investigation. To the administration's cha-
grin, the ITC determined in April that there was no market disruption.
The 3-2 ITC decision ostensibly turned on the economic injury criteria,
but the change seemed more likely the result of the change of one Com-
missioner. 188 Thus the President was left in the strange situation created
by the U.S. statutes-he was able to stop U.S. exports, but unable to
prevent most imports without invoking emergency powers.
b. Where the ITC Lacks Jurisdiction
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 189 is probably the
most open-ended of those import statutes that are tied to economic crite-
ria but do not provide some jurisdiction to the ITC. It authorizes the
President to "take all appropriate and feasible actions within his power"
to: (1) enforce U.S. rights under any trade agreement; or (2) respond to
any act by a foreign country that is inconsistent with a trade agreement,
or that is "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory."1 90
In spite of section 301's broad charter for retaliation, it would be
difficult to justify most uses of this statute for foreign policy purposes.
First, the triggering criteria turn on the trade or investment practices of
foreign countries, not on their military or other foreign policy activities.
Second, use of section 301 has been limited in the past to trade and
investment issues.' 91
6. Running Afoul of GATT
Even though the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 192 primarily focuses on imports, U.S. obligations under GATT
187. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
188. Anhydrous Ammonia From the U.S.S.R., 45 Fed. Reg. 27,570 (1980) (ITC report to the
President).
189. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985).
190. Id. § 2411(a). See also id. §§ 2411-2416. It is section 301 which President Reagan
invoked in April 1987 to raise tariffs on a variety of Japanese goods as a result of Japanese violation
of its trade agreement regarding semiconductor chips. Exec. Order No. 5631, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,412
(1987). Some of these sanctions have since been suspended. 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (1987).
191. See Presidential Retaliation, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 49:0101, 0104-05 (1986); Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 49:0801-4C (1986). One use of section 301 for the foreign policy purposes discussed in
this Article is possible. The statutory standards, expanded in 1984 to include foreign practices
affecting investment as well as goods and services, allow retaliation for expropriation of U.S.
businesses. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e).
192. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No.
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have not been a serious obstacle to imposing import controls for foreign
policy purposes.
193
First, many of the present or likely target countries for economic
sanctions are not contracting parties 194 to GATT. For example, the
Soviet Union, East Germany, Iran, and Libya are not members. 195 Even
some GATT members that are likely targets for U.S. sanctions have a
trade relationship with the United States that is a special combination of
the GATT framework and bilateral agreements.196 Therefore, U.S. sanc-
tions against countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and
Poland would not necessarily violate GATT.
Second, even for those countries that the United States trades with
on a regular basis under GATT, the General Agreement includes broad
exceptions that can often be invoked to justify the use of import controls
for foreign policy purposes. 19 7 The most readily available justifications
are articles XXI and XXV,' 9' and what might be termed "tacit excep-
1700, at 639, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950) (original text). For the current version, see CONTRACTING
PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, 4 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969). GATT has never come formally into force, since the requisite
minimum number of nations has never accepted it "definitively." All nations that apply GATT do
so provisionally under various protocols. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 60-
61 (1969).
193. Although GATT focuses on imports, exports are mentioned in at least 13 GATT clauses,
and are related to obligations in several others. J. JACKSON, supra note 192, at 498. The most
significant provisions regarding exports are the MFN treatment obligation in article I and the ban on
quantitative restrictions in article XI.
U.S. export controls on goods and technology for foreign policy purposes obviously
discriminate among nations and could potentially create problems under GATT. A careful reading
of the GATT provisions and decisions, however, suggests that U.S. export controls either do not
violate GATT or might be classified as technical violations. See id. at 497-506; Abbott, supra note
13, at 849-57. This is primarily because "the GATT exceptions are so broad and vague as to almost
render [the GATT export] obligations meaningless." J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 888 (1986). Most relevant are the security exceptions
of article XXI. See infra text accompanying notes 201-02.
194. "Contracting Parties" (with capitalization) is used in this Article to refer to the parties to
GATT acting formally as a body. References to individual or several contracting parties, or
members, are uncapitalized.
195. See GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1984 72 (1985).
196. See, eg., GATT, 31st Supp. BISD 180 (1985) (protocol of accession of Hungary to
GATT); Pres. Proc. No. 4560, 43 Fed. Reg. 15,125 (1978) (United States enters into a trade
agreement with Hungary); GATT, 30th Supp. BISD 194 (1984) (protocol of accession of Romania
to GAIT); Pres. Proc. No. 4369, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,389 (1975) (United States enters into trade
agreement with Romania). See generally J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 193, at 1183-87.
197. A third reason is that the target countries for a variety of reasons sometimes choose not to
challenge the sanctions in GATT. For example, South Africa has apparently not challenged the
various U.S. export controls against it nor the recent U.S. ban on several imported goods, possibly
because it realizes the weakness of its position in the international community.
198. Paragraph 5 of article XXV allows the Contracting Parties in "exceptional circumstances
not elsewhere provided in this Agreement" to "waive an obligation" imposed on an individual
contracting party. 55 U.N.T.S. at 272. This waiver requires a two-thirds vote to pass. The
Contracting Parties have not always specified the basis for some actions that might be viewed as
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tions." '19 9 The justifications should also be viewed in the context of the
problems with the GATT dispute settlement process.
Article XXI contains security exceptions that are very broad. For
example, no contracting party may be prevented from any action "which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security inter-
ests," if that action relates to fissionable materials, traffic in arms or other
goods "as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment," or "time of war or other emergency in interna-
tional relations." 2"
Article XXI has rarely been invoked to justify economic sanctions
for foreign policy purposes.20 1  Nevertheless, the use of the article has
falling under this waiver. For example, article XXV may have been the unstated basis for their
approval of the U.S. suspension of MFN status to Czechoslovakia in 1952, GATT Press Release 46
(1951), at 1, although no explicit GATr article was cited in the declaration. See J. JACKSON, supra
note 192, at 750.
199. A "tacit exception" is one that cites no specific exception, but allows a situation to continue
because it involves broader political questions. For example, GATT's acceptance of the U.S.
suspension of MFN status to Czechoslovakia, discussed supra note 198, could be viewed as such a
declaration, rather than as a waiver under article XXV. One contracting party's delegate favored a
nonspecific declaration because it only acknowledged the state of affairs and would not provide a
precedent under the General Agreement, which "'was a technical instrument to deal with technical
trade problems.'" J. JACKSON, supra note 192, at 750 (quoting GAIT Doe. CP.6/SR.13, at 4
(1951)); see Abbott, supra note 13, at 853.
The United States apparently tried to use this approach when it explicitly declined to rely on
any specific GATT clause to justify its drastic reduction of the Nicaraguan sugar quota in 1983. A
GATT panel report, however, concluded that the U.S. action was not consistent with the obligations
of nondiscrimination set forth in article XIII:2. GATT Doe. L/5607, at 6-7 (1984). The GATT
Council adopted the report in March 1984. GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1984 39 (1985).
The United States did not object to Nicaragua's resort to the GATT dispute process, and even
recognized that Nicaragua had certain rights under article XXIII. GAIT Doe. C/M/178, at 27
(June 13, 1984). However, the United States presumably realized that the worst sanction that the
Contracting Parties could impose would be to authorize Nicaragua to suspend concessions that it
had made to the United States or to suspend other obligations. See infra text accompanying notes
203-05 (discussing the GATT dispute resolution process). The United States was clearly willing to
absorb any such retaliatory action.
Nevertheless, the United States would have been wise to cite article XXI, as it later did
(possibly having learned from experience) with the 1985 trade embargo against Nicaragua, discussed
below. See infra note 201. Because the United States did not cite any of the specific exceptions, such
as in article XXI, the GATT panel in this case found that it could not consider possible justifications
and thus concluded that a violation of a GATT article was unjustified. See GATT Doe. L/5607, at
6-7.
200. GATT, art. XXI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266.
201. The first use of article XXI to justify foreign policy sanctions was in response to
Czechoslovakia's challenge to the U.S. use of its export controls in 1949. The Contracting Parties
decisively rejected that challenge. GATT Doe. CP.3/SR.22, at 4-10 (June 8, 1949).
Through 1982, only three other cases arose, none involving the United States as a party, and
none resulted in the Contracting Parties authorizing any relief. J. JACKSON, supra note 192, at 750;
GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1982 72-73 (1983).
Most recently, article XXI was cited by the United States as a justification for its May 1985
trade embargo against Nicaragua. After considerable discussion in the GATT Council (which meets
monthly and has broad jurisdiction), a panel was established to investigate the matter. At the
insistence of the United States, the panel's terms of reference were limited-it could not examine or
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come under increasing scrutiny. For example, at their annual meeting in
November 1982, GATT member states voted to increase the procedural
requirements for invoking article XXI, and recognized that the target
country retains its full rights under the General Agreement, including
recourse to the complaint procedures.2 °2
The effectiveness of any complaints in GATT against import (or
export) sanctions is considerably affected by the GATT dispute resolu-
tion machinery, which is complicated, sometimes cumbersome, and often
inadequate.20 3 Central to the process, especially for claims against for-
eign policy sanctions, is article XXIII. It provides for mediation by the
Contracting Parties and, if they authorize it, retaliation by the target
country. That country can then suspend the concessions it has granted
the sender country or suspend other obligations owed to it.
For a target country, the limited relief available under article XXIII
is a serious problem, particularly where the country imposing the sanc-
tions is willing to absorb some costs to carry out its foreign policy.2°4
The fact that the process is exceedingly slow compounds the problem. In
practice, only one dispute has resulted in suspension of the target coun-
try's concessions under article XXIII-a complaint by the Netherlands
against the United States in the 1950's. There has been no suspension of
"other obligations" under GATT.2 °5
On balance, the infrequent use of import sanctions for foreign policy
judge the validity of, or the motivation for, the U.S. use of article XXI. GATT Doe. C/M/196, at 7
(March 12, 1986).
The panel reported its results to the Council in October 1986. The panel concluded, among
other things, that since its terms of reference did not authorize it to examine the U.S. use of article
XXI, "it could not find the United States neither to be complying with its obligations under the
General Agreement nor to be failing to carry out its obligations under that Agreement." The panel
further noted, however, that "embargoes such as the one imposed by the United States ... ran
counter to the basic aims of the GATT." GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES 1986 58 (1987). The panel's
report should lead to further discussion in GATT about use of article XXI. Id. at 59; see 3 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1368 (1986).
202. GATT Doe. L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982); GATT Doc. SR 38/10, at 2-3 (Dec. 16, 1982).
203. The GATT articles contain over 30 provisions relating to dispute settlement procedures.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GATT AND THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS 1, ITC Pub. 1793 (Dec.
1985).
204. The situation is especially unsatisfactory when the target country is much smaller than the
country imposing the sanctions, because the small country's retaliation is unlikely to have a
significant effect on the large country.
205. J. JACKSON, supra note 192, at 185. Nevertheless, Professor Jackson notes:
[T]he language of... article [XXIII] is broad and sweeping. The language itself is not
limited just to "compensating" redress but is broad enough to be used as the basis for
serious sanctions. For instance, all concessions of all other contracting parties could be
suspended vis-a-vis a notoriously offending contracting party-in effect, driving it out of
GATT-if the CONTRACTING PARTIES determined this to be "appropriate."
Likewise, lesser penalties, but still stronger than compensating redress, could be authorized
for application by groups of contracting parties.
Id. at 186-87.
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reasons has occasioned only rare disruptions of the GATT trading sys-
tem. Nevertheless, unless carefully controlled, more frequent U.S. resort
to import sanctions could have a much more significant impact.20 6 If
other countries followed suit, the commendable effort to move toward an
open, nondiscriminatory trading system that benefits the United States
and other countries would be weakened.
Increased use of import sanctions, however, is difficult under
existing U.S. laws. The President has no general statutory authority to
restrict imports for foreign policy reasons, as he does for exports. The
hodgepodge of existing laws restricts his discretion significantly and
skews his decisions.
D. Private Financial Transactions
Regulation of the financial transactions that U.S. banks or other pri-
vate entities can have with foreigners is a potentially important sanction.
Indeed, financial sanctions are a major component of the U.S. measures
against South Africa, and extensive financial controls were imposed
against Iran in 1980 and Libya in 1986.
At present, however, the President has very limited statutory
authority over these private financial transactions. For instance, if New
York-based Citibank wants to loan money to the government or private
entities in Chile, or Iraq, or Poland, the President cannot prevent that
loan for foreign policy reasons, at least in the absence of a declared
national emergency.
This lack of authority is especially important today, since interna-
tional financial activity is growing dramatically and increasingly inter-
sects with foreign policy.20 7 And, while the premier role that U.S. banks
enjoyed in the 1960's and early 1970's has eroded as Japanese and Euro-
pean banks have grown and become more active internationally,2"8 U.S.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 416-29.
207. For example, about $12 billion in Iranian assets was in the possession of U.S. banks and
other entities here and abroad when the President froze these assets during the 1979-80 hostage
crisis. Similarly, when Chase Manhattan and other U.S. banks decided, for a variety of reasons, not
to roll over short-term loans to South Africa in mid-1985, it helped force South Africa to close its
stock exchange temporarily and to declare a four-month moratorium on repayments of most foreign
debts. Madison, Breaking the Engagement, 18 NAT'L J. 1820, 1822 (1986); The Bankers Challenge
Botha, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1986, at 36. It was not until early 1987 that South Africa managed to
reach an agreement with its foreign creditors on rescheduling about $13 billion of its foreign debt.
N.Y. Times, March 25, 1987, at DI, col. 1.
208. A 1988 report indicated that Tokyo has overtaken New York as a center for international
lending and that Japanese banks had maintained their lead over U.S. banks in international assets.
Japanese banks were estimated to have over twice the international assets of U.S. banks as of
September 1987, having passed the American banks in late 1985. French banks were third, West
German banks were fourth, and British banks were fifth. Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 1988, at Fl, col. 1,
citing a February 1988 report by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). This situation
contrasts with that at the end of 1984, when the BIS estimated that U.S. banks accounted for the
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banks continue to be a major force in private international banking.209
U.S. credit is particularly important in certain regions and coun-
tries. For example, U.S. banks, traders, and other entities provide large
amounts of credit to noncommunist countries in Latin America and
Asia. In mid-1986, U.S. banks' claims as a percentage of total foreign
bank claims were 47% for Chile, 43% for Mexico, 40% for Guatemala,
26% for South Korea, 31% for Taiwan, and 17% for the Philippines." 0
Regulation of private financial transactions is thus a potentially effective
foreign policy tool in such cases. 11
For purposes of analysis, private financial transactions in which for-
eigners have an interest may be categorized into three types: (1) deposits
in U.S. banks; (2) financing for trade; and (3) loans for investment or
other purposes.
At present, no U.S. laws exist for controlling foreigners' deposits for
foreign policy reasons in nonemergency situations, except for the special
case of South Africa. As for trade financing, section 15 of the Export
Administration Act provides the President with authority to restrict
export financing, but not import financing or other financial transactions.
Finally, the only example of U.S. regulation of foreign investment or
other credit activities for foreign policy purposes are the 1986 sanctions
against South Africa. Otherwise, the Johnson Act of 1934 and certain
lending limits on individual borrowers provide the President with only a
modicum of authority. He also has some informal, though modest, influ-
ence arising from the Executive Branch's general regulation of banks.
1. Section 15 of the EAA: Stop Financing Those Exports
The President's primary statutory authority to control U.S. private
credit is contained in section 15 of the Export Administration Act:
The President and the Secretary [of Commerce] may issue such reg-
ulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. Any
largest share (28%) of the assets in the international banking system, followed by the Japanese
(23.5%), French (9%), British (7%), and West German banks (6.5%). BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, THE NATIONALITY STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING MARKET AND
THE ROLE OF INTERBANK OPERATIONS 4 (1985); see J. SPINDLER, THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT 5 (1984).
209. As noted in footnote 209 supra, U.S. banks are behind only the Japanese banks in
international assets. Also, at the end of 1985, seven of the 50 largest commercial were U.S. banks.
World's Top 500 Banks, Am. Banker, July 30, 1986, at 36.
210. See Figure I in Section II.B.2. at 1178, and sources cited there. In contrast, in mid-1985,
U.S. banks held only about 6-7% of the total debt owed by the Soviet Union and other Comecon
countries to foreign banks. Controls on the Export of Capital from the United States: Hearings on S.
812 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 139
(1985) (statement of David C. Mulford, asst. secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter 1985 Hearings
on S. 812].
211. See infra text accompanying notes 430-49 (presenting recommendations in this area).
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such regulations issued to carry out the provisions of [this Act] may
apply to the financing, transporting, or other servicing of exports and the
participation therein by any person.2 12
Section 15's language strongly suggests that it was designed to help
implement EAA export controls, and not to be an independent authority
to control international financial transactions. In other words, the Presi-
dent is not authorized to impose a few export controls on goods and
technology to Chile, and then prohibit all financing to that country under
Section 15. Moreover, none of the other EAA provisions envision general
controls on financing.
The legislative history of section 15 similarly indicates the intent
only to help implement the EAA through regulation of financing and
other ancillary activities.2 t3
Section 15 was arguably invoked once for foreign policy purposes to
justify regulation of financial transactions not directly related to
exports.214 The section's clear statutory language and legislative history,
however, make difficult any attempts to use it to restrict private credit
that is not connected with export controls on goods and technology.
2. The Johnson Debt Default Act
The Johnson Act of 1934,215 which provides criminal penalties for
whoever in the United States buys or sells the securities of certain foreign
governments, could be a possible obstacle for extending private credit to
212. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2414 (1982) (emphasis added).
213. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 127, at 107-08.
214. In a controversial move, President Carter invoked section 15 to help limit U.S.
participation in the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The President prohibited the export of virtually all
goods and technology associated with the Olympics, including souvenirs. He also directed the
prohibition of "payments or transactions which are in any way related to arrangements involving or
requiring ... exports, where such payments or transactions could provide financial support for [the]
Games." 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 559-60 (Mar. 28, 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 21,612 (1980).
The financial controls were primarily designed to prohibit NBC from making further payments
under its $87 million contract to broadcast the Olympics. NBC had already shipped most of its
equipment, but still had three remaining payments totaling $20-26 million. HousE AFGHANISTAN
REPORT, supra note 69, at 92-93.
The President's directive and the resulting regulations on financial transactions were explicitly
tied to "involving or requiring.., exports," and NBC still had to export some equipment. Thus the
company was in danger of violating the language of the directive. Two experts argue, however, that
"the NBC payments were not directly related to U.S. exports. Rather, the monies... were partial
consideration for the contractual right to broadcast, a transaction that was clearly not a U.S. export
within the meaning of the EAA." Moyer & Mabry, supra note 127, at 108 (footnote omitted).
(Moyer was General Counsel, Counsellor to the Secretary, and Deputy General Counsel of the U.S.
Department of Commerce during the Carter administration.)
NBC did not, however, challenge the controls, probably because the network was insured for
about 90% of the costs. HOUSE AFGHANISTAN REPORT, supra note 69, at 91. Also, there would
have been a much smaller U.S. viewing audience given the absence of a U.S. team and a challenge by
NBC probably would not have been good public relations.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1982) (as revised in 1948).
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some foreign governments. The scope of the Act, however, is quite nar-
row. To begin with, it only applies to those foreign governments that are
in default on debts owed to the U.S. government. The Act has also been
riddled with several major exceptions.216 As a result, the statute is now
mainly a trap for the unwary. In those few cases where it might apply,
its terms give no discretion to the President beyond deciding whether to
enforce the statute or not.
3. Federal Lending Limits
Lending limits have been characteristic of U.S. banking for over 100
years.217 They are not helpful, however, as a vehicle for restricting for-
eign lending for foreign policy reasons.
The limits still allow large amounts of lending to a single borrower.
They provide, for national banks, that the total amount of loans and
extensions of credit to a single person shall not exceed 15% of the bank's
"unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus." This limit can rise to
25% if the portion above 15% is fully secured. 18 The percentage limits
are also fixed. Consequently, the President has no discretion to alter
them; he can only determine whether there have been violations.
4. Twisting Arms
The U.S. system for regulating and supervising banks and other
entities that provide private credit to foreigners is labyrinthine-involv-
ing numerous federal as well as state agencies.219  Nevertheless, the
216. First, any countries which are members of both the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund are exempted from the Act. Id. Second, the U.S. Attorney General, presuming that
corporate branches function independently, concluded that the Act does not apply to loans from
foreign branches of U.S. banks, a large loophole today since many U.S. banks have overseas
branches. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 398, 401-402 (1939). Third, the statute has also been interpreted as not
prohibiting trade financing (such as for exports), as distinguished from general purpose loans. 42
Op. Att'y Gen. 357, 362 (1967).
217. Corse & Nichols, United States Government Regulation of International Lending by
American Banks in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 105 (R. Rendell ed. 1980). See generally
Note, The Policies Behind Lending Limits: An Argument for a Uniform Country Exposure Ceiling, 99
HARV. L. REv. 430 (1985) (reviewing lending limits for U.S. banks).
218. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1), (2) (1982). Research failed to unearth any careful, published
calculations of what these lending limits mean in practice. The legislative history of the 1983
amendments to the statute, however, provide some data. A House Report provided several banks'
capital figures in June 1982, based on a definition close to the regulatory one in 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.2(c),
3.100 (1987). Based on these figures, a 15% lending limit would have allowed Citibank to lend $771
million to a single borrower and Chase Manhattan to lend $478 million. H.R. REP. No. 175, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 36 n.2 (statistics drawn from Federal Reserve Board, June 1982, Consolidated
Reports of Condition), reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1898, 1919.
Moreover, it appears that many banks have significantly increased their capital since 1982. See
CHASE MANHATTAN CORP., 1985 ANNUAL REPORT (1986).
219. See generally TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 18 (July 2, 1984). This is the report of an Executive Branch interagency group.
1987] 1215
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
extensive and intensive federal regulation provides only rare opportuni-
ties for the President to influence the flow of private credit for foreign
policy reasons.
In the past, U.S. banking regulators were primarily concerned with
the management of domestic savings and credit flows, the growth of the
money supply, and the protection of domestic depositors, borrowers, and
investors. The foreign operations of U.S. banks were considered largely
irrelevant to these concerns.22°
Under pressure from Congress, the three federal agencies supervis-
ing foreign lending-the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-began
to take a more aggressive role. In 1979, the agencies established the
Interagency Country Evaluation Review Committee (ICERC) to evalu-
ate and classify the riskiness of U.S. banks' outstanding loans. Bank
examiners are required to use the ICERC ratings in examining the
soundness of a bank's international operations.22' Growing concern over
the international debt crisis then spurred passage of the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983.222 Among its many important provi-
sions, the Act authorized the regulators to require beefed-up capital and
loan-loss reserves to strengthen banks against potential losses on foreign
loans. These changes have made federal regulation of foreign lending
more intensive and more uniform.
The present U.S. regulatory system, however, provides the President
with only very limited influence to control private credit to a foreign
country for foreign policy reasons. The President could try to operate in
either of two ways: (1) by attempting to influence the ICERC's categori-
zation of a country so that banks would be more hesitant to make loans
to it; or, more directly, (2) by pressuring banks to restrict lending to a
country regardless of its credit rating.
Reclassification could be a potent sanction in discouraging new
lending to a targeted country. If, for example, the ICERC rates loans to
a country as "value-impaired," banks with such loans are required to set
up special reserves, called Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves.223 The
money that banks set aside must come out of their current earnings,
which hurts their quarterly reports and could reduce the price of their
stock.
220. Lissakers, Bank Regulation and International Debt, in UNCERTAIN FUTURE:
COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE THIRD WORLD 48-49 (R. Feinberg and V. Kallab eds. 1984).
221. Stokes, Mystery Surrounds Agenda, Decisions of Foreign Loan Review Committee, 17
NAT'L J. 2136, 2136-37 (1985); Lissakers, supra note 220, at 54, 59.
222. Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. IX, 97 Stat. 1278 (1983) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (Supp.
IV 1986)).
223. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(b)(2), 211.43(b)(2), 351.1(b)(2)(ii) (1987); see Stokes, supra note 221, at
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Because the ICERC's members are bank examiners from the Office
of the Comptroller, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, there is some concern in the banking community
that the White House can influence the review committee's decisions
through the Treasury or State Department.224
The President's power to influence country classifications, however,
seems very limited. First, the target country must in fact be near the
substandard or value-impaired situation. A country that is regularly
making payments on its debts seems relatively invulnerable to this tactic.
Second, the discretion of the review committee and the regulatory agen-
cies is generally confined by the detailed criteria for the various
categories.225
The President might also try, directly or indirectly, to pressure
banks not to extend credit to a target country. For example, a bank that
continued to make loans to target countries might encounter regulatory
obstacles to opening new branches or getting access to discount loans, or
its loan portfolios might be more closely supervised.2 26
Such presidential pressure would probably encounter serious opposi-
tion and would, at best, be only partially successful. First, given the lack
of clear statutory authority, the President would have to expend consid-
erable political capital to ensure cooperation.22 7 Second, the banks
would have a commercial interest in continuing to lend to a target coun-
try that was a good credit risk. Bank officers have a duty to act in the
best interests of their shareholders, and would thus be reluctant to make
decisions for foreign policy reasons that would be contrary to the share-
holders' interest in making profits. Finally, the President would be oper-
ating against a long-standing tradition of an arm's-length relationship
between banks and the U.S. government.228
224. Stokes, supra note 221, at 2138. Critics have charged that the ICERC's handling of Peru's
debts in June 1985 is an example of bending to political pressure. See id. at 2138-39.
225. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3904 (Supp. IV 1986). But cf Stokes, supra note 221, at 2138-39.
226. During the Polish debt crisis in early 1982, for instance, some U.S. officials wanted to
pressure U.S. banks to declare Poland in default. After considerable debate and confusion, the
Reagan administration took no such action. J. SPINDLER, supra note 208, at 198. In an analogous
situation, the Executive Branch apparently tried to influence U.S. banks to refinance and expand
their loans to financially troubled developing countries in late 1982 and early 1983, in order to
maintain international financial stability. For example, the Federal Reserve informed commercial
banks that they would not be criticized if they renewed or even increased by seven percent their
loans to Mexico. On the other hand, banks failing to do this would find their Mexican loans coming
under closer scrutiny by bank examiners. Id. at 197 n.38; Heinemann, A Fed Push on Foreign Loans
Seen, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
227. See Koschik, Foreign Policy Motivated Credit Restrictions: Potential Bases ofAuthority and
a Practical Analysis, 16 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 539, 553 n.68 (1984).
228. During interviews conducted by one expert in late 1982, senior executives at several of the
largest banks "indicated a general unwillingness to cooperate with any attempt by the U.S.
Government to instruct them on where and when to lend internationally." J. SPINDLER, supra note
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E. International Financial Institutions
The international financial institutions (IFI's), such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank, control billions of dollars.
Their decisions are often critical to the survival or health of a country's
government. Thus, on first impression, the IFI's appear to be attractive
vehicles for the United States to advance its foreign policy goals.
The United States, however, has only a limited ability to influence
the IFI's, because of their apolitical purposes and their multilateral deci-
sionmaking. The small influence that the U.S. government has in the
IFI's usually arises from building alliances with other countries and from
informal persuasion, and not from formal voting power.
The IFI's include the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
four multilateral development banks (MDB's): the World Bank
Group,22 9 the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), and the African Development Bank
(AFDB). While the purposes of the IMF and the MDB's differ, all have
nonpolitical objectives.
The IMF is designed to promote international monetary coopera-
tion and stability in foreign exchange. The IMF provides its 149 member
countries with assistance only on balance of payment problems, and does
not extend development assistance.23 ° In contrast, the MDB's seek to
assist in the economic and social development of developing countries.
The World Bank makes loans to assist developing countries around the
world, and the other banks help countries in particular regions. Each
bank provides ordinary loans (at near-market rates of interest) and con-
cessional loans (at reduced interest rates).231
208, at 200-01. To be sure, some U.S. banks are sensitive to U.S. foreign policy, but for purely
commercial reasons. For example, if the United States is strongly committed to supporting a foreign
government, the banks are more comfortable lending to that country because of the likelihood that
the United States would devote additional resources to protect that government if troubles arise. Id.
at 201.
229. The World Bank Group consists of three institutions: the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or, more commonly, the World Bank), the International
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
230. A. CHANDAVARKAR, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ITS FINANCIAL
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES I (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 42, 1984). Gross drawings on IMF
resources during fiscal year 1984, by 86 member countries, amounted to about $11.4 billion.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 3 (1985) (annual report to the President and Congress for fiscal year
1984) [hereinafter INT'L FINANCE].
231. Concessional loans are reserved for the poorest countries and sometimes for special types
of projects. The MDB's are the largest source of governmental development assistance to the
developing nations. In U.S. fiscal year 1986, the banks made loans and other financial commitments
totalling about $23.1 billion-$17.5 billion from the World Bank Group, $2.3 billion from the IDB,
$1.9 billion from the ADB, and $1.3 billion from the AFDB. FY 1986 INT'L FINANCE, supra note
230, at 15-20.
The charters of the IFI's specify their nonpolitical objectives. The World Bank Charter, for
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These objectives of the IMF and the development banks are gener-
ally consistent with U.S. policies of encouraging international monetary
stability and the development of less-developed countries. Problems
arise, however, when the United States seeks to use the IFI's for its own
foreign policy purposes. For example, the United States has tried to cut
off IFI assistance to leftist governments and to governments that engage
in gross violations of human rights.232 It has attempted to inject these
foreign policy goals into IFI decisionmaking either as a result of an
independent Executive Branch decision (as with Chile in 1970-73 and
Nicaragua currently), or as a result of congressionally initiated
legislation.233
U.S. laws address a wide range of activities by a recipient country.
The strictest statutes instruct the U.S. director at an IFI to oppose loans
to an offending country. For example, certain laws instruct U.S. direc-
tors at the MDB's to oppose assistance to a country if its government
expropriates U.S. property without paying prompt, adequate, and effec-
tive compensation;2 34 provides refuge to airplane hijackers; or engages in
a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.2 35 U.S. directors have frequently opposed loans on these grounds,
though some critics argue that the laws should be invoked more often.236
The United States can raise these foreign policy considerations
through its formal votes and by lobbying other member countries and the
institutions' staffs. Since decisionmaking structures at the IMF, World
example, provides that "the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions .. " IBRD
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, art. IV, § 10. In addition, some IFI charters prohibit the institution
from accepting contributions with strings attached. E.g., ADB CHARTER, art. 36, § 2.
232. See infra text accompanying notes 235-36, 241, 243.
233. As concluded in Part VI below, further U.S. efforts to politicize the IFI's seem unwise-
not only are these efforts likely to fail, but they could weaken the effectiveness of the IFI's at a time
when these institutions are playing a critical role in dealing with problems of Third World debt and
international financial stability.
234. See, eg., 22 U.S.C. §§ 283r (IDB), 284j (IDA), 285o (ADB) (1982). The President may
waive these provisions if the parties have submitted the dispute to international arbitration or if
good-faith negotiations are underway. Id.
235. 22 U.S.C. § 262d (1982 & Supp. III 1985). There is an exception in the last two cases if the
assistance is for programs which serve the basic human needs of the country's citizens. 22 U.S.C.
§ 262d(f) (1982). Although the U.S. director at the IMF is not under such constraints with respect
to expropriation or human rights issues, the law does require him to oppose IMF assistance to
countries harboring terrorists, to communist dictatorships, and to countries practicing apartheid. 22
U.S.C. §§ 286e-ll (terrorists), 286aa (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (communist dictatorships and
apartheid systems).
236. Curry & Royce, Enforcing Human Rights: Congress and the Multilateral Banks, INT'L
POL'Y REP. 12-18 (Feb. 1985). See also infra note 243 and accompanying text (discussion of Chile).
The dispute illustrates the difficulty with attempting to force the Executive Branch to act against its
wishes on the basis of general criteria.
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Bank, and regional banks are similar,237 these institutions are treated col-
lectively here.
1. Voting Systems
Voting power in the IMF and World Bank is primarily a function of
the relative economic strength of member countries. Each member
receives an equal, small allocation of basic votes, and the remaining votes
are distributed according to levels of contributions (or quotas). Gener-
ally, a simple majority of the votes cast is sufficient to resolve a member's
financial request.238
The IMF/World Bank model strongly influenced the voting systems
adopted by the regional development banks. While there are some
important differences, all the banks employ the approach of a basic vote
plus weighted votes, with the latter allocated according to the member's
subscription. 239 Formal votes on loan decisions generally require a
majority vote.
One exception to the usual simple majority is the two-thirds vote
required by the IDB's Fund for Special Operations (FSO)-its conces-
sional loan window. IDB rules also provide that the voting power of the
member with the largest number of shares cannot be less than 34.5%.24
Thus, as the largest shareholder, the United States effectively exercises
veto power over all FSO loans.
Otherwise, the United States lacks the unilateral voting clout to
block assistance from the regular fund of the IDB or from the other
IFI's. The U.S. voting percentages are far less than a majority in each
case. They are approximately 19% in the IMF, from 18.4 to 27.6% in
the World Bank Group, 34.5% in the IDB, 13.9% in the ADB, and
5.5% in the AFDB.24' Moreover, these percentages have generally
237. Each institution has a Board of Executive Directors that votes on requests for financial
assistance and oversees other operations. See Zamora, Voting in International Economic
Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 566, 577 (1980).
238. Id. at 576-77, 595.
239. Id. at 577-78.
240. IDB ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, art. IV, § 9(b), art. VIII, § 4(b). The United States has
sought since 1986 to increase its voting power in order to have a near-unilateral veto over all loans
the IDB makes. This effort was rebuffed in March 1987. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1987, at DI, col.
1; see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at D2, col. 4. U.S. efforts continue, however. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 12, 1988, at D3, col. 4. 1
241. See respectively: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 1986 at 120;
WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 1987 at 179 (IBRD), 195 (IDA);
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 1986 at 59 (IFC); INTER-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK ANNUAL REPORT 1986 at 126 (1987); ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
ANNUAL REPORT 1984 at 78 (1985); FY 1986 INT'L FINANCE, supra note 230, at 294 (AFDB).
Ethiopia and human rights provide two case studies of the limited ability of the United States to
influence IFI decisionmaking through formal voting. The United States consistently opposed IFI
loans to Ethiopia's Soviet-oriented Mengistu regime between 1977-85, primarily because of an
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declined over time as other countries' contributions have grown, and
U.S. subscriptions have become a relatively smaller proportion of the
total.
2. Alliances and Informal Persuasion
Most decisions on loan requests are decided not by formal vote, but
by the IFI executive boards through informal consensus.242 Thus, it is
often difficult to determine when pressure by one country is instrumental
in a loan request being approved, rejected, or never even receiving formal
consideration. U.S. officials have emphasized this to discount the rele-
vance of the United States' limited voting power and the poor U.S. rec-
ord in winning formal votes.243
expropriation dispute. Nevertheless, the United States lost on all 35 votes it either cast against
Ethiopia or abstained on during this period. This conclusion is based on an analysis of the relevant
annual reports by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies.
See supra note 230.
Compare negative U.S. votes and abstentions with IFI loan approvals as reported in FY 1985
INT'L FINANCE, supra note 230, at 196; FY 1984 id. at 69; FY 1983 id. at 85-86, 102, 178-79; FY
1982 id. at 89, 107-08, 200-01; FY 1981 id. at 93, 113-14; FY 1980 id. at 107; FY 1979 id. at 103,
228; FY 1978 id. at 109, 135, 252; FY 1977 id. at 124, 145. Of the 35 votes, three U.S. abstentions
were on human rights grounds. See FY 1978 id. at 109 (IDA loan vote in April 1978); FY 1977 id.
at 124 (IDA loan votes in May 1977).
On human rights generally, since the 1977 enactment of the Harkin Amendment, Pub. L. No.
95-118, § 701, 91 Stat. 1069 (1977) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262d (Supp. III 1985)), the United States
has frequently voted in the MDB's against loans to countries with poor records on human rights.
For example, from 1977 through September 1981, the United States voted "no" or abstained 118
times on human rights grounds. However, all 118 loans were approved, and U.S. opposition
apparently did not cause any significant diminution in lending to countries that allegedly violated
human rights. J. SANFORD, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
203-04 (1982). Another scholar concludes, however, that "the Carter administration policy served
to deter loan application [sic] [to MDB's] by Latin America's most repressive governments." L.
SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 299 (1981).
242. J. SANFORD, supra note 241, at 8.
243. See id. at 185. The case studies of Nicaragua and Chile illustrate the U.S. influence-and
its limits-through informal methods versus formal voting.
During fiscal years 1977-85, the U.S. voted against seven loans to Nicaragua, but succeeded in
blocking only one. Of the seven loan requests, two were from the World Bank and five from the
IDB. See FY 1985 INT'L FINANCE, supra note 230, at 183-97; FY 1984 id. at 69; FY 1983 id. at 85-
86; FY 1982 id. at 89; FY 1981 id. at 93; FY 1980 id. at 107; FY 1979 id. at 103; FY 1978 id. at 109;
FY 1977 id. at 124. See also U.S. Dep't of Treasury, U.S. Negative Votes and Abstentions in the
MDBs for Economic and/or Financial Reasons (May 6, 1985) (internal memorandum) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Treasury Dep't Memorandum]. The isolated success came when Nicaragua
requested a concessional loan from the IDB's Fund for Special Operations, where the United States
has a veto power. Reportedly, all other 42 members of the IDB voted for the loan, and the U.S.
position generated severe criticism from other board members, including Britain and West
Germany. Wash. Post, July 30, 1983, at D8, col. 1. (Strangely, no record of this vote appears in
either FY 1983 INT'L FINANCE, supra note 230, at 86, or in Treasury Dep't Memorandum, supra, at
4, listing all U.S. negative votes and abstentions in the MDB's from fiscal year 1975 through the
spring of 1985.)
The United States has had more success in stopping loans by applying informal pressure.
Apparently in part because of U.S. pressure, there has been a sharp decrease in IDB lending to
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Overall, the United States has only limited ability to use the IFI's to
impose economic sanctions for its own foreign policy reasons. Moreover,
the prospects for the U.S. increasing its use of the IFI's are poor. First,
in a period of domestic budgetary restraint, U.S. contributions to the
Nicaragua in recent years. After receiving loans for $34.4 million in 1982 and $30.7 million in 1983,
Nicaragua received no new loans from 1984 through January 1988. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1988,
at D3, col. 1; telephone interview with Joseph U. Hinshaw, Assoc. Deputy for External Relations
Advisor, IDB (June 23, 1987); see N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, at A8, col. 1; see also INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 88, 105-09 (1987) (for calendar year
1986); FY 1985 INT'L FINANCE, supra note 230, at 144; FY 1984 id. at 142; FY 1983 id. at 159; FY
1982 id. at 175-76. U.S. pressure has been considerable, and not always quiet. For example,
Secretary of State George Shultz sent an unprecedented private letter to IDB President Mena urging
the IDB not to approve a particular loan to Nicaragua. Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 1. See
also Treasury News, May 16, 1985, at 4; N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, at A8, col. 1; Wash. Post, Feb.
19, 1988, at F3, col. 3.
Nicaragua has also experienced a drought in assistance from the World Bank Group, receiving
no aid since a $16 million IBRD loan in January 1982. Telephone interview with Antonio Pimenta-
Neva, Public Affairs Office, World Bank (June 23, 1987); see FY 1985 INT'L FINANCE, supra note
230, at 285, 293; FY 1984 id. at 111; FY 1983 id. at 123; FY 1982 id. at 134 (together indicating no
loans through Sept. 30, 1985). The reasons for the World Bank situation are not entirely clear.
However, recently Nicaragua has been in arrears on loan repayments to the World Bank, which
automatically disqualifies it from receiving new lending. Telephone interview with Antonio
Pimenta-Neva, supra.
In the case of Chile, the U.S. effort to apply economic pressure on the leftist Allende
government during the early 1970s constitutes one of the most controversial, and possibly most
effective, examples of targeting a country within the IFI's. In 1970, when Salvadore Allende was
elected President of Chile, President Nixon privately called for U.S. actions to "make the [Chilean]
economy scream." Intelligence Activities, Senate Resolution 21: Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., vol. 7, at 96 (1975) (handwritten notes by CIA Director Helms). Nixon issued a secret
National Security Memorandum that called for pressure on IFI's to limit assistance to Chile. S.
HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER 294-96 (1983).
Chile experienced a substantial decline in MDB lending during the Allende period. There is
general agreement that U.S. pressure did influence the IDB to reduce sharply its lending. See, e.g., J.
SANFORD, supra note 241, at 212; Sigmund, The "Invisible Blockade" and the Overthrow of Allende,
52 FOREIGN AFF. 322, 327 (1974). The evidence is less clear on U.S. success in blocking new World
Bank loans to Chile. Compare Sigmund, supra, at 326-28, 338 (U.S. pressure instrumental) with J.
SANFORD, supra note 241, at 211 (World Bank acted on unrelated macroeconomic considerations),
But cf H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 680-83 (1979) (while acknowledging U.S. pressures,
Kissinger concludes that Allende's own policies caused his downfall).
A second chapter in the Chilean case has begun. Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, disclosed in July 1986 that the Reagan administration was giving
serious consideration to voting "no" on IFI loans to Chile unless Chile significantly improved its
human rights record. The signal of possible U.S. opposition in July apparently led Chile in August
to ask the World Bank and IDB to postpone final consideration of its pending loans. The loan
requests, which were expected to be voted on in September or October, were delayed until
November. The United States then abstained on the World Bank vote approving a $250 million loan
to Chile. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1986, at A3, col. 4; id., July 31, 1986, at Al, col. 1. The continuing
resoution for most FY 1988 funding for the U.S government includes a provision that the United
States should oppose all loans to Chile from MDB's, except for those loans for basic needs, until the
government of Chile ends its gross abuse of internationally recognized human rights and takes
significant steps to restore democracy. 1988 Appropriations Act, supra note 90, § 551; see also id.
§ 577 (general statement of U.S. policy toward Chile, with an emphasis on the need for the Chilean
government to return to democracy).
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IFI's are likely to decline, rather than increase, relative to other coun-
tries. As a result, U.S. voting power is likely to decline slightly. Second,
given the apolitical nature of the IFI's, there is no reason to expect that
countries that are otherwise friendly to the United States are any more
likely to go along with special U.S. foreign policy interests now than in
the past. This does not rule out, of course, the possibility of cooperation
among countries in more extreme situations.
F Other Relevant U.S. Laws
Besides the U.S. laws that deal primarily with one type of economic
activity, such as exports or private financial transactions, there are laws
that span several types of economic activity, and that give the President
some power to impose economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes.
The two principal examples are the antiboycott laws and the U.N. Partic-
ipation Act.2' 4
L The Antiboycott Laws: The United States Strikes Back
In reaction to the continuing Arab boycott of Israel, the United
States has imposed major limits on U.S. business activities that comply
with or support any boycott that is not approved by the United States
and that is directed against a friendly country.245 The U.S. antiboycott
244. Another statute broadly applicable on its face is 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982). Passed in 1868,
it was dubbed the "Hostage Act" during the Iranian hostage litigation. It provides that when a U.S.
citizen has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by a foreign government, "the President shall use
such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or
effectuate the release .... Id.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S, 654, 677 (1981), the Court grouped the Hostage Act
with IEEPA as "highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional acceptance of a broad
scope for executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this case." Nevertheless, the
statute's age, legislative history, and rare use suggest that section 1732 should have little life left in it.
See Mikva & Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and the "Hostage Act, " 49 U. CMI. L. REV. 292, 353-54
(1982).
A new law that does not fit in the categories discussed above (such as exports and imports) is
the 1987 provision that denies tax credits to U.S. companies for the taxes paid by their subsidiaries in
South Africa. See infra discussion at note 255. Using the tax laws to impose sanctions for foreign
policy purposes is relatively rare. Previously, the major use of the tax laws for such purposes is the
provisions against the Arab boycott. See infra note 245.
245. The principal antiboycott law is section 8 of the EAA. EAA Amendments of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-52, tit. II, 91 Stat. 235 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app. (1982)). See,
especially, § 2407.
Prior to the passage of the 1977 EAA amendments, opponents of the Arab boycott added
provisions to the tax laws in 1976. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-445, §§ 1061-1064,
1066-1067, 90 Stat. 1525, 1649-50, 1654 (codified in scattered sections of the I.R.C.). The
provisions, popularly known as the "Ribicoff Amendment" after their Senate sponsor, were designed
to discourage "participat[ing] in or cooperat[ing] with" an international boycott. I.R.C. § 908
(1982).
Although the U.S. government has apparently brought no new antitrust suits based on boycott
activities since 1977, it could do so in the future. See United States v. Bechtel Corp., 1979 Trade
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laws further a number of American foreign policy interests-maintaining
close ties to Israel, opposing discrimination against ethnic groups, and
protecting U.S. sovereignty against unreasonable efforts by foreign states
to regulate U.S. business.
The antiboycott laws are not an affirmative, but rather a reactive,
weapon. Other countries must act before the laws are triggered. Given
the reactive nature of the laws and their focus on only the Arab boy-
cott,24 6 a detailed examination of their complicated, often subtle, provi-
sions is beyond the scope of this Article.
2. The U.N. Participation Act: But for the Veto
Section 287c of the U.N. Participation Act of 1945247 gives the Pres-
ident sweeping powers to impose the full range of economic sanctions
when they are mandated by the U.N. Security Council. The President is
authorized to "regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic rela-
tions or ... communication" between any foreign country or national
and any one subject to U.S. jurisdiction.248
The Security Council has broad powers under article 41 of the U.N.
Charter to call for the "complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and ... communication."249 The Security Council has acted,
however, in only two situations where the President then used his
authority under section 287c to impose economic sanctions-against
Rhodesia25 and South Africa.251
Cas. (CCH), 1 62,429 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 648 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981). The 1977 amendments to the EAA were generally perceived to supplant future
uses of the antitrust laws, even though the statute specified that it did not "supersede or limit the
operation of the antitrust... laws." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(4) (1982).
For excellent discussions of the Arab boycott and the resulting U.S. legislation, see both 3 A.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 307-423
(1983); Fenton, United States Antiboycott Laws: An Assessment of Their Impact Ten Years After
Adoption, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 211 (1987).
246. See 52 Fed. Reg. 17,284 (May 7, 1987) (announcement by the Department of Commerce
that the antiboycott regulations at 15 C.F.R. pt. 369 do not apply to foreign boycotts against South
Africa).
247. 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1982).
248. Id.
249. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. The Security Council may call for economic sanctions after
determining the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Id.
at art. 39. Before recommending action under article 41, the Security Council may ask the parties
concerned to comply with any "provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable." Id. at art.
40.
250. The Security Council first explicitly used its article 41 authority against Rhodesia. The
Security Council called for selective mandatory sanctions in 1966 and for comprehensive sanctions
in 1968. Relying on section 287c, President Johnson issued Executive Orders, implementing the
U.N. resolutions and controlling transactions with Rhodesia. E.g., Exec. Order No. 11,419, 33 Fed.
Reg. 10,837 (1968) (implementing S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions) at 5-7
(1968) (comprehensive sanctions)); Exec. Order No. 11,322, 32 Fed. Reg. 119 (1967) (implementing
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In recent decades, the Security Council has had trouble mandating
any action, usually because of a veto by one or more of its five permanent
members.2  In particular, the conflicting interests of the United States
and the Soviet Union generally make it difficult for the Council to agree
on unified action in any international crises.253
G. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, passed by Con-
S.C. Res. 232, 21(2) U.N. SCOR Supp. (Resolutions and Decisions) at 7-9 (1966) (selective
sanctions)).
In 1971, Congress cut a hole in these U.S. sanctions by passing the so-called Byrd Amendment,
which allowed the importation of some strategic materials from Rhodesia. 50 U.S.C. § 98-98h
(1976). The statute was upheld in Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1973). The Amendment was repealed in 1977. United Nations Participation Act
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-12, 91 Stat. 22 (1977). For an excellent account of this period, see 3 A.
LOWENFELD, supra note 245, at 452-535.
The U.S. sanctions were terminated in December 1979 when an arrangement was reached for
majority rule in Rhodesia, soon to be called Zimbabwe. Exec. Order 12,183, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,787
(1979). The U.N. also ended its call for sanctions at that time. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1979, at 8, col.
4.
251. In 1977, the Security Council called for an embargo on shipments of arms, munitions, and
military equipment to or from South Africa. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
33 (1977). Later Council resolutions against South Africa include S.C. Res. 569 of July 1985.
Pursuant to the arms export acts, the United States had limited such exports before the 1977
resolution.
Indeed, U.S. sanctions against South Africa have been more thoroughgoing than those
mandated by the Security Council resolutions, and are based on other U.S. laws as well as section
287c. For example, when President Reagan imposed new sanctions against South Africa in
September 1986, he cited section 287c as but one of the bases for his actions. See Exec. Order No.
12,232, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985).
252. For example, in February 1987, the United States and Great Britain both vetoed a
resolution that would have imposed further mandatory sanctions on South Africa. N.Y. Times, Feb.
21, 1987, at 3, col. 1. These were similar to those approved by Congress over President Reagan's
veto in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, discussed infra text accompanying notes
254-71.
Of the Security Council's 15 members, the permanent ones are China, France, the Soviet Union,
Great Britain, and the United States. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1.
253. In the 1979-80 Iranian hostage situation, the United States had hoped to use the U.N.
Security Council to develop and generate support for multilateral sanctions. A proposed ban on
most exports to Iran was negotiated with U.S. allies and Third World countries, but the proposal
was stymied by a Soviet veto in January 1980. While some U.S. allies later imposed sanctions
unilaterally against Iran, there was greater wariness to do so because of the lack of "the protective
shield of a U.N. vote." Carswell & Davis, The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and
Sanctions, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra note 39, at 173, 196-98.
As of February 1988, there was some hope for a Security Council resolution imposing an arms
embargo against Iran because of Iran's refusal to accept a July 1987 Council resolution calling for a
cease-fire in the seven-year-old war with Iraq. In December 1987, the 15 Security Council members
announced that they were ready to proceed with an embargo. Efforts to draft a resolution, however,
reportedly were slowed by Soviet hesitation to support it. The Soviets apparently wanted further
efforts at diplomacy and were chary of offending the Iranians. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1988, at 4, col.
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gress over President Reagan's veto,254 provides a contrast to the haphaz-
ard statutory scheme governing most uses of economic sanctions by the
United States in the absence of a declared national emergency. Focused
on South Africa, the Anti-Apartheid Act provides for a variety of con-
trols on bilateral government programs, exports, imports, and private
financial transactions.255 While the Act suggests approaches to restruc-
turing the U.S. framework for imposing sanctions, it is geographically
limited, provides very little discretion to the President, and required
years of effort in Congress to become law.
The United States first imposed sanctions against South Africa in
1963, by limiting arms sales, partly at the urging of the United Nations.
Despite occasional backsliding, the United States gradually increased the
type and severity of its sanctions through 1985. President Reagan pre-
empted new congressional action in September 1985 by declaring a
national emergency and invoking his powers under IEEPA. He then
ordered by regulation most of the sanctions that Congress had been
about to pass.256
Congress returned to the subject with the Anti-Apartheid Act. It
includes several important new measures, and writes into law most of the
sanctions that Reagan had imposed the preceding year. By and large, the
Act's provisions are mandatory and precise. The President's discretion is
thus considerably confined, though he is given some flexibility on the
details of implementation.
As for U.S. government programs, the principal provision prohibits
the airlines of either South Africa or the United States from taking off or
landing in the other country.2 57 The Act also codifies a 1985 regulation
requiring any U.S. national in South Africa (including U.S.-controlled
corporations) to observe the Sullivan Principles, a set of fair employment
254. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5001-5116 (West Supp.
1987)) [hereinafter the Anti-Apartheid Act]. The House of Representatives voted on September 29
to override the veto by 313-83, and then the Senate voted 78-21 on October 2.
255. The Act did not contain any provisions regarding international financial institutions.
However, a separate 1983 law instructed the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF actively to oppose
IMF funding for any country that practiced apartheid. 22 U.S.C. § 286aa(b) (Supp. III 1985).
In the continuing resolution for FY 1988, Congress included a new sanction again South
Africa-the denial of tax credits to U.S. companies for taxes paid by their subsidiaries in South
Africa. The new law prevented the U.S. companies from crediting the taxes paid in South Africa
against the companies' tax bills in the United States on a dollar-for-dollar basis, as is generally
allowed for taxes paid to other countries. The full impact of this provision is still not clear. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 25, 1987, at Dl, col. 3.
256. For a discussion of the use of IEEPA, see infra text accompanying notes 272-336. For an
earlier history of U.S. sanctions, see supra note 251 and any of a number of histories on the South
African sanctions, such as K. DANAHER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD
SOUTH AFRICA (1985).
257. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5056. See Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1986, at D9, col. 4.
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practices. 8
The new law also adds export controls. Subject to certain excep-
tions, it prohibits the export of crude oil and petroleum products to all
customers in South Africa, and essentially codifies existing regulations
against exporting most nuclear goods or technology, computers, and
arms to South African government agencies.25 9 The limits on petroleum
-will have little economic impact, since U.S. oil exports to South Africa
totaled only about $33 million in 1985, and South Africa has many alter-
native sources.260 Nevertheless, after the unhappy lessons learned from
the imposition of only partial sanctions against Italy by the League of
Nations and against Rhodesia by the United Nations, there is considera-
ble symbolic value in cutting off petroleum exports.26 ' Overall, however,
the export controls will not reduce substantially the recent level of U.S.
exports to South Africa (which totaled about $1.2 billion in 1985)262
because the controls over items other than petroleum were already in
place under existing regulations.
The import controls are more extensive. The Act codifies President
Reagan's import restrictions on gold coins, nuclear goods and technol-
ogy, and arms. Moreover, it adds new prohibitions against imports of
uranium, coal, iron, steel, textiles, sugar, and other agricultural products,
as well as against most items from any South African entity that is
owned, controlled, or subsidized by the South African government.2 63
The continued ban against the kruggerand will probably have the
greatest impact of all the import controls. U.S. imports of the gold coin
had reached about $600 million in 1984, accounting for about 50% of
South Africa's kruggerand exports.264 The prohibitions on the new items
seem to be a pragmatic mixture of controls designed to hurt South
Africa's economy and those designed to improve the chances of the bill's
258. Failure to adhere to the principles means that the U.S. government will not intercede on
behalf of that national "with any foreign government or foreign national regarding the export
marketing activities [by the U.S. national] in any country." 22 U.S.C.A. § 5034.
259. Id. §§ 5071 (oil), 5057 (nuclear items), 5054 (computers), 5067-5068 (arms). See generally
Paretzky, The United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: An Analysis of the Laws,
Regulations, and Loopholes, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 133 (1987).
260. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. EXPORTS 1091 (Pub. FT455/1985 Dec. and Annual
1986).
261. The failure of the League's sanctions against Italy in 1935-36 for its invasion of Ethiopia
was partly attributed to the omission of petroleum from the commodities embargoed. See supra note
20. Although the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia sought to stop petroleum shipments, Rhodesia
was easily able to circumvent this attempted barrier. 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 245, at 458-59;
see also supra text accompanying notes 247-53 (discussing U.N. sanctions in detail).
262. 2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 260, at 1090.
263. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5051 (gold coins), 5052 (military articles), 5053 (parastatal organizations),
5057 (nuclear items), 5059 (uranium, coal, and textiles), 5069 (agricultural products), 5070 (iron and
steel), 5059 (sugar).
264. Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1985, at A14, col. 3.
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passage in Congress. Overall, it is estimated that these new prohibitions
account for about $300-350 million of the $2.2 billion worth of U.S.
imports from South Africa.265 At least as important as their economic
impact, the bans against steel, textiles, and agricultural products also
appealed to powerful producer constituencies in the United States. These
provisions were added during the Senate floor debate in August 1986.266
The Act's most path-breaking provisions are probably its three
major restrictions on private financial transactions, since Congress had
not often relied on such measures before. First, the Act prohibits almost
all loans by U.S. nationals to the South African government or to any
entity owned or controlled by it.267 This ban is important, but not novel,
since it essentially extends the 1985 regulation, and banks had been vol-
untarily reducing their loans even before then.268  The Act's second
restriction is new, but less important. It prohibits U.S. banks from hold-
ing a deposit account for any South African government entity.269 This
limit on deposits and the loan restriction are apparently designed to
make it difficult for the South African government to do business in the
United States.
The third provision is both new and important. It prohibits U.S.
nationals from making "any new investment" in South Africa, except in
firms owned by black South Africans.27 ° This marks the first time in
recent years that Congress has specifically prohibited investment in a
particular country. Of course, in the two years prior to the law, many
U.S. businesses had apparently stopped making new investments in
South Africa, and some had even begun to divest.27' Nevertheless, if
South Africa somehow regained its financial stability and became attrac-
265. Id., Oct. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
266. Compare the Act as passed with S. 2701, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2334, as reported to the Senate on August 6. 132 CONG. REC. 510613
(daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986).
267. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5055. "Loan" is defined broadly to include, among other things, "any
transfer or extension of funds or credit on the basis of an obligation to repay." It did not include,
however, "normal short-term trade financing, as by letters of credit" or "rescheduling of existing
loans, if no new... funds are thereby extended." Id. § 5001(3).
268. According to one estimate, loans from U.S. banks dropped from nearly $5 billion in
September 1984 to $3.4 billion in September 1985. See Madison, supra note 207, at 1822.
269. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5058. There is an exception for accounts which are authorized by the U.S.
President for diplomatic or consular purposes. Id.
270. Id. § 5060. New investment is defined broadly to include "contributions of funds or other
assets" and "extension[s] of credit." It does not encompass, however, "the reinvestment of profits
generated by a controlled South African entity" into a South African entity, or situations where
funds are needed to allow a controlled South African entity to operate "in an economically sound
manner, without expanding its operations." Id. § 5001(4)(B). See also 51 Fed. Reg. 46,853 (1986)
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 545) (implementing regulations).
271. According to Department of Commerce figures, direct U.S. investment in South Africa
was about $1.3 billion in 1985, down from $2.3 billion in 1982. The data, however, are confounded
by the sharp drop in the value of the South African rand against the dollar, which reduces on paper
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tive again to foreign investors, the statute would act as a bar to new
investment.
The special case of sanctions against South Africa suggests possible
approaches to creating a comprehensive framework to govern the use of
economic sanctions in nonemergency situations. However, present U.S.
laws other than the Anti-Apartheid Act fall decidedly short of a compre-
hensive approach. Instead, the present haphazard statutory structure
provides the President with greatly varying authority for imposing differ-
ent types of sanctions. These laws can skew the President's decisionmak-
ing so that he will choose less effective sanctions, or those with greater
domestic costs, because they are more easily implemented.
IV
THE EMERGENCY LAWS
Faced with the great variation in his authority for imposing different
types of economic sanctions under the nonemergency statutes, the Presi-
dent can alternatively declare a national emergency and invoke his
sweeping emergency powers. Indeed, the present nonemergency laws
encourage the President to resort to declaring dubious national emergen-
cies, which open the door to nearly unlimited economic power that Con-
gress cannot effectively review or terminate. Consequently, any careful
analysis of the U.S. laws for economic sanctions must examine the emer-
gency as well as the nonemergency laws. This comprehensive analysis
provides the basis for recommending major changes in both sets of laws.
If the President is going to impose economic sanctions during a
declared emergency, the statutory vehicle will almost certainly be the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).272 It is
designed to deal with "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has
its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." '27 3 If
the President determines that such a threat exists, he may declare a
national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA).274
IEEPA then authorizes him to employ a wide range of economic sanc-
tions, such as cutting off exports or imports, or restricting private finan-
cial transactions.275
the value of U.S. investments. Even after correcting for changes in the exchange rate, though, the
data suggest that U.S. investment had declined. See Madison, supra note 207, at 1822.
272. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
273. Id. § 1701(a).
274. Id. The National Emergencies Act is codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)). As discussed below, the termination provisions were amended in 1985.
275. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1702 (1982). The key statutory language is as follows:
[T]he President may...
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
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IEEPA was passed in 1977 to replace the Trading with the Enemy
Act (TWEA),2 7 6 which had become "essentially an unlimited grant of
authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in
both the domestic and international economic arena, without congres-
sional review."2 7 7 TWEA is still applicable in wartime, and a grandfa-
ther provision preserves it as the statutory basis for peacetime controls
against certain countries such as Cuba.
A. The Evolution of IEEPA
IEEPA was, by all accounts, designed to allow the President limited
emergency powers in peacetime. The principal concerns with TWEA
were that it had granted such broad powers, that Presidents had used
these powers for actions unrelated to the declared national emergency,
and that there was no congressional review of the President's actions.278
TWEA was passed in 1917, when the United States entered World
War I, in order to "define, regulate, and punish trading with the enemy."
Section 5(b) gave the President broad powers over international financial
transactions in wartime. It exempted "transactions to be executed
wholly within the United States" and did not include a provision
allowing use during national emergencies.279
Nevertheless, confronted with a financial crisis in 1933, Franklin
Roosevelt in his first official act as President cited section 5(b) to declare
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking
institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any
foreign country or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest;
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
Id. § 1702(a)(1).
Before exercising these authorities, the President is directed "in every possible instance" to
consult with Congress. Id. § 1703(a). Moreover, if he does use IEEPA, he must immediately report
to Congress. Id. § 1703(b). The President can continue IEEPA sanctions until he decides to termi-
nate the emergency, unless Congress acts to terminate it by joint resolution. Nat'l Emergencies Act,
50 U.S.C. § 1622(a), (c), (d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
276. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982).
277. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
REFORM LEGISLATION, H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1977) [hereinafter HousE
IEEPA REPORT]; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS LEGISLATION, S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977)
[hereinafter SENATE IEEPA REPORT].
278. E.g., HOUSE IEEPA REPORT, supra note 277, at 9-11.
279. TWEA, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-19
(1982)).
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a national emergency, and then ordered a bank holiday. When Congress
convened, it "approved and confirmed" the President's actions retroac-
tively,280 and amended section 5(b) to provide that its authorities could
be used by the President when he declared a national emergency.28'
The period after World War II witnessed several important uses of
TWEA. For example, concerned with a balance of payments deficit,
President Nixon imposed a 10% surcharge on imports in August 1971.
In his proclamation, Nixon declared a national emergency, but did not
cite section 5(b) among his statutory authorities.282 The surcharge was
terminated four months later, but importers of Japanese zippers chal-
lenged it in Yoshida International, Inc. v. United States.283
A three-judge panel of the Customs Court found the surcharge inva-
lid because it was not within the President's authority under the existing
trade laws. Section 5(b)'s authority to "regulate ... importation" was
interpreted restrictively, so as not to include supplemental customs
duties.284 The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed.
While agreeing that the nonemergency trade laws did not authorize the
President's acts, the court found that Nixon had declared a national
emergency; that the surcharge was reasonably related to the broad
authorities of section 5(b); and that the surcharge was reasonably related
to the emergency.285
TWEA was also used to prohibit all, or most, trade and other finan-
cial transactions with several countries that were viewed as unfriendly.
Always relying on the 1950 national emergency declared for the Korean
War, Presidents imposed controls on China, North Korea, Cuba, Viet-
nam, and Cambodia from the 1950's through the 1970's. The extraterri-
torial scope of some of these controls gave rise on occasion to vehement
disagreements between the United States and its allies, presaging the
1982 pipeline dispute under the EAA.2 86
By the early 1970's, the questionable uses of TWEA had begun to
trouble many people. Moreover, the increasingly imperial Presidency
came under heavy congressional fire in the wake of Vietnam and Water-
gate. During 1972-77, Congress reasserted itself on a number of fronts,
sparking a renaissance of congressional influence in the making of U.S.
foreign policy.
280. Emergency Banking and Bank Conservation Act of 1933, ch. 1, § 1, 48 Stat. 1, 1 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 95b (1982)).
281. Id. § 2, 48 Stat. 1-2 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982)).
282. Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1972).
283. 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
284. Yoshida, 378 F. Supp. at 1173-76.
285. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 572, 578-80 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
286. See 3 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 245, at 91-105; see supra text accompanying notes 123-
30 (regarding the pipeline controls).
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One product of the renaissance was the 1976 passage of the National
Emergencies Act,287 which terminated all authorities possessed by the
President as a result of any past declaration of a national emergency.
Congress exempted, however, certain emergency statutes then in use
(including TWEA) because of their importance to the continued func-
tioning of the government.
Congress then proceeded the next year to amend TWEA to apply
only "[d]uring the time of war" and to existing declared emergencies.2 8
Consequently, economic sanctions against Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam,
and Cambodia continue today under TWEA.289
Except for countries still covered by TWEA, IEEPA is now the stat-
utory basis for economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes during a
declared national emergency. Congress tried to apply the lessons of the
TWEA experience to IEEPA by making the President's authority more
limited in scope and subject to strict procedural limitations. At the same
time, Congress recognized that the President's powers "should be suffi-
ciently broad and flexible to enable [him] to respond as appropriate and
necessary to unforeseen contingencies."290
B. Current Issues Surrounding ZEEPA
After ten years, IEEPA is alive and robust. Presidents have
resorted to it six times for five distinct purposes. It was first used in the
Iranian hostage crisis in 1979 to freeze about $12 billion in Iranian funds,
to cut off U.S. trade with Iran, and to limit U.S. travelers to Iran.2 91 It
287. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
288. Amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 1625
(1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1982)). The grandfather provision allowed the President to
continue to exercise "the authorities conferred upon [him] by section 5(b) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act which were being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977, as a result of a
national emergency declared by the President before such date." Id.
289. See 31 C.F.R. pts. 500, 515, 520 (1986); see also Fed. Reg. 33,397 (1987) (one-year
extension of certain TWEA authorities). A question did arise whether the President could, under
TWEA, expand the controls existing in 1977 against one of these countries, or whether resort to
IEEPA was needed. In Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), the Supreme Court, by a five to four
vote, effectively decided that reliance on TWEA was sufficient basis to expand controls against the
countries subject to the grandfathered controls. See generally Are the U.S. Treasury's Assets Control
Regulations a Fair and Effective Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy? The Case of Cuba, 1985 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. 169 (an informative discussion of the TWEA regulations against Cuba).
290. HOUSE IEEPA REPORT, supra note 277, at 10; see also Note, The International Emergency
Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1102, 1106 (1983) (IEEPA gives President broad power to impose controls).
291. Receiving reports that the government of Iran was about to withdraw its deposits from
U.S. banks, President Carter declared a national emergency on November 14, 1979, and, pursuant to
IEEPA, blocked the transfer of all property of the Iranian government. 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 2117 (Nov. 14, 1979). The order immediately froze about $12 billion of Iranian funds in U.S.
banks or in the possession of U.S. corporations, whether located in the United States or abroad. The
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was next employed to continue the Export Administration Act regula-
tions when that statute twice lapsed because of deadlocks within Con-
gress.2z 2 The uses of IEEPA have recently multiplied. President Reagan
has invoked IEEPA and imposed major sanctions three times since April
1985-against Nicaragua, 293 South Africa,294 and Libya.295
IEEPA controls were later expanded to cut off almost all trade with Iran. And, except for
journalists, travel was restricted by prohibiting financial transactions within Iran by U.S. citizens.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,205, 3 C.F.R. 248 (1981) (prohibiting exports or new loans to Iran);
Exec. Order No. 12,211, 3 C.F.R. 253 (1981) (prohibiting imports from Iran and financial
transactions with Iran, and restricting travel to Iran). A detailed account of the events is chronicled
in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN (P. Kreisberg ed. 1985) and G. SICK, ALL FALL DOWN (1985).
In 1981, President Carter and later President Reagan took a number of steps to implement the
so-called Algiers Agreements, which resulted in release of the hostages and the termination of the
U.S. sanctions. These included ordering the transfer of billions of dollars back to Iran or to trust
funds, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,277, 3 C.F.R. 105 (1982), as well as suspending claims against Iran
that were pending in U.S. courts. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1982).
All the Iranian sanctions and the actions to end them were upheld by U.S. courts under IEEPA,
except that the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675-90 (1981), looked to
additional authority to uphold the suspension of claims then pending in U.S. courts. See infra text
accompanying notes 324-36.
292. When the EAA expired on October 14, 1983, President Reagan declared the first of two
national emergencies to continue the existing EAA regulations. The EAA now is not due to expire
next until September 30, 1989. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (Supp. III 1985). See Harris & Bialos, The
Strange New World of United States Export Controls Under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 71, 74-75 (1985); see also Nuclear Pacific, Inc. v. United
States, No. C84-49R (W.D. Wash. June 8, 1984) (EAA regulations upheld under IEEPA, though
court allowed judicial review) (copy on file with California Law Review).
293. On May 1, 1985, President Reagan declared a national emergency and ordered a number of
sanctions against Nicaragua. These included: a ban on importation of Nicaraguan goods; a ban on
exports to Nicaragua, unless destined for the U.S.-backed contras; a prohibition on Nicaraguan air
carriers flying to or from points in the United States; and a prohibition on Nicaraguan vessels
entering U.S. ports. Exec. Order 12,513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1986). Reagan's order relied primarily on
IEEPA.
294. IEEPA sanctions against South Africa followed shortly after those against Nicaragua. On
September 9, 1985, Reagan declared a national emergency and imposed the new sanctions in
response to both a growing public outcry and imminent passage of sanctions by Congress. Exec.
Order No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1986); see also President's Remarks, Sept. 9, 1985, reprinted in 85
DEP'T ST. BULL. 1 (Oct. 1985).
While not comprehensive, the sanctions were many and varied, affecting U.S. government
programs, exports, imports, and private financial transactions. They reflected the fact that partial
sanctions were already in place against South Africa, as well as the provisions of the pending
congressional bill.
As for government programs, the President proclaimed that all U.S. firms in South Africa
should adhere to the Sullivan Principles for fair labor practices. Existing export restrictions were
expanded to include: (1) a ban on exports of computers and related items to any South African
governmental entity enforcing apartheid; and (2) a ban on most nuclear exports. Exec. Order No.
12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1986).
The major import control was the prohibition on imports of South African krugerrands. Exec.
Order No. 12,535, 3 C.F.R. 393 (1986). Also prohibited were imports of arms, ammunition, or
military vehicles produced in South Africa. Finally, U.S. financial institutions were forbidden from
extending loans to the South African government or related entities. Exec. Order No. 12,532, 3
C.F.R. 387 (1986).
These sanctions were effectively superseded by the more comprehensive sanctions passed by
Congress in October 1986 over President Reagan's veto. See supra text accompanying notes 254-71.
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While IEEPA's procedural requirements are an improvement over
TWEA, recent experience suggests that IEEPA is also flawed. The crite-
ria for invoking it are vague, Congress has very little to say about its use,
and there is no effective way to terminate a use that becomes inappropri-
ate as time passes.
1. Are We Falling Victim to Dubious "National Emergencies"?
"[E]mergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be
equated with normal, ongoing problems .... A state of national emer-
gency should not be a normal state of affairs." '296 Consistent with this
viewpoint, IEEPA contains several provisions designed in part to limit
the President's use of the statute.
First, in contrast to TWEA's failure to define "national emergency,"
IEEPA provides that its authorities are to be exercised in the event of an
"unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or sub-
stantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States." '297 Second, the President must
declare a national emergency for that threat before using IEEPA's pow-
ers.298 Third, he is directed to consult "in every possible instance" with
295. Libya was the target of the most recent invocation of IEEPA. In January 1986, acting in
the wake of terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, Reagan declared a national
emergency and proceeded to impose very comprehensive economic sanctions. These sanctions
include: a ban on almost all imports from and exports to Libya; a prohibition.on any new loans or
other credits to Libya; financial controls that effectively prohibit most travel to Libya or residency
there; and a freeze on all Libyan property interests in the United States or under the control of any
U.S. person, including overseas branches of U.S. entities. Exec. Orders Nos. 12,543, 12,544, 3
C.F.R. 181, 183 (1987).
These sanctions are similar in scope to the 1979-81 sanctions against Iran, and the continuing
TWEA sanctions against Cuba, except for considerably narrower claims of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: LIBYAN
SANCTIONS (1987) (an evaluation of the effectiveness of the controls); Bialos & Juster, The Libyan
Sanctions: A Rational Response to State-Sponsored Terrorism?, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 799 (1986) (a
detailed analysis of the sanctions).
The extraterritorial reach of the U.S. sanctions encountered a considerable challenge in fall
1987 when a U.K. trial court ruled that Bankers Trust Company was obligated to pay the Libyan
Arab Foreign Bank $292.5 million in funds that the Libyan bank had deposited with Bankers Trust
and that the U.S. bank claimed had been frozen by President Reagan's order in January 1986. About
half of the money had been in the London branch of Bankers Trust and the other half was money the
U.S. bank had failed to transfer, as directed by the Libyan bank, to its London branch prior to the
freeze. In reaching its decision, the trial court concluded that law of the place (i.e., U.K. law)
applied to accounts in the United Kingdom, even in the branch of a U.S. bank. Libyan Arab
Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 26 I.L.M. 1600 (Q.B. Comm'l Ct. Sept. 2, 1987). Rather than
appeal this unfavorable opinion, Bankers Trust paid the Libyan bank the $292.5 million, plus $28
million in interest. The U.S. Treasury Department granted the necessary license for Bankers Trust
to make the payment to a Libyan entity. Marcom, Bankers Trust Cleared by U.S. To Repay Libya,
Wall. St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
296. HOUSE IEEPA REPORT, supra note 277, at 10.
297. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982).
298. Id. § 1701(b).
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Congress. 299 Finally, he must immediately report to Congress any
actions taken under the statute.3°
In practice, however, these provisions create few roadblocks to pres-
idential action. If the President wants to use IEEPA even in minor dis-
putes or to avoid a legislative airing of issues in Congress, there is little in
the statute to stop him.
The criteria for an "unusual and extraordinary threat" are broad
and subject to many interpretations. Indeed, another section of the stat-
ute authorizes the President to issue regulations "prescribing definitions"
under the statute!"'1 Moreover, declaring an emergency requires only a
brief executive order, which often does little more than recite the statu-
tory criteria as a litany.
Consultation with Congress is only encouraged, not mandatory. It
does not have to be extensive or designed to influence policy. Although
the report required for IEEPA's use does ensure that some presidential
rationale for the actions will be advanced, the report may not be more
substantial than the statements and reports issued routinely by the White
House. The reporting requirement thus is probably not an important
deterrent to the President.
In reviewing the past uses of IEPPA, the early experience seems
consistent with the Act's purposes. The Iranian crisis was developing
rapidly and had significant impact on U.S. foreign policy. Quick action
was needed to block Iran's plans to withdraw its deposits from U.S.
banks and to impose other sanctions.3 "2 Reagan's first use of IEEPA-to
continue the export regulations when the Export Administration Act
lapsed-also seems appropriate.30 3
Resorting to IEEPA against Nicaragua, South Africa, and Libya,
however, seems questionable. These uses suggest that the statute can and
will be invoked whenever the President desires to draw on its broad pow-
ers, whether or not there is a genuine emergency.
Invoking IEEPA against Nicaragua looks more like an attempt by
the President to avoid a protracted and difficult struggle with Congress
than a response to an "unusual and extraordinary threat." To be sure,
President Reagan's message to Congress and other administration state-
ments did list some contemporary events, such as the visit of Nicaraguan
President Ortega to Moscow, but none demonstrated a sudden deteriora-
tion in the Reagan administration's long-festering relationship with the
299. Id. § 1703.
300. Id.
301. Id. § 1704.
302. See supra note 291.
303. See Harris & Bialos, supra note 292, at 73-75, 77-82.
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Sandinista government. 3"
The more obvious triggering event was the rejection by the House of
Representatives of Reagan's proposal for assistance to the contras.
Resort to IEEPA was part of a prolonged struggle between Congress
(especially the House) and the administration over U.S. policy in Central
America. The administration apparently decided to circumvent the nor-
mal legislative process by using IEEPA to impose a trade embargo.
Although the President's action was an apparent perversion of the stat-
ute's purpose, it was questioned only sporadically in Congress and else-
where.3" 5 (Probably the most visible criticism came from Garry Trudeau
in his popular comic strip Doonesbury, as illustrated on the next page.)
The use of IEEPA sanctions against South Africa 306 was at least as
questionable as the Nicaraguan case, though for different reasons. While
the turmoil was growing in South Africa, it is not clear that the situation
required the President to declare a national emergency, 3 7 especially
since sanctions legislation was already far along in Congress. A confer-
ence bill had passed the House by an overwhelming margin and was
expected to pass the Senate.
Even the Reagan administration's public statements suggest that its
chief aim in employing IEEPA was to preempt congressional action.
Reagan was motivated in part by his belief that the congressional sanc-
tions went too far and might "damage the economic well-being of mil-
lions of people in South and southern Africa. ' 30 8 But he must also have
hoped to garner political credit for acting against apartheid. 3 9 The
political posturing becomes evident when one compares the Reagan sanc-
tions with those then pending in Congress. The similarities far outnum-
bered the differences.310
304. See President Reagan's Message to the Congress and White House Statement (May 1,
1985), reprinted in 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 74 (July 1985).
305. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. H2751 (daily ed. May 1, 1985) (statement of Rep. Bonker); see
also N.Y. Times, May 8, 1985, at A7, col. 1 (noting Democratic criticism of Reagan's failure to
consult Congress).
306. See Exec. Order No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1986); see also President's Message to Congress,
21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1054 (Sept. 9, 1985) (announcing imposition of sanctions).
307. Note that the U.S. sanctions, such as the ban on U.S. bank loans to the South African
government, were not going to help the South African financial crisis, and possibly would have
aggravated it.
308. President's Remarks, Sept. 9, 1985, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRE. Doc. 1048-49 (Sept. 16,
1985).
309. It also appeared unlikely that Reagan could have stopped the legislation simply by
opposing it. See Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1985, at All, col. I.
310. Compare the Reagan sanctions, supra note 294, with the proposed Anti-Apartheid Act of
1985, found in H.R. CONF. REP. No. 242, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also Wash. Post, Sept. 10,
1985, at A10, col. 3 (presenting a chart comparing Reagan's sanctions with the proposed
congressional action).
The conference bill had only one major additional provision. If the President determined that
South Africa had not made significant progress over the next 12 months, then he was to recommend
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The use of IEEPA against Libya in January 1986 also raises ques-
tions. As with Nicaragua, U.S. relations with Libya had been fractious
for years, and the United States had already imposed import limits on oil
and passport restrictions under nonemergency statutes.311
which additional, designated sanctions should be imposed. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 242, § 16(c).
While some of the designated alternatives were major, there was also a catch-all of "[o]ther
economic or political sanctions." Id. § 16(c)(3)(D). Consequently, despite considerable rhetoric on
all sides about how this provision strengthened the conference bill, the difference was more apparent
than real. Reagan would have had discretion to make the determination about progress after only a
one-year period. Moreover, the residual clause would have allowed him to recommend a very minor
next step, if he so desired.
311. See supra notes 157 (oil import limits), 84 (passport restrictions).
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The event triggering comprehensive IEEPA sanctions was Colonel
Qaddafi's apparent support of the cold-blooded attacks at the Rome and
Vienna airports in December 1985, which killed nineteen people, includ-
ing five Americans. 312 Outrageous as the attacks were, it is not clear that
declaration of a national emergency was justified.
President Reagan already had available particularly broad nonemer-
gency authorities. Congress had added provisions in 1985 authorizing
the President to cut off all imports as well as exports from Libya. On the
other hand, IEEPA uniquely provided the power to freeze Libyan assets
and to ban travel to or in Libya. The United States had earlier tried to
limit travel to Libya by prohibiting the use of U.S. passports, but Ameri-
cans travelled there without them. Under IEEPA, all financial transac-
tions related to travel could be and were prohibited, including purchases
of transportation, lodging, and meals. This inhibited travel much more
effectively than passport restrictions.31 3
Given the American public's outrage toward Libya, the President
could have gone to Congress and obtained special nonemergency laws
authorizing the asset freeze and travel ban. The joint effort would have
highlighted the national attitude toward Libya. On the other hand, the
normal legislative process might have taken more time and would have
required the President to share center stage.
In sum, recent experience with IEEPA raises concerns that it may
be used casually for spurious national emergencies.
It is unlikely that the courts will step in to limit resort to IEEPA.
Courts will analyze the specific measures taken in a national emergency
to see if they are authorized under IEEPA. There is, however, nearly
complete judicial deference to a President's determination that a national
emergency exists. Considering President Nixon's import surcharge, the
court in United States v. Yoshida International, Inc. said that "courts will
not normally review the essentially political questions surrounding the
declaration or continuance of a national emergency."'3
14
It therefore falls to Congress to limit the President's resort to
IEEPA's broad powers. Alternatively, one must ignore the omens in
recent history and rely on the future self-discipline of Presidents.
312. See State Department Report on Libya Under Qaddafi, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1986, at A6, col. 1 (detailing various terrorist acts by Libya).
313. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1986, at A8, col. 3; id., Jan. 9, 1986, at A8, col. 1.
314. 526 F.2d at 579, 581 n.32 (C.C.P.A. 1975); see also Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361
F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir.) (court will not review an executive determination of a national emergency in
Korea), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966); Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1194-
95 (D. Mass. 1986) (court lacks resources and expertise to decide whether Nicaragua poses an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the U.S. and such questions cannot be answered without
political policy judgments; thus the question is nonjusticiable), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1987).
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2. Will It Ever End?
IEEPA's drafters envisioned the statute's use for national emergen-
cies that were "rare and brief," and not for "normal, ongoing
problems." '315 IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act include three
methods to terminate a declared national emergency and thereby limit
the duration of the emergency powers.
Two are housekeeping provisions to ensure that the national emer-
gency does not continue needlessly. First, the President can unilaterally
terminate the emergency. Second, the emergency will automatically ter-
minate in one year unless the President renews it. Renewal is easy, how-
ever, because the President need only publish a notice in the Federal
Register and notify Congress. 316
The third and critical provision would have terminated the national
emergency when Congress passed a concurrent resolution.317 While
Congress was unlikely to so challenge the President, particularly in the
heat of a crisis, having the option to terminate the emergency might have
provided Congress with substantial leverage to influence Executive
Branch policymaking. This would have been especially true in cases
where the crisis had cooled, but the use of emergency powers had
continued.
In 1983, however, the Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha3 11 invalidated a similar provision that allowed
either House of Congress to "veto" INS decisions and compel the Execu-
tive Branch to reinstitute deportation proceedings. The reasoning of the
six-Justice majority, echoed in later rulings, suggested strongly that
IEEPA's provision for a two-house concurrent resolution is also
invalid.319
Congress consequently amended the provision to provide instead for
termination by a joint resolution. 320 But since the President can veto a
315. HOUSE IEEPA REPORT, supra note 277, at 10.
316. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a), (d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
317. Id. § 1622(a), (c).
318. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
319. See id. at 944-59 (veto has a legislative character, therefore it is unconstitutional unless
implemented by following constitutional procedures for legislative action); see also Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (striking down two-
house veto), aff'd sub nom. Pacific Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463
U.S. 1216 (1983); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673
F.2d 425, 470-78 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (striking down one-house veto), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas, 463
U.S. at 1216; cf Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987) (invalid legislative veto
provision is severable where statute is capable of functioning independently, absent indication of
contrary legislative intent). The literature on Chadha is extensive. See, e.g., Franck & Bob, supra
note 140.
320. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, tit.
VIII, § 801, 99 Stat. 407, 448 (1985) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (Supp. III 1985)).
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joint resolution, the practical effect of this amendment is that a declared
national emergency may now continue at the President's pleasure. (It is
unlikely that Congress could muster the two-thirds vote of both Houses
necessary to override the President's veto.)
Unending national emergencies have not yet become a serious prob-
lem under IEEPA. There are, however, tell-tale warning signs: the
national emergencies against Nicaragua and Libya threaten to become "a
normal state of affairs." '321 Both national emergencies were routinely
extended in 1987 for another year.322 Even though the Reagan adminis-
tration had obtained $100 million in assistance for the Nicaraguan con-
tras in 1986, the administration made no effort then (or since) to obtain
statutory authority to impose nonemergency import controls. Similarly,
in the case of Libya, the administration is not seeking nonemergency
powers to freeze assets or limit travel.
It is not only the Reagan administration that has been contributing
to the problem. No sustained opposition has arisen in Congress calling
on the Executive Branch to seek nonemergency authority for the contin-
uing sanctions. The long-term danger of these national emergencies is
that this country will "grow used to them as the fittings of ordinary
existence., 32
3
3. What Can't the President Do?
There is very little that the President is clearly prohibited from
doing when imposing economic sanctions under IEEPA. Explicitly
included among IEEPA's sweeping powers is the authority to "regulate
... or prohibit, any ... importation or exportation.., in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest. '324 The President
321. Cf HOUSE IEEPA REPORT, supra note 277, at 10. In addition, it is somewhat
discouraging that the emergency against Iran continues after more than eight years, though the
sanctions have been cut back sharply to encompass mainly the continuing efforts to resolve disputed
claims before the U.S.-Iranian Claims Tribunal at the Hague. The emergency was renewed again on
Nov. 10, 1987. 52 Fed. Reg. 43,549 (1987).
Two slim rays of hope have recently appeared that suggest the Reagan administration might be
beginning to use IEEPA more cautiously. First, in October 1987 President Reagan relied on new
nonemergency powers, rather than IEEPA, to impose a new embargo on imports from Iran. See
supra text accompanying notes 164-65. The resort to new legislation was easy since the statute only
imposed lenient requirements for consultation and reporting. See supra note 164.
Second, the administration allowed the national emergency against South Africa to lapse in
September 1987 when it did not renew the one-year emergency. The steps that Reagan had ordered
pursuant to this emergency, however, had essentially been duplicated, and even broadened, by the
nonemergency Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. See supra text accompanying notes 254-
71. Reagan's regulations had effectively become redundant.
322. 52 Fed. Reg. 13,425 (Apr. 1987) (Nicaragua); 52 Fed. Reg. 47,891 (Dec. 1987) (Libya).
323. Bauer v. United States, 244 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1957) (dicta). This quote was described
as "prophetic" in United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 581 n.32 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
324. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982).
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also has the power to freeze foreign-owned assets and to prohibit new
financial transactions, such as loans, to the foreign country or its nation-
als.325 Further, through these comprehensive restrictions on financial
transactions, the President can very effectively ban travel to or in another
country.
The President's broad powers exist in spite of efforts by IEEPA's
authors to limit them relative to the TWEA powers. In contrast to
TWEA, IEEPA was understood not to include: "(1) the power to vest,
i.e., to take title to foreign property; (2) the power to regulate purely
domestic transaction[s]; (3) the power to regulate gold or bullion; and (4)
the power to seize records." '326 Moreover, IEEPA explicitly does not
authorize the President to interfere with the international flow of mail or
other communications (where they do not involve the transfer of some-
thing of value)3 27 None of these omitted powers, however, seems vital
for imposing economic sanctions.328
Omission of the vesting power does not seem significant in light of
the President's other powers over foreign-owned property, including the
power to "direct and compel" its "transfer, withdrawal ... or exporta-
tion. 329 In Dames & Moore v. Regan,33 ° the Supreme Court found these
provisions sufficient to uphold President Carter's order nullifying certain
attachments against the $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets, and transfer-
ring the assets back to Iran and other parties.3 31
The Court did conclude, however, that IEEPA did not specifically
give the President authority to suspend lawsuits of U.S. citizens pending
325. See id. § 1702(a)(1)(A).
326. HOUSE IEEPA REPORT, supra note 277, at 15.
327. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (1982).
328. In the area of domestic transactions, IEEPA limits most of its authority "to the extent that
such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof." Id.
§ 1702(a). This qualification was intended to withhold from the President the use of emergency
powers to regulate "purely domestic" transactions during peacetime. HouSE IEEPA REPORT,
supra note 277, at 15. It is unlikely, however, that economic sanctions against a foreign country
would require any such regulation of domestic transactions, such as consumer credit. Moreover, the
President would still have considerable latitude given the potential broad scope of the phrase "any
interest" in IEEPA and the existence of various banking statutes for emergencies. See Note, supra
note 290, at 1110-11.
Omitting the President's power to seize records appears to be a limitation without substance.
The Act still authorizes the President to require any person to keep and produce records. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(2) (1982).
329. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1982).
330. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
331. Id. at 672 n.5. Some have argued that the Court's decision effectively gives the President
the power to vest. E.g., Marks & Grabow, The President's Foreign Economic Powers after Dames &
Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 68, 78-80 (1982). The transfer
of assets, however, was performed in accordance with agreements with Iran. Indeed, during the
crisis, U.S. policymakers had operated under the assumption that IEEPA did not give the President
authority to take title to Iranian property. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 253, at 199-200.
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in American courts.332 But, since the Court found that Congress had
acquiesced in the President's action, the Court upheld the suspension.333
In any event, except in the Iranian case and other claims settlement situ-
ations, the power to suspend lawsuits has not been important.
With the possible exceptions of vesting title or suspending lawsuits,
the powers that IEEPA does not provide the President are few and mar-
ginal. Given the authorities that the Act does provide, the President
need not be concerned with inadequate statutory power for imposing eco-
nomic sanctions in an emergency. Indeed, the consensus of many foreign
policy experts is that the existing legal authorities are adequate and
proper.334 And, there is no persuasive evidence that the President's
authorities in real emergencies are excessive.
The real concern is the danger that the President will resort casually
to these sweeping emergency powers in order to circumvent the
hodgepodge of nonemergency laws for imposing economic sanctions.
Today, there are no effective limits on the President's invoking IEEPA
for dubious national emergencies, and no effective way to terminate the
statute's use when it becomes inappropriate with the passing of time. As
Justice Jackson warned in his famous opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,335 "We may say that power to legislate for emergen-
cies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can pre-
vent power from slipping through its fingers. ' 336
V
POSSIBLE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT BEYOND
THE STATUTES
Can the President impose economic sanctions with steps that exceed
the authorities granted him in U.S. statutes? The discussion thus far has
intentionally not addressed this issue. With the exception of President
Carter's suspension of lawsuits in the Iranian hostage case, almost every
recent use of economic sanctions appears clearly based on the President's
nonemergency or emergency powers under the statutes.
Indeed, during a crisis, U.S. policymakers are very aware of what
authorities the President does and does not have. They will try to avoid
332. 453 U.S. at 675.
333. Id. at 680-82; see infra text accompanying notes 351-57.
334. "Those involved in making and implementing the Carter Administration's policies [in the
Iranian hostage crisis] felt that in general the legal authorities in existence during the crisis were
adequate and proper." Ribicoff, Lessons and Conclusions, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra
note 39, at 374, 380. A footnote added: "This view was also shared by the diverse participants in
the Council [on Foreign Relations] study group, who considered this issue at length." Id. at 380 n.5.
335. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
336. Id. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson also noted that our forefathers "suspected
that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies." Id. at 650.
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using sanctions that might lead to unnecessary litigation or embarrass-
ment in the courts. For example, in the Iran hostage case, officials were
aware that IEEPA did not authorize vesting title of the frozen assets, and
the President did not attempt to take title.337 The serious problems
recently encountered by Executive Branch officials who tried to evade the
law in arms sales to Iran will presumably reinforce the caution of future
policymakers.
Nevertheless, the question of the President's extrastatutory powers
can arise, and thus a brief analysis is appropriate. The central conclusion
is that the President should tread cautiously and follow the statutes.
Otherwise, he risks successful challenge to any steps taken beyond his
statutory powers, though the outcome will depend on the circumstances
involved.
The Constitution gives both the President and Congress major pow-
ers in foreign affairs. Article II provides the President with "executive
Power," designates him the "Commander in Chief," gives him the
"Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties," and authorizes him to appoint and receive ambassadors.33
Especially during the first seventy years of this century, with two World
Wars, the Depression, and the Cold War, Presidents came to play an
increasingly important role in U.S. foreign affairs.
Even with the recent renaissance of congressional involvement in
foreign policy, the substantial role that the Constitution assigns to Con-
gress is often forgotten. The Constitution provides Congress plenary
authority over foreign commerce and over the government purse-
including the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" and
to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts,"33 9 along with the stricture
that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law."'34° These provisions give Congress the
dominant role in international economic affairs. Congress has since dele-
gated much of this authority to the President through various laws, many
of which are discussed above in Parts III and IV.
Listing these congressional and presidential powers leaves unan-
swered the question of whether the President's explicit constitutional
powers or other inherent powers authorize him to impose economic sanc-
tions on his own. The question was muddied in 1936 by United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.341 There, the Supreme Court upheld a con-
337. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 39, at 185-88; Christopher, supra note 65, at 5; Ribicoff,
supra note 334, at 380-81.
338. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
339. Id. art. I, § 8.
340. Id. § 9.
341. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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gressional delegation of power authorizing the President to declare illegal
certain arms exports. Although the decision can be interpreted on the
relatively narrow ground of a valid congressional delegation of power,
the opinion included sweeping dicta that the President has a foreign
affairs power that "does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress, 342 and that might even arise from outside the Constitution.343
Curtiss-Wright's dicta was substantially trimmed by the 1952 deci-
sion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.34 There, the Court
rejected the President's sweeping claims of power to seize and operate
most of the nation's steel mills during a strike in the midst of the Korean
War.345 In an often-cited concurring opinion, Justice Jackson provided a
three-pronged test to assess the President's authority to act. First,
"[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. ' 346 In
this case, the President's act is "supported by the strongest of presump-
tions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation. 347
Second, "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers." He enters a "zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain. 3
4 8
Finally, when the President acts contrary to the will of Congress,
"his power is at its lowest ebb." The Court can sustain his actions "only
by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. '349
The Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan35 in 1981 found Jackson's
categories "analytically useful. ' 35 1 In examining the President's suspen-
342. Id. at 320.
343. Id. at 315-18. There is an extensive body of literature on the Curtiss-Wright decision, often
critical of the sweep of the majority opinion. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 19-26 (1972).
344. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
345. Id. at 583-84, 589. The President's order was not based upon any specific statutory
authority, but rather upon the general powers vested in the President by the Constitution and U.S.
laws. Id. at 582-85.
346. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Jackson put the Curtiss-
Wright situation in this category. Id. at n.2.
347. Id. at 637.
348. Id. In this situation, the Court noted twenty-five years later in Dames & Moore v. Regan:
"[Tihe analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity of the President's action ... hinges on a
consideration of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the Legislative Branch
toward such action, including 'congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence.'" 453 U.S. 654,
668-69 (1981) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
349. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
350. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
35 1. Id. at 669. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist noted, however, that "Justice Jackson
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sion of certain claims pending in U.S. courts, the Court concluded that
this action was not specifically authorized by IEEPA.35 z The Court went
on to determine, however, that IEEPA and the so-called Hostage Act35 3
indicated congressional acceptance of a broad range of presidential
action in circumstances such as the Iranian crisis. Moreover, the Court
cited a history of congressional acquiescence toward Presidents entering
international agreements to settle outstanding claims with another coun-
try.354 Justice Rehnquist concluded:
Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but "long-continued prac-
tice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption
that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent." Such
practice is present here and such a presumption is also appropriate. In
light of the fact that Congress may be considered to have consented to
the President's action in suspending claims, we cannot say that action
exceeded the President's powers.355
Some commentators have criticized Dames & Moore for its finding
of congressional acquiescence, which pushes the President's suspension
of claims toward Jackson's easy-to-uphold first category.3 56 The Court
has been accused of implicitly creating "a presumption of legislative
acquiescence in executive agreements, absent specific congressional
disapproval. 357
Whether or not Dames & Moore requires more evidence of congres-
sional acquiescence beyond simply a lack of specific disapproval is not,
however, a critical question for most of the steps that a President might
take to impose economic sanctions. Congress has expressed its views
fairly clearly about almost all the major types of controls a President
might employ.
Looking first at nonemergencies, import controls provide a useful
illustration. Congress has passed many statutes which define when the
President may impose these controls. The laws are both comprehensive
and specific, and are grounded on Congress's plenary power over foreign
commerce. If the President were to act contrary to one of the limits on
his discretion or if he were to operate outside the statutory procedures,
himself recognized that his three categories represented 'a somewhat oversimplified grouping.'" Id.
(quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
352. Id. at 675.
353. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982). See discussion supra note 244.
354. 453 U.S. at 677-88.
355. Id. at 686 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)) (citation
omitted).
356. Despite discussing Jackson's categories, the Court never specifically placed Reagan's
actions in a specific category. 453 U.S. at 669. Indeed, in its conclusions, the Court also drew upon
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Youngstown. Id. at 678.
357. Marks & Grabow, supra note 331, at 103; see also Note, supra note 290, at 1113.
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his power would be at "its lowest ebb," and a court might refuse to
uphold his act.
The sparse case law provides some support for this conclusion. In
Yoshida, the court concluded that the import surcharge would have been
invalid, but for the national emergency and the President's TWEA pow-
ers.358 Similarly, in United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,3 59 the Fourth
Circuit held that the President did not have the authority to enter into an
executive agreement with Canada which limited imports of certain types
of potatoes, because the agreement did not comply with the procedures
Congress had specified by statute. Congress had occupied the field.36
The courts, however, are chary of restricting the President in the
international economic area, including his actions regulating imports.36 t
In Guy Capps, for example, the Supreme Court affirmed on nonconstitu-
tional grounds, and the majority of the Court consciously avoided the
constitutional issue.362 Indeed, the courts might resort to a variety of
approaches to uphold the President's action. For example, they might
find that the action is not so mandatory or formal that it conflicts with
legislatively defined limits.3 63 Or, they might interpret a statute narrowly
so that the actions of the President or his appointees are held not to
conflict. 364 Alternatively, the courts could interpret a statute broadly to
find the necessary authorization for the President's actions.365 Finally, as
discussed below, the courts might avoid the substantive issues by decid-
ing that the case is not justiciable.366
Where there is a declared national emergency, the existence of an
emergency is not by itself decisive in assessing the validity of a Presi-
dent's action. The Court in Dames & Moore considered the emergency
as one of the "circumstances" to be used in determining whether Con-
358. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 578-80 (C.C.P.A. 1975); see supra text
accompanying notes 282-85.
359. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
360. Id. at 661.
361. See generally J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 193, at 132-33.
The analysis for controls on exports and private financial transactions would be similar to that
for import controls. The legislation in both areas is comprehensive, specific, and within Congress's
powers under the commerce clause. An analysis of controls over bilateral government programs and
U.S. activities with international financial institutions (though not the focus of this Article) should
recognize Congress's additional power over the federal purse.
362. 348 U.S. at 305; see B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME
COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 165-66 (1983).
363. See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 142-44 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
364. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) (the
five-Justice majority arguably gave an artificially narrow reading to the statute and the legislative
history).
365. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
366. See infra text accompanying notes 368-73.
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gress had acquiesced in the President's need to act.367 IEEPA, however,
may provide a statutory basis for the President's actions in a declared
national emergency. IEEPA's sweeping powers far exceed the President's
authority in the absence of an emergency. For example, the availability
of TWEA, the predecessor of IEEPA, as a statutory basis for sanctions
was decisive in Yoshida. And, IEEPA's powers were clearly important
in Dames & Moore.
In either nonemergency or emergency situations, then, the President
should follow the existing statutory framework or step very cautiously.
Given the extensive congressional activity in the international economic
area and Congress's constitutional powers over foreign commerce and
the purse, it is difficult to identify any significant extrastatutory steps that
the President could take that would not potentially run afoul of the
courts.
Problems of justiciability. There is the related question of whether
the courts will review the President's actions. The courts often decline to
decide matters of foreign policy, especially those which might involve
separation of powers issues between the President and Congress. Courts
will avoid the substantive issues by ruling, for example, that the case
raises a political question368 or is otherwise not justiciable.369
Although obtaining judicial review can be a problem, it is often not
insurmountable. Some statutes, particularly in the import area, specifi-
cally provide for judicial review of the President's actions. 370  Courts
have also reviewed presidential decisions under other statutes, such as
TWEA and IEEPA.37' There are even possibilities for review under the
EAA, though it is sharply limited. In addition, a defendant in a criminal
prosecution under EAA can raise statutory questions. 372 Courts will also
entertain claims that the Executive Branch is operating outside the scope
367. 453 U.S. at 677. One view maintains that emergencies do not create extraconstitutional
powers. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934); Exparte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866). But cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944)
(upholding wartime exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from selected West Coast areas).
368. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (concurring opinion by Rehnquist, J.,
joined by three other Justices, viewing President Carter's termination of a treaty with Taiwan as a
political question); cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (delineating what does and does not
constitute a political question).
369. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997-98 (opinion by Powell, J., finding issue not yet ripe for
judicial review); see also Franck & Bob, supra note 140, at 952-57.
370. E.g. statutes cited supra notes 179-82.
371. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654-90 (IEEPA); United States v. Yoshida Int'l,
Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (TWEA); Nuclear Pacific, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Commerce, No. C84-49R (W.D. Wash. June 8, 1984) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss
for lack ofjurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies in IEEPA challenge) (copy on
file with California Law Review).
372. See, e.g., United States v. Edler Indus. Inc., 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976).
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of the statute.373
In short, a President is well advised to stay within the statutory
framework when he imposes economic sanctions. This conclusion reem-
phasizes the need to take a hard look at the U.S. laws, and to make
necessary changes.
VI
PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
"If it ain't broke, don't fix it," goes one down-home aphorism. Seri-
ous defects, however, do exist in the U.S. legal regime for imposing eco-
nomic sanctions for foreign policy reasons, and these problems should be
"fixed." The analysis in the previous Parts provides the foundations for
recommending what should be done. Several important conclusions
emerge from that analysis. Among them:
(1) While measuring effectiveness is fraught with difficulty and con-
troversy, there is persuasive historical evidence that sanctions can some-
times be an effective tool for achieving foreign policy objectives. In over
sixty cases since 1945 where the United States has resorted to economic
sanctions, they have arguably been successful over one-third of the time.
This success rate has varied with the objective sought. Especially
effective have been sanctions designed to destabilize a government, which
have succeeded in an estimated ten out of fourteen efforts, with two cases
continuing to the present. U.S. sanctions for more narrow policy goals
have been effective about 40% of the time, with measures against expro-
priation being especially successful.
Indeed, even if sanctions might not be effective in accomplishing a
foreign policy objective, they still might be used to give the appearance of
"doing something." Faced with immediate political and diplomatic pres-
sures to act, a President will often find that sanctions represent more
concrete action than diplomatic measures, and are more acceptable to
many constituencies and less costly than the use of force.
(2) The range of choices among possible types of economic sanc-
tions should not encompass only cutbacks in bilateral government pro-
grams or controls on exports. Rather, each use of sanctions should be
based on a careful analysis of the vulnerabilities of the target country and
the relative costs to the United States of alternative sanctions.
373. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986); United
States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
One approach for increasing the possibility of judicial review is for Congress by statute to
compel justiciability in certain circumstances. See Franck & Bob, supra note 140 at 957-59. For
example, the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982), specifically directs the
courts to decide suits about foreign expropriation of U.S. assets "on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law."
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Controls on imports or private financial transactions might some-
times be advisable as part of a sanctions package, and might even be the
most effective and least costly measures. Indeed, one comprehensive
study concluded that import controls have been the most successful sanc-
tions, and that various types of financial controls have also been effective
at times.374
A preliminary analysis of the trade and credit situation of potential
target countries indicates several cases where a country would be at least
as vulnerable to U.S. import and possibly credit controls as it would be to
U.S. export controls. For example, the United States imports about 39%
of all of South Korea's foreign sales, while its exports total only about
20% of South Korea's foreign purchases. U.S. banks also provide about
26% of that country's private foreign credit. Other examples include
Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, the Philippines, and Taiwan.375
Moreover, while calculating the domestic costs of various sanctions
is difficult and inexact, import and financial controls might cost the
United States less than export controls. For example, export sanctions
directly cause lost sales for U.S. business and lost jobs for U.S. workers,
and raise longer-term questions about the reliability of U.S. suppliers. In
contrast, import controls generally mean few, if any, lost jobs or sales in
the United States in the short term, though there can be higher costs to
purchasers and harmful long-term effects on productivity.
(3) The present laws for imposing economic sanctions for foreign
policy reasons are haphazard. Most were passed primarily for other pur-
poses and without any serious consideration of the best legal regime for
the use of economic sanctions. Accordingly, there are dramatic varia-
tions in the amount of presidential authority in the five types of activity
that sanctions restrict-bilateral government programs, exports, imports,
private financial transactions, and lending by international financial
institutions.
Passing new, specific legislation in a timely fashion when a dispute
or minor crisis arises is often difficult or even impossible. Consequently,
the existing legal regime can lead to two undesirable results. First, it can
skew the President's decisions in a nonemergency situation toward sanc-
tions that may not be as effective, or that may have more negative repercus-
sions on the US. economy than other options. Second, it encourages the
President to resort to declarations of dubious national emergencies, which
open the door to nearly unlimited economic power that Congress cannot
effectively review or terminate.
As for the first result, existing legal options can strongly influence
374. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOI, supra note 13, at 89.
375. See supra Figure 1 at 1178; see also supra text accompanying notes 55-67.
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the President's choice of which sanctions to employ when there is no
declared national emergency-whether he wants to protest Soviet
actions, to try to destabilize an unfriendly government, or to express dis-
pleasure with a country's policies toward human rights or terrorism.
These laws help explain why the United States frequently resorts to easy-
to-impose measures such as cutbacks in government programs or new
export controls,376 and why it less frequently employs limits on imports
or private financial transactions.
A classic example is the U.S. reaction to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The United States curtailed several government programs,
such as Soviet fishing rights in U.S. waters and Aeroflot airline service to
this country. Exports were sharply limited, with a cutback in agricul-
tural exports and new controls on high technology goods. The only
effort to limit imports, however, was President Carter's abortive attempt
to restrict imports of Soviet ammonia-an attempt that ran afoul of the
ITC.37 7 Private financial transactions were untouched, except for those
related to exports.
As the second undesirable result, the haphazard legal regime for
economic sanctions creates incentives for the President to declare a
national emergency in order to employ the sweeping powers of IEEPA in
dubious circumstances, or to continue their use after the crisis has
passed. For example, President Reagan's resort to IEEPA against Nica-
ragua, South Africa, and Libya are all questionable in light of the stat-
ute's purposes. Even if one believes that the President legitimately
needed to use IEEPA powers to react quickly to each of these "unusual
or extraordinary" threats, it is still unclear why he should continue to use
IEEPA month after month against Nicaragua and Libya, rather than
seeking the appropriate nonemergency powers from Congress. Should
the United States really come to accept national emergencies "as the fit-
tings of ordinary existence"? 378
The present U.S. legal system for economic sanctions is obviously
not the only possible legal framework. The recent amendments in the
laws, such as the export laws, suggest further useful steps.
A. Threshold Considerations
To develop a better legal regime for imposing economic sanctions,
two important threshold considerations must be addressed. First,
because the variety of possible sanctions involves myriad laws, there is no
376. See, e.g., the list of sanctions in G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 13, at 70-77.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 183-88.
378. Bauer v. United States, 244 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1957) (dicta), quoted in United States v.
Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 581 n.32 (C.C.P.A. 1975). See supra text accompanying notes
321-23.
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quick fix. Rather, having identified the principal problems with the pres-
ent system, the next step is to flesh out alternatives to improve the
system.
In doing so, it is most productive to concentrate on three of the five
broad activities for economic sanctions-exports, imports, and private
financial transactions. Changes in the remaining two categories-bilat-
eral government programs and the U.S. role in the international financial
institutions-are either less needed or much more difficult to achieve.
In the area of government programs, the President now has nearly
complete discretion to act. Giving him more discretion would add little
to his authority. And taking some discretion away does not seem advisa-
ble. These government programs are arguably the activity that the Presi-
dent, as Chief Executive, should most control. Also, it is not clear how
reducing the President's discretion would contribute much, if anything,
toward improving the use of sanctions or toward realizing other worth-
while objectives. Finally, as Congress has already discovered with its
attempts to condition foreign aid, limiting the President's discretion here
is a very difficult task.379
As for the international financial institutions (IFI's), asserting more
U.S. control would be very difficult, given their charters and interna-
tional character. The IMF is designed to promote international mone-
tary cooperation and stability in foreign exchange, while the World Bank
and the regional development banks seek to assist the economic and
social development of developing countries. Their charters specify the
IFI's nonpolitical nature and often contain prohibitions against weighing
political considerations.
U.S. efforts to politicize the IFI's further would probably not only
fail, but also weaken their effectiveness. Given the ongoing serious
problems of Third World debt and international financial stability, now
does not seem the time to create further difficulties for these institutions.
A second threshold consideration is that the many laws regulating
exports, imports, and private financial transactions almost always have
purposes other than imposing sanctions for foreign policy reasons.
Indeed, while the export laws are created primarily for these foreign pol-
icy purposes (in the broad sense that includes national security), nearly
all the laws regulating imports and private financial transactions have
other important purposes.
The import laws are designed, among other reasons, to protect
American businesses and workers, and to provide a negotiating basis to
persuade other countries to reduce their trade barriers. Likewise, the
laws regulating private financial transactions with foreigners are designed
379. See supra text accompanying notes 78-92.
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to help ensure the solvency of banks and other financial entities, to pro-
tect depositors and borrowers, and to provide for the safe and efficient
functioning of both the U.S. and the international financial systems.
Thoroughly analyzing all these other purposes and priorities of the
laws is well beyond the scope of this study. The most reasonable and
efficient approach must therefore be a carefully tailored one-to consider
alternatives that seek to affect only the President's authority to impose
economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes. In essence, this requires
considering how to give the President the authority to impose a sanction,
such as an import control, while specifically limiting that authority to use
for foreign policy purposes.
B. A Major Restructuring
Given the problems of the present system and the two preceding
considerations, what might a better U.S. legal regime entail?38
In broad terms, the wisest course would be to narrow the disparity
between the President's sweeping authority over exports vis-a-vis his lim-
ited discretion over imports and private financial transactions. This
could best be done by substantially increasing the President's authority
over imports and financial transactions, while reducing his control over
exports. 38
1
380. Given the present haphazard U.S. laws for imposing economic sanctions, the
recommendations below do not require a precise overall model of the relationship between the
President and Congress. Instead, these recommendations, which impose more rationality on the
presently great disparities in the President's authority, can be supported by people with widely
varying conceptions of the role of Congress in foreign affairs.
Nevertheless, I will note my belief that Congress should be in a constructive partnership with
the President on foreign affairs, with the President taking the lead role (i.e., the general partner) and
Congress playing an important supporting role. See generally Christopher, supra note 87, at 998
(calling for a new "compact" between the two branches "based on mutually reinforcing
commitments and mutually accepted restraints"); T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 86, at 61
(supporting a "system of policy codetermination"). This partnership approach is fully consistent
with the Constitution. See supra text accompanying notes 337-73.
381. Another approach would be to reduce sharply the President's power over exports, and
leave his authority over imports and financial transactions unchanged. The resulting limited
presidential authority in all three areas might, on first impression, be very attractive to those who
believe in removing Executive Branch obstacles to U.S. sales abroad. A glaring problem, however, is
that it would aggravate the present problems with casual declarations of national emergencies and
use of IEEPA's sweeping powers. Amending IEEPA in an effort to eliminate these problems is a
possibility. Given the effectiveness and political usefulness of economic sanctions, however, there
should be limits on how much restraint Congress should place on all the President's nonemergency
and emergency authorities to use economic sanctions. Moreover, political realities circumscribe how
much restraint Congress would be willing and able to enact.
Yet another approach would be to increase substantially the President's authority over imports
and private financial transactions (like the proposal in the text), but not reduce his power over
exports. This approach, however, fails to reflect either that export controls would not be as
necessary since other sanctions would now be available, or the need to reduce use of export controls
to improve the U.S. trade balance. See discussion below, note 382 and accompanying text.
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This approach would give the President great flexibility in selecting
among possible controls over exports, imports, or private financial trans-
actions. Since he would have considerable authority in each area, and
could impose a wide range of possible sanctions, his decision would not
be biased by the laws.
At the same time, since the President would then have other weap-
ons in his arsenal, his nearly unlimited control over exports would be
trimmed. This might help reduce excessive use of export controls, and
help signal a U.S. commitment to becoming a more reliable supplier.
There is a pressing need to encourage export trade.38 2
This approach would also strengthen the case for amending IEEPA
to reduce the President's powers there. If the President has a better
package of authorities for imposing sanctions without having to declare a
national emergency, then there is less need to use IEEPA. Moreover,
unless IEEPA is amended to discourage its casual use, the President can
nullify any qualifications on new nonemergency powers by continuing to
resort to IEEPA.
The proposal does have potential problems. First, making changes
in the import and financial laws that affect only the President's authority
to impose sanctions for foreign policy purposes is difficult. There is
always room for some abuse of the legislative intent. For example, a
President could use his new authority over imports for blatantly political
purposes-deciding in an election year to restrict imports of television
sets from Taiwan because of its alleged violations of human rights, or
even shoes from Italy because it allegedly is not tough enough on
terrorists.
Second, even assuming that the new laws are written as tightly as
possible, the President's new authority may make the use of economic
sanctions so easy that their use becomes excessive. All economic sanc-
tions have costs-whether to exporters, importers and consumers, bank-
ers, or the international economic system. The full costs often take time
to appear-such as lost markets for agricultural products or foreigners
moving their bank deposits elsewhere to avoid a future freeze order. If
economic sanctions can be imposed more easily, then short-term political
or foreign policy benefits might greatly increase the frequency of their
use, even though a long-term assessment of the full costs would argue
against many uses.
The next section elaborates more detailed recommendations for
382. The U.S. merchandise trade deficit (i.e., the excess of imports over exports) was a record
$171.2 billion in 1987, nearly 10% larger than the $156.2 billion gap in 1986, according to the
Department of Commerce. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 198 (Feb. 17, 1988). The 1987 deficit did
begin to show some improvement in November and December 1987, largely because of the decline in
the value of the dollar. Id. at 198-95.
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changes in the President's authority to impose economic sanctions under
both nonemergency laws and IEEPA. These proposals are designed to
minimize the potential problems noted above, and are briefly sketched in
Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
A NEW REGIME
I. PRESIDENT'S NONEMERGENCY POWERS
A. Exports: Broad powers retained, with some trimming.
1. Criteria, consultation, and reporting requirements retained.
2. Contract sanctity expanded, with compensation for existing contracts and licenses.
3. Sunset provision expanded.
4. Use of extraterritorial jurisdiction discouraged.
B. Imports: Broad powers granted.
1. Criteria, consultation, and reporting requirements enacted.
2. Sunset provision included.
3. Contract sanctity respected, with compensation for existing contracts.
4. (Possibly) linkage provisions:
a. To controls on most imports;
b. To controls on government programs or other sanctions.
5. Adherence to GA 7T encouraged.
C. Private Financial Transactions:
I. Trade Financing: Broad authority granted, same as for "Exports" and "Imports"
above.
2. General Lending: Power to stop lending granted (probably limited to foreign
governments).
a. Criteria, consultation, and reporting requirements enacted.
b. Contract sanctity respected, with compensation if old loans terminated.
c. Sunset provisions included.
d. Extraterritorial jurisdiction discouraged, and jurisdiction over U.S. persons only.
3. Foreigners' Bank Deposits and Other Assets: (Possibly) power to freeze. Same
provisions as for "General Lending" above.
II. PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY POWERS
Applies to Exports, Imports, and Private Financial Transactions: Sweeping authority
retained, but ability to declare and continue emergency trimmed.
1. Tougher criteria and mandatory consultation requirements enacted; reporting
requirements retained.
2. Sunset provision included.
3. Contract sanctity provisions the same as for nonemergency powers.
4. Use of extraterritorial jurisdiction discouraged.
C. Specific Recommendations
The loss of the legislative veto was a blow to congressional efforts to
control presidential discretion in a carefully tailored way. 383 Neverthe-
less, a wide variety of legislative tools are still available for trimming the
383. See supra discussion of Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), text accompanying notes 318-20.
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President's authority over exports and for expanding it over imports and
private financial transactions, as well as for improving IEEPA.
A list of these tools includes, among others, provisions that: specify
what type of consultation would be required and when; flatly prohibit
certain actions; redefine the criteria for imposing controls; provide for
administrative and judicial review; and establish time limits tying the
date when controls will become effective or when they will lapse to con-
gressional approval by joint resolution.384 The legislative reaction to the
1980 Soviet grain embargo suggests two additional tools-provisions for
contract sanctity and compensation to the injured business. Finally, as
discussed below for imports and financial credit, "linkages" of various
types might be required. For example, an import control could not be
imposed unless other controls-on different products or even of a differ-
ent type (such as an export control)-were also imposed.
Making lists is easy. It is more demanding to develop the most
appropriate and effective measures for providing the President with the
desired authority to impose sanctions for foreign policy reasons, while
limiting the possibilities for misuse of that authority.
1. Trimming the President's Authority over Exports
Changes in the export laws should be at most evolutionary, rather
than revolutionary. Recent amendments to the Export Administration
Act provide an excellent starting point.
a. Expanding the Contract Sanctity Provision
The contract sanctity provision of the EAA now prohibits the Presi-
dent from imposing foreign policy controls on exports for which there
are existing contracts or validated licenses. The President may waive this
prohibition, however, if he certifies that there is a serious "breach of
peace," and that prohibiting or curtailing the contracts or licenses would
help remedy it.385
This contract sanctity provision should be expanded to apply to
national security controls as well as foreign policy controls.386 Extending
the coverage closes an obvious loophole. As illustrated by President
Carter's questionable declaration that the Soviet grain embargo was
384. For a thorough, excellent study of many possible legislative approaches, see Franck & Bob,
supra note 140, at 933-59.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 116-22. As discussed there, the phrase "breach of
peace" is vague and subject to conflicting interpretations. For purposes of the recommendations
here, however, the critical issue is simply whether the President uses the waiver to terminate existing
contracts or licenses.
386. As indicated supra note 9, the EAA distinguishes between "national security" and "foreign
policy" controls. However, unless this Article is specifically addressing those EAA controls, the
phrase "foreign policy" is used broadly to include national security considerations.
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imposed for national security as well as foreign policy reasons, the divid-
ing line between these two types of EAA controls can easily be bridged.
On the other hand, broader coverage will not tie the President's hands in
dealing with sensitive national security matters, since he can determine
when a waiver is necessary.
Retaining a waiver provision would allow the President to act deci-
sively, rather than to have the controls' impact be diluted by numerous
exceptions for continuing business relationships under existing contracts
and licenses.
Nevertheless, the injured exporter should be compensated when the
President invokes the waiver provision to terminate existing contracts
and licenses. And adding a cost to the President's action might also help
to deter casual resort to the waiver provision.
This cost would usually be small, though. First, it would only be
incurred where the President's new export controls actually impaired or
terminated existing contracts and licenses. Injury to potential contracts
or pending license applications would not be compensated. Second, most
cases of export controls for foreign policy purposes are against countries
to which the United States does not export a great amount-such as
Nicaragua and Libya. Even U.S. exports to the Soviet Union are rela-
tively small, generally less than $3 billion per year. 87 Moreover, only
part of a year's total exports would be covered at any given time by
existing contracts or licenses. Finally, consistent with accepted measures
of damages, the exporter would be under an obligation to mitigate its
damages by, for example, attempting to sell the goods elsewhere.
While the costs would likely be small, compensation may be a useful
deterrent, since it seems difficult to provide other significant safeguards
against dubious use of the waiver provision. (Other legislative steps that
could be useful include drafting the criteria for waiver as strictly as possi-
ble and requiring consultation with Congress and with exporters, but
these measures would probably not be as helpful as the compensation
provision.)388
387. In 1981 (before the sanctions), U.S. exports were $184 million to Nicaragua and $813
million to Libya. Exports to the Soviet Union totaled $3.6 billion in 1979 (before the grain embargo)
and were still $2.6 billion in 1982 and $1.2 billion in 1986. U.S. exports to South Africa totaled $2.3
billion in 1984 and $1.2 billion in 1986. In contrast, U.S. exports in 1986 were $45 billion to Canada,
$27 billion to Japan, and $11 billion to the United Kingdom. Total U.S. exports in 1986 were $217
billion. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DIRECTION OFTRADE SrATISTICS: YEARBOOK 1987,
at 404-06 (1987).
388. See the earlier analyses of the limited utility of consultation and reporting provisions, supra
text accompanying notes 112-15, and ofjudicial review, supra text accompanying notes 368-73. The
mandatory consultation requirements, however, do raise a question about whether compensation
should be required for curtailing contracts that were entered into during the consultation period. (A
similar question would arise for revoking licenses that were issued during the consultations, though
the U.S. government would presumably defer decisions on licenses during this period.) The
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Compensation would also reimburse exporters caught in the vagar-
ies of international politics. Today, exporters themselves can assume the
risk, and try to pass the costs on to their other customers or absorb the
loss, with resulting lower profits.389 Exporters can also purchase insur-
ance, which covers cancellation of existing export licenses, from the For-
eign Credit Insurance Association or from other private insurers. This
insurance, however, can be expensive and sometimes difficult to obtain,
especially when the exporter is shipping to likely target countries such as
the Soviet Union, South Africa, or Chile. The insurance companies are
also aware of the risks.3 90
Whether the exporter insures or not, it faces the higher costs arising
from the risk that the President will terminate or curtail its contracts for
U.S. foreign policy reasons. This arguably is not a risk that the exporter
should have to bear, particularly since this country is trying to encourage
companies to increase exports. The U.S. government is taking action
against the target country, and the exporter is caught in the fray.
Admittedly, private parties often bear the costs of government
actions that adversely affect them, whether the actions are changes in
trade policies, tax laws, or zoning laws. Only in limited areas do the
parties have a claim to just compensation under the takings clause of the
President should be able to declare at the start of consultations that if sanctions were imposed, no
compensation would be allowed for new contracts and licenses after that date. This would provide
fair notice to exporters and would protect the United States from last-minute efforts to create claims
against it.
389. The present U.S. laws generally excuse the seller from performing under a contract when
new government regulations make delivery impracticable. Hence, each party bears its own costs and
loses any expected profits. U.C.C. § 2-615 & comments 4, 10 (1977); accord, U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 79, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/18 (1980), reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 668, 689-90 (1980).
On the other hand, foreign courts have occasionally refused to allow U.S. export regulations to
excuse a corporation in their country from performing under a contract when the local law was
found controlling. See discussion of the Sensor case, supra note 129.
390. For example, the Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA) is a private-sector group of
about 50 companies which offers insurance in conjunction with the U.S. Export-Import Bank.
FCIA has a wide range of programs, insuring exports worth nearly $36 billion during fiscal years
1981-85. FOREIGN CREDIT INSURANCE ASS'N, AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCE (1986)
(brochure on file with author); see generally Eximbank, A Map of Eximbank Programs (undated
brochure on file with author presenting a chart of various FCIA and Eximbank programs).
FCIA political risk insurance, which covers losses caused by cancellation or nonrenewal of an
export license (including the period prior to shipment), costs at least one percent of the value of the
insured goods. Risky countries mean higher rates, higher deductible amounts, a lower percentage of
value covered (e.g., 90% rather than 100%), and other conditions. Insurance is not even available
for some countries because of the high risk or Eximbank's political guidelines. Telephone interview
with Robert L. Chapman, FCIA Assistant Vice President (Oct. 29, 1986). The FCIA recently was
not offering political risk insurance for exports to Peru, Poland, Somalia, the Soviet Union, and
Zaire, among other countries. Insurance for exports to many other countries was heavily
conditioned. Id.; see also FCIA, Country Limitation Schedule, March 1, 1986, and supplements
through July 17, 1986 (presenting schedule of various "special conditions" pertaining to export
credit insurance and the bank guarantee program) (on file with author).
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fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 391  Termination of export
licenses and existing contracts to export are not constitutionally
protected.392
Compensation provisions are not without precedent, however. The
U.S. government has on occasion provided by statute for compensation
to people injured by its acts or by developments in the foreign trade area.
Most analogous is the 1981 law that requires the Secretary of Agriculture
to compensate farmers for an agricultural embargo against a major for-
eign purchasing country.393
Similarly, the trade adjustment assistance program has contained
various compensation provisions over the years for businesses, workers,
and communities adversely affected by increased imports. The original
provision in the 1962 law required a link between the injury and the tariff
concessions by the U.S. government, though such a link no longer needs
to be demonstrated.394 During its history, this program has been much
broader in scope and more expensive than the recommendation for com-
pensation advanced in this Article.
The exact details of this compensation proposal need further refine-
ment. It would seem that the party in the United States who held the
existing contract or license should be the person compensated, provided,
of course, that it could demonstrate losses. While further analysis would
be useful, compensation would probably not be provided to persons in
the United States who are not direct parties to the license or contract,
such as suppliers to the exporter. They too might well be hurt by the
export controls, since the exporter will not make additional purchases
from them to complete the contract. There are, however, difficult proof
problems as parties are added. For example, who would the exporter
391. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V.
392. See supra text accompanying note 97 (exporting as a privilege rather than a right). See
generally Trimble, Foreign Policy Frustrated-Dames & Moore, Claims Court Jurisdiction and a
New Raid on the Treasury, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 317 (1984) (analysis of the proper role of U.S. courts
in international claims settlements and other foreign policy actions that may raise takings issues);
Brownstein, The Takings Clause and the Iranian Claims Settlement, 29 UCLA L. REv. 984 (1982)
(examining international claims settlements under various models of the takings clause).
393. Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, 7 U.S.C. § 1378 (1982); see supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
394. The original law was part of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 201,
76 Stat. 872. The rules governing eligibility for adjustment assistance were repealed in 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, § 602(e), 88 Stat. 2072. Eligibility is now determined according to the provisions of the
Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform and Extension Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 110 Stat. 300,
304 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2291, 2297-2298, 2345) (further extending the adjustment
assistance for workers and firms until Sept. 30, 1991). See generally Adjustment Assistance, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), U.S. Import Weekly Reference File 61:0101 (1986); R. LAWRENCE & R. LITAN,
SAVING FREE TRADE: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 51-62,112-22 (1986).
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actually have bought from, and at what price?3 95
Even if the proposal does not cover these other parties, the U.S.
government could still compensate them in special cases. For example,
when President Carter cut back sharply on grain exports to the Soviet
Union in 1980, his administration took several steps to prop up agricul-
tural prices beyond purchasing existing export contracts. These steps
included: financial incentives to encourage larger grain reserves by farm-
ers; increased government purchases of certain commodities; and diplo-
matic efforts and financial incentives to promote exports to other
countries.396
Compensation almost certainly should not be provided to the for-
eign purchaser. This would be contrary to the purpose of the sanction
and the invocation of the waiver clause, which is to put economic pres-
sure on the target country.3 97
b. Enlarging the Sunset Provision
If the President imposes a major export embargo against a country,
he should be required to obtain congressional approval to continue the
embargo beyond a short statutory period. The 1985 Export Administra-
tion Amendments Act already prohibits the President from imposing
export controls on any agricultural commodity for more than sixty days,
unless Congress enacts a joint resolution authorizing the action.398
This proposed "sunset" provision could usefully apply to any major
embargo against a country.39 9 Congressional review after, say, six
months4" would require the President to justify the dramatic and major
395. Cf Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (limiting the parties able to recover in
an antitrust price-fixing case).
396. HousE AFGHANISTAN REPORT, supra note 69, at 25-35.
397. It would also be politically difficult for the President to justify payments to parties in the
target country. Even if the injured foreign party were an innocent middleman in a third country,
compensation would also seem administratively and politically difficult.
Definitive answers on other administrative questions regarding this compensation proposal are
beyond the scope of this Article. However, many useful analogies can be found in the earlier
discussion of the EAA. See supra text accompanying notes 96-130.
398. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(g)(3)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1986). An exception is provided if the
controls are part of a complete cutoff of exports to that country. Id. § 2406(g)(3)(B)(ii); see supra
text accompanying note 111.
399. Carefully defining "major embargo" is important. For example, it might be defined as
controls over exports that amounted to, say, 80% of the total U.S. exports to that country in the
preceding 12 months. Otherwise, the President could stop all exports, except for one or two minor
items, and argue that the sunset provision did not apply because the embargo was not major.
400. Six months would probably give Congress adequate time to study the reasons for the
embargo and initial developments under it. This was the period established for initial review (and
regular follow-up reviews) by the now-invalid legislative veto under the National Emergencies Act
and IEEPA. 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (1982). See supra text accompanying note 320.
A 60-day limit is another possibility. It is the period now prescribed for a major agricultural
embargo, as well as the period (with a possible 30-day extension) permitted under the War Powers
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act of a trade embargo. Given political realities, Congress would proba-
bly acquiesce, but the review provision would stimulate greater discus-
sion of the issues and require Congress to take a position.
The sunset provision might also require Congress to renew the
embargo every year or six months. This would further ensure that Con-
gress and the President had consciously considered the need to continue
the embargo.
Despite its benefits, the sunset provision should not apply to any
export control, but only to major embargoes. Congress cannot be
expected to act every time the President adds or modifies an export con-
trol. To do so would be a burden on Congress and would unnecessarily
hamper the President.
A sunset provision has worked in a constructive way with the War
Powers Resolution. 4°1 There, the President is required to "terminate any
use of United States Armed Forces" under the Resolution4 °2 if he does
not obtain congressional approval within sixty, or possibly ninety, days
after introducing the forces "into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances. ' '4°" The deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1982-84
illustrates the application of the Resolution.
When the Marines began suffering casualties from hostile fire in
August 1983, many in Congress argued that the sixty-day period had
begun running.' Facing a congressional vote, both the Executive
Branch and Congress engaged in an intense public discussion of U.S. pol-
icy in Lebanon and whether the Marines' presence was necessary. Presi-
Resolution. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see infra text accompanying notes
401-06. Sixty days, however, seems a very short period for Congress to evaluate an embargo,
especially since an embargo will probably not be as visible, nor as urgent, as the deployment of U.S.
armed forces into situations involving hostilities or where imminent involvement in hostilities is
likely.
401. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548.
402. Id. § 1544(b).
403. Id. § 1543(a)(1). The President can certify that the additional 30 days are needed in
certain situations. Id. § 1544(b).
404. The vague language of the War Powers Resolution regarding "hostilities" has led to
frequent confusion over when the time period begins to run-i.e., when U.S. forces have been
introduced into the requisite situation. In the case of Lebanon, the Executive Branch continued to
maintain that the period had not started, even though Marines were being killed by sniper fire.
President Reagan reiterated this claim when he signed the joint resolution concerning the Lebanon
deployment discussed below. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, at A7, col. 1; see infra text accompanying
note 405.
Similarly, the Reagan administration has so far refused to say that the Resolution's time period
has begun to run in the continuing crisis in the Persian Gulf where Iran and Iraq have been attacking
ships. Madison, A Reflagged Policy, 19 NAT'L J. 3026 (1987); Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1987, at A3,
col. 1.
A sunset provision for the export laws would not have the same ambiguity over the starting
point because it would commence on the specific date when the formal controls began.
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dent Reagan, for example, made several major public statements. The
result was a congressional joint resolution, signed by the President on
October 12, in which Congress authorized the continued presence of the
Marines in Lebanon for another eighteen months." 5
The benefits of this process were soon demonstrated by the tragic
events of October 23, when a suicide attack destroyed the Marine bar-
racks and killed 240 men. The disaster proved less divisive than it might
have been between the President and Congress, and throughout the
nation. The sunset provision had led to the creation, through negotiation
and public debate, of a more accepted policy and a greater national
consensus.
406
c. Reining in Extraterritoriality
While the need for flexibility argues for retaining the potentially
sweeping extraterritorial reach of export controls, experience teaches that
resort to broad claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction should be sharply
circumscribed." 7 Moreover, granting the President increased authority
to impose other types of sanctions, such as import controls, would pre-
sumably reduce his need to rely on expansive export controls.
Judicious extraterritorial application of sanctions can be effective.
In the analogous case of IEEPA financial controls against Iran,
extending the freeze on Iranian assets to U.S. banks abroad accounted for
nearly one half of the $12 billion total in frozen assets4' 8 and met only
muted foreign criticism." 9 On the other hand, as dramatized by Presi-
dent Reagan's efforts to stop construction of the Soviet gas pipeline,
broad claims of extraterritoriality can be decidedly counterproductive
405. Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. III 1985)).
406. Public debate over the Lebanon disaster was also muted by the U.S. invasion of Grenada,
which began two days later on October 25.
While sunset provisions have begun to appear in other statutes concerning foreign policy, none
have apparently come into play in any important way in U.S. actions. The EAA provision on
agricultural embargoes has not been triggered. And, the Reagan administration apparently did not
consider the August 1986 amendment to the Arms Export Control Act applicable to its arms sales to
Iran in October-November 1986. That amendment prohibited the sale of arms to a country
designated as supporting terrorists, such as Iran, unless the President formally waived the ban. Any
such waiver expires at the end of 90 days unless Congress enacts a law extending it. Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 509, 100 Stat. 853, 874
(codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2780 (West Supp. 1987)). President Reagan never formally waived the
statutory ban. The administration apparently considered that the arms sales statutes were not
applicable to a covert intelligence activity. See supra text accompanying notes 142-49.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 123-30 (discussing extraterritoriality generally and the
abortive pipeline sanctions specifically).
408. Carswell & Davis, supra note 39, at 205, 233 ("[t]hat extraterritorial reach provided the
real leverage").
409. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 253, at 177-99 (lack of foreign criticism in large part
because of the general international outrage at the seizure of diplomatic personnel).
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where major U.S. allies do not share the U.S. position on the underlying
issue.
Part of the problem appears to stem from a lack of institutional
memory in the Presidency. For example, many decisionmakers in the
Reagan administration apparently had little sense of what they were get-
ting into with the pipeline controls. They probably were unaware of the
earlier brouhahas with U.S. allies over TWEA controls regarding China
and Cuba. When the administration later imposed sanctions against
Nicaragua, South Africa, and Libya, the extraterritorial reach of the reg-
ulations was more limited.41 0 Presumably the administration's experi-
ence with the pipeline had taught it a lesson.
Despite extensive discussion of the extraterritoriality issue in the
cases and scholarly literature, there are no simple legislative solutions for
discouraging the extraterritorial use of sanctions, while simultaneously
preserving flexibility. This helps explain why Congress did not amend
the jurisdictional provisions in the 1985 EAAA, even though the pipeline
fiasco was still a vivid memory.
Calling for consistent application of international law principles
raises as many questions as it resolves, since theories of jurisdiction in
international law are hardly consistent or precise.41' Recommending
that U.S. courts take into account certain general considerations, such as
the interests of the foreign state or the likelihood of retaliation, might
provide some guidance in deciding suits under the U.S. antitrust laws or
other laws that involve the interests of other nations. 412 However, since
export controls can be so sweeping and have such immediate impact, an
important objective of any recommendation must be to influence the
President's initial decision on the scope of the controls, not await some
long-delayed court decision.
At least one step would be an improvement: the use of extraterrito-
rial sanctions should be discouraged, especially in their broadest applica-
tions, by requiring the President to make certain findings before he
imposes these sanctions, 413 and by allowing disgruntled private parties to
410. For example, the export controls against Nicaragua and Libya were limited to exports
from the United States. 31 C.F.R. §§ 540.204-.208 (Nicaragua); 550.201-.207 (Libya) (1987). The
freeze of Libyan assets included those in overseas branches of U.S. banks and other entities. Id.
§ 550.206. In spite of their relatively limited scope, a U.K. court found the Libyan controls to be
overreaching. See supra note 295.
411. See, e.g., Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The
Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439, 446-47 (1981).
412. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 (to be published April 1988); Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The
Expansion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 343-44 (1981).
413. For example, the President might be required to make special findings for jurisdiction to
extend beyond U.S. territory and U.S. nationals (wherever located). The President might also be
directed to give due regard to the legitimate interests of foreign governments and the jurisdictional
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bring administrative challenges. This approach is similar to the EAA's
"foreign availability" provisions, which were toughened in the 1985
amendments to help ensure better evaluation of the potential effective-
ness of export controls in light of the foreign availability of goods that the
President proposes to control.414
Other changes in the export laws that could impose major limits on
the President's present authority are, of course, possible. 415 However,
this Article does not recommend further limits on the President's author-
ity because of the danger that he would simply use IEEPA more
frequently.
The President's authority can be trimmed sufficiently by the changes
recommended here: expanding the contract sanctity provision (including
a limited right to compensation); adding a sunset provision requiring
congressional approval of a comprehensive export embargo; and discour-
aging frequent claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
2. Giving the President Broad Authority over Imports
The best opportunity to improve the U.S. legal regime for imposing
sanctions for foreign policy reasons is to expand substantially the Presi-
dent's power over imports. While the President now has only meager
authority in this area, the United States already has considerable experi-
ence with other import controls, such as those for antidumping and for-
eign subsidies.4 16
The most constructive way to proceed, however, is not to build on
the 1985 additions to the President's authority over imports from Libya
or countries supporting terrorists. 417 Those provisions are far too open-
ended. The Libyan provision contains no limitations whatsoever on the
President's authority, reflecting the low congressional regard for that
country and the relatively small economic cost to the United States of
imposing sanctions against it. The terrorism provision only requires the
principles of international law. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403.
414. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(f), 2405(h) (Supp. III 1985); 15 C.F.R. § 391.1-.6 (1987)
(definitions of, and procedures for, the determination of foreign availability). Further efforts to limit
use of extraterritoriality should be actively considered. For example, the Executive Branch or
Congress might create a commission to develop further concrete proposals. Although commissions
are often a tactic for avoiding concrete action, it is important to begin developing a consensus among
policymakers about the issues and specific proposals.
415. Some of the more thoroughgoing ones include greatly expanding the right of administrative
and judicial review over the imposition of controls and individual licensing decisions, and
eliminating the President's power to impose foreign policy (though not national security) controls.
See Abbott, supra note 13, at 873-89; Murphy & Downey, supra note 97, at 822.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 178-91 (discussing economic-based import statutes).
417. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64.
1987] 1263
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
President to consult in advance with Congress "in every possible
instance" and to report any sanctions immediately.
Expanding section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962418 is also
inadvisable because the statute would require a complete revision. The
language regarding "national security," the legislative history, and the
actual uses of the law make it too narrow to suit the purposes discussed
here.
The best approach would be to draft carefully a new statute that
incorporates a number of provisions designed to protect against hasty use
of the new authority and against use for other than foreign policy rea-
sons. The Export Administration Act, as amended in 1985, provides sev-
eral useful analogies.
An import control act should, of course, have detailed criteria defin-
ing when the restrictions are to be imposed. Mandatory prior consultation
with Congress and some consultation with affected U.S. industries, con-
sumer groups, and other countries should be required by provisions simi-
lar to those governing foreign policy controls under the EAA. Moreover,
the President should be required to report fully to Congress whenever he
uses his new authority. Such provisions, however, are only the first step.
There should also be a provision for contract sanctity similar to the
recommendation made earlier for the export laws. The provision should
cover all import controls imposed for foreign policy reasons, and should
compensate the importer when the President certifies that he must order
the breach of existing contracts.
The new law should also have a sunset provision, under which Con-
gress must approve any major import ban within, say, six months. Such
provisions require the President to justify his actions, and will ensure
that both the Executive Branch and Congress give serious consideration
to the policy at issue.
The contract sanctity and sunset provisions should help put a
damper on inappropriate uses of the President's new authority over
import controls. A sunset provision, however, will probably check the
President less effectively in the context of import controls than it would
for export controls. In recent years, Congress has been more willing than
the President to support import controls, while the reverse has been true
of export sanctions. This can largely be explained by the short-term ben-
efits of import restrictions for U.S. businesses and workers, in contrast to
the immediate injury that export controls inflict.
Pressures to use the new law for protectionist purposes would surely
arise, though. For example, the U.S. steel industry might become "very
concerned" about human rights violations in Taiwan and South Korea,
418. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 153-60.
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and call for a ban on steel imports from those countries. Though it
would have a tougher case to make, the shoe industry might similarly use
Italy's refusal to extradite terrorists as grounds for calling for a ban on
Italian shoe imports.
The potential harm of these pressures should not be overestimated.
First, to the extent that there is some factual basis for the pressures (such
as actual human rights violations in South Korea), they arguably help
further important U.S. foreign policy interests. Second, even if the pres-
sures lead to the imposition of import controls primarily for protectionist
reasons, the restrictions are likely to apply to only one or a few coun-
tries.4 19 Alternative foreign suppliers would usually be available to help
minimize any additional costs to importers and consumers. For exam-
ple, stopping steel imports from South Korea and Taiwan would reduce
only slightly total U.S. steel imports, and might be offset by increased
imports from countries that are not likely targets of economic
sanctions.42 o
Nevertheless, additional steps might be taken to minimize the
impact of protectionist pressures on decisions to impose import controls
for foreign policy reasons. Two provisions which have no analogues in
the export laws should be seriously considered-one requiring "linkage,"
and another encouraging some consistency with GATT.421
As for linkage, a proposal meriting further study would require any
import control to be linked to other import controls on at least several
other goods from the target country. Such linkage would ensure that the
problem with the country is with its policies, and not just with its exports
of steel or shoes that compete with U.S. industry. Requiring controls on
several items at once is reasonable in a genuine policy dispute, and would
419. Passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 apparently reflected a mix of
pressures. The primary motivation was certainly opposition to apartheid. Nevertheless, some of the
import provisions that presumably increased the bill's support were added on the Senate floor, partly
at the urging of special interest groups seeking to help domestic industries. The import bans added
were on steel, textiles, and agricultural products. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
420. To the extent that there are alternative suppliers, domestic industries would have less
incentive to seek the imposition of economic sanctions on a particular country or countries in the
first place.
Note that the United States' relations with its principal trading partners are such that imposing
economic sanctions on them for (noneconomic) foreign policy reasons is unlikely. The principal
suppliers in 1986 were, in descending order of dollar value, Japan, Canada, the EEC countries, and
Mexico.
Of course, the United States might be dependent on a very few countries for certain items, such
as a particular mineral. There is, however, usually more than one foreign supplier, and precautionary
steps such as maintaining strategic reserves are possible. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, STRATEGIC MATERIALS: TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE U.S. IMPORT VULNERABILITY
(1985).
421. Unlike export controls, there is no recommendation here regarding extraterritoriality.
Import controls pose no problems of extraterritorial applications: they limit imports into U.S.
territory and hence have the strong jurisdictional basis of territoriality.
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not inappropriately limit the President's new discretion. The broad con-
trols would also give greater visibility to the President's action both in
the target country and at home, thus increasing the need for a persuasive
foreign policy rationale.422
A more problematic proposal for linkage would require import con-
trols to be imposed only in conjunction with other types of economic
sanctions-such as controls on government programs, exports, or private
financial transactions. This requirement would also give the President's
actions broader impact in both the United States and the target country,
thus creating a greater need for justification.423
The purpose would again be to blunt protectionist efforts. Pressures
for new import controls would be countered by pressure from other
groups that opposed controls on exports or private financial transactions.
On the other hand, the linkage provision would create demand for export
controls from industries, such as steel and shoe manufacturing, which
have previously sought only import controls, and which would not be
hurt by export controls since they produce primarily for the U.S. domes-
tic market.424
422. Some potential problems with this proposal require further study. For example, one
problem is determining how many imported items must be affected. If the target country shipped
only four major products to the United States, how does Congress prevent the President from
banning one of the important products plus 12 other items that are imported in minuscule quantities
or not at all? This problem could be solved by requiring the President to impose similar controls on,
for example, three of the four largest imports from the target country as measured the previous year.
423. A provision authorizing import controls when linked to export controls was considered in
Congress in 1983-84. In April 1983, Senators Heinz and Garn introduced a bill (S. 979) to amend
the EAA, which would have allowed the President to impose import controls whenever he imposed
export controls under the EAA's foreign policy section. Senate Bill 979 was reported favorably out
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The Committee report
explained: "Not only will the authority to control imports.., widen the President's options, it could
also lessen the burden on American exporters, who have heretofore been asked to pay the entire
price of foreign policy action in this area." S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983). The
import control provision was opposed by the majority of the Senate Finance Committee and by the
Reagan administration. 130 CONG. REC. S1712 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Danforth). The principal objections were that the controls would be inconsistent with GATT and
that protectionist pressures would increase the use of sanctions, including the required export
controls. Id. at S1712-13; see also id. at S1714-15 (statement of Sen. Dole).
The provision was amended on the Senate floor to require that the sanctions be imposed only if
the President "determines and reports to the Congress, in advance of imposition of such controls,
that such controls are consistent with the international obligations of the United States, including
the [GATT]." Id. at S1715-16. In that form, it was passed by the Senate in March 1984. 130
CONG. REC. 82143 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984).
The House declined to include such a provision in its proposed EAA amendments in 1984. The
Senate provision was dropped in conference, partly in exchange for the provision allowing the use of
import sanctions against persons who violated the EAA national security controls. Telephone
interview with Wayne Abernathy, Staff Economist on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs (Mar. 12, 1986).
424. See 130 CONG. REC. S1714-15 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statements of Sens. Danforth and
Dole).
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A possible compromise would allow import controls only if there
were also a cutback in U.S. bilateral programs, and not link the controls
to new export or private credit controls. Restricting government pro-
grams suggests a genuine foreign policy dispute between the two coun-
tries. It would also avoid creating new pressures for export or credit
controls.
From another standpoint, any required linkage among various types
of controls reduces the President's discretion. The purpose of giving the
President new authority to limit imports and private financial transac-
tions is to provide him with greater flexibility to choose the best sanc-
tions. Thus, the value of linkage in discouraging protectionism must be
weighed against the cost in terms of flexibility.
The clash of the new import sanctions with the GATT requirements
of MFN treatment and nondiscrimination is a serious potential problem.
As a result, the new statute should include a provision at least encourag-
ing the President to ensure that any new import controls be consistent with
GATT
While serious, the GATT problem is not insurmountable. As
detailed above,"' many of the present (or potential) target countries
for import sanctions-such as the Soviet Union, Iran, Libya, and
Guatemala-are not GATT members. Moreover, some Eastern Euro-
pean countries that are GATT members have trade relationships with
the United States that limit U.S. obligations to them under GATT.
Finally, some future import controls against GATT countries could well
fit within the broad security exceptions of article XXI.
Assuming that the other provisions of the new statute would
encourage the judicious use of import controls, the approach of "encour-
aging" the President to follow GATT is preferable to "requiring adher-
ence." First, given the breadth of the GATT provisions, it is not always
clear at the outset whether an import restriction violates GATT, and
there is no mechanism available to obtain a quick declaratory judgment.
Second, if the President thinks the foreign policy issue is compelling
enough, he should have the discretion to take steps that might violate the
General Agreement, with the understanding that the other country could
pursue its claims in GATT and obtain the allowed relief. 26
To help offset any potential negative impact of the new U.S. law, the
United States should probably accompany it with efforts to strengthen
425. See supra text accompanying notes 194-201.
426. Accepting the principle that the other country can pursue its claims in GATT
demonstrates some continued support for the entity. However, given the usually limited relief
offered in GATT, this would probably not be a major economic burden on the United States,
particularly if the target country is not a major U.S. trading partner. See supra text accompanying
notes 204-06.
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GATT and the international trading system generally.427
Finally, to help ensure presidential adherence to the letter and spirit
of the proposed new import law, its provisions-such as the criteria for
invoking it and the possible requirements for linkage-must be as precise
as possible.4 28 Bright statutory guidelines clearly influence the presiden-
tial decisionmaking process. 429 And, as proposed above, the law should
include a congressional review in the sunset provision, and should award
compensation if existing contracts or licenses are terminated.
The new import law, then, should give the President major new
authority, but it should also include provisions designed to guarantee
that the authority is used appropriately.
3. Giving the President Authority over Private Financial Transactions:
Exploring Virgin Territory
The President should also be provided with considerably greater
authority over private financial transactions in order to impose economic
sanctions in nonemergency situations. Delegating this authority to the
President in a constructive way can be difficult, however, depending on
the type of financial transaction involved.
Regulating financial transactions is often hard because money is
very fungible and easily transferable. Millions of dollars can be moved
among several banks by wire in a few moments. Money cannot be traced
as easily as, say, the export of a large computer. These problems are
accentuated by the relatively limited experience of the United States in
regulating private international financial transactions for foreign policy
reasons. Further compounding the difficulties is the paucity of empirical
research and technical analysis of potential problems.
The types of financial transactions that might be regulated can be
divided roughly into three categories, which differ considerably in their
susceptibility to effective controls. These categories are: (a) international
trade financing; (b) general financing; and (c) foreign deposits in U.S.
financial entities.
427. Probably the most important step the United States could take would be to participate
constructively in GATT's new Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The United States got off to a
promising start with its major proposals at the GATT meeting in Punta del Este in September 1986.
428. The proposals for a new import law do not include specific provisions for general
administrative or judicial review-and intentionally so. Since the purposes underlying the export
licensing system do not apply here, it would be foolish and costly to add that licensing system to the
regulation of imports. Similarly, the roles of the ITC and Department of Commerce under other
import laws-making determinations of injury, unfair pricing, and the like-are not relevant for
noneconomic foreign policy questions.
429. See supra text accompanying note 337.
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a. International Trade Financing
This type of financial transaction is the easiest and the most appro-
priate for the President to control. International trade financing
includes: loans by a U.S. exporter or importer to a foreign seller or
buyer; a U.S. bank's letters of credit, acceptances, or similar direct
financing arrangements to assist an international trade deal; and other
loans by a U.S. bank that are related to the trade.
Since this financing is directly related to exports or imports, it is
usually easy to identify. Moreover, unlike some other financial areas, the
United States has considerable past experience with controls over export
financing.43 The antiboycott laws have also generated extensive regula-
tions of letters of credit and other bankers' trade documents.431 This
experience suggests that future controls over export or import financing
can be effective.
In addition, it seems reasonable to apply essentially similar provi-
sions to financing as to controls on the underlying export or import
transaction. Indeed, the EAA already empowers the President to regu-
late export "financing. '4 32 This authority, which was used broadly to
limit U.S. business participation in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, should
be maintained.433 Similarly, the new import law should include a provi-
sion that authorizes the President to regulate import financing.
b. General International Financing
This category includes general loans from U.S. banks and other
financial entities to foreign governments or foreign entities. For example,
Citibank or a syndicate of U.S. banks might loan several hundred million
dollars to the Chilean government to help it deal with a balance-of-pay-
ments problem, or to a private Chilean company to build an industrial
complex.
Attempts to control this type of financing present serious problems
of effectiveness and enforcement because of the fungibility of money and
its rapid movement among banks. How effective, for example, would a
prohibition on loans to Chile be? Rather than making such a loan,4 34 a
U.S. bank might in good faith make an inter-bank loan to a Japanese,
Swiss, or Panamanian bank. The next day that foreign bank might make
430. See supra text accompanying notes 212-14.
431. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 369 (1987). Implementation of the antiboycott laws and regulations has
been difficult, in part because of their complexity. See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 245, at 257-87.
432. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2414 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 212-14.
433. The authority should, of course, be subject to any of the changes in the export laws that
were recommended above-such as strengthening contract sanctity and adding a sunset provision.
434. U.S. banks' claims account for 47% of total foreign bank claims in Chile, making it
particularly vulnerable to finance sanctions. See supra Figure I at 1178.
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a loan to Chile, at a slightly higher rate of interest to include that bank's
costs and profit, thereby undercutting the U.S. restriction.
U.S. banks are a major force in private international banking, even
though their premier role of the 1960's and 1970's has eroded considera-
bly as Japanese and European banks have grown and expanded their
international activities. Moreover, the relative importance of U.S. credit
varies by region, with U.S. banks particularly important in certain coun-
tries in Latin America and Asia.4
35
Cutting off general loans from U.S. banks would force a foreign bor-
rower to search elsewhere for loans. The borrower might encounter
some delays in finding another lender and might have to pay a slightly
higher interest rate. These difficulties would vary from country to coun-
try, depending on which banks were accustomed to doing business in a
particular nation. However, these difficulties are probably not severe,
with the possible exception of marginal borrowers who have a special
relationship with U.S. banks.
The recent case of South Africa, however, provides an important
example of the effective use of financial sanctions, albeit in combination
with other steps. The decisions in August 1985 by some private banks in
the United States and elsewhere not to roll over short-term loans to
South Africa triggered a financial crisis there. The financial pressures
were continued by President Reagan's 1985 ban on new bank loans to the
South African government, and then by the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act,
which codified that ban and added a prohibition on new private invest-
ment in South Africa.436
The South African experience, together with the possibility of for-
mal or informal cooperation with U.S. allies, suggests that the President
should have the authority to prohibit new general lending for foreign
policy reasons. Given lingering questions about effectiveness and
enforcement, however, further analysis would be useful.437
If new authority is provided, it should be carefully circumscribed. 438
435. See supra note 209 and Figure 1 at 1178.
436. Neither the President's action nor the Anti-Apartheid Act appear to have been preceded
by careful analysis of the effectiveness of the prohibition on loans. The administration released no
study, and no detailed analysis of this sanction appears in the legislative history.
437. An alternative approach is to continue with the present arrangement, where the President
has authority over general international lending only through special, ad hoc legislation (such as
with South Africa), or by declaring a national emergency and using his IEEPA powers.
438. It could be included either in a new law, or in an amendment to the export laws under the
assumption that this would be authority over the export of capital. An amendment to the EAA was
the approach taken by Senators Garn and Proxmire in 1985 when they introduced a bill (S. 812) to
give the President the authority to limit financial transactions to any "controlled country." (These
countries are the communist countries, including China but excluding Yugoslavia.) Under this bill,
the President would be able to prohibit or regulate the export or transfer of money or other financial
assets, including loans and the extension of credit, to the government of any controlled country. The
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The President should be authorized to stop or regulate, for foreign policy
reasons, any loans or other extensions of credit to another country. One
way to confine the authority over general international lending might be
to restrict regulation of lending to a foreign government and its con-
trolled entities, rather than extending it to independent private entities as
well.
There is a danger that private entities would attempt to circumvent
a ban against lending to a foreign government by borrowing on behalf of
that government. The size of the loans, however, would make them rela-
tively easy to detect and thus would discourage violations. 439  Also,
restricting the President's authority to control loans to government enti-
ties will make the new law less threatening to private foreign borrowers,
who would fear that the United States will limit their borrowing from
U.S. banks in a foreign policy dispute."'
capital controls would not be subject to the various safeguards for other export controls-such as the
criteria for using the controls, consultation, foreign availability, and the like. Moreover, it would
only be applicable to controlled countries and not to, for example, South Korea or Chile. S. 812,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
While some witnesses supported the bill or at least important aspects of it, bankers and the
AFL-CIO opposed the bill as drafted. 1985 Hearings on S. 812, supra note 210, at 93-121, 193-208.
The bill apparently occasioned a sharp split in the Reagan administration. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3,
1985, at D27, col. 3. President Reagan decided to oppose the bill. 1985 Hearings on S. 812, supra
note 210, at 133-34 (statements of David C. Mulford, assistant secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs). There was no further action on the bill before the 99th Congress adjourned in
1986.
In March 1987, a nearly identical bill (S. 786) was introduced in the 100th Congress, with some
additional provisions. The President's proposed new authority over exports of capital would be
extended to countries supporting international terrorism as well as controlled countries. The bill
would also bar controlled countries from ownership or control of federally insured U.S. banks. S.
786, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). In August 1987, a bill essentially identical to S. 786 was
introduced in the House, with some added provisions requiring federally insured banks to report
publicly their loans and investments in controlled countries. H.R. 3095, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); see 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 978 (Aug. 5, 1987).
The addition of the antiterrorism provisions were obviously an effort to expand the coverage of
the proposed new law, as well as an apparent means to broaden the domestic political support.
Nevertheless, Congress had taken no action on either of the 1987 bills as of February 1988.
439. Authority over loans to private entities is another way to limit U.S. foreign investment in
the target country. This limitation, however, would have a less direct effect on the target
government than halting loans to the government itself. Also, specific legislation might be required
for this control, as with the anti-apartheid law.
440. Interestingly, the IEEPA lending prohibitions against Iran, South Africa, and Libya
applied only to loans to those governments, though the President could have made them broader.
Another way to limit the President's authority would be to restrict it to new lending, and not
encompass existing loans. This approach was taken in sanctions against South Africa and Libya.
Such prospective regulation has the advantage of avoiding contract sanctity issues. Moreover, if the
loan has already been made to the foreigner, the only transaction remaining is probably repayment,
which should not be discouraged.
A problem arises if the President also freezes foreign deposits. See infra text accompanying
notes 443-49. The foreign borrower will then have trouble making payments on its loans-not only
might some of its assets in the United States be frozen, but the lender will also be disinclined to send
more funds here. In the 1979-81 Iran hostage case, the outstanding loans went into default.
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The authority to restrict foreign borrowing should be further limited
by measures similar to those suggested for the new import bill-tough
criteria for resort to the authority, mandatory consultation with Con-
gress and suggested consultation with both the U.S. banking industry
and with U.S. allies, and detailed reporting provisions. Most impor-
tantly, there should be a sunset provision that requires congressional
approval for major new controls.
A contract sanctity clause is also recommended to protect existing
loans, unless the President certifies that a "breach of peace" requires ter-
mination. To limit abuse, the U.S. government should be required to
compensate the U.S. financial institutions whose loans are terminated.44'
The extraterritoriality provision of the finance sanction law should
surely be more limited than the one proposed for exports. The President
should be allowed to claim jurisdiction only over persons and entities
within U.S. territory and over U.S. nationals abroad. This jurisdiction
would not cover foreign subsidiaries or independent foreign companies,
even if they have a contractual relationship with a U.S. company. The
authorized jurisdiction would still permit the President to control lend-
ing by U.S. banks, including their overseas branches. Such extraterrito-
rial reach was very helpful in the 1979-81 Iranian crisis and is now being
used against Libya. Authorization of broader jurisdictional claims, how-
ever, seems unnecessary. And limiting the President's jurisdictional
authority can help prevent potential abuse. 44
c. Foreign Deposits
The IEEPA controls used in the Iranian crisis and against Libya
demonstrate that foreign deposits in U.S. banks-here or in branches
abroad-can be effectively frozen, as can foreigner's funds held by U.S.
corporations. The actions against Iran and Libya were carried out
promptly, although not without some difficulties." 3
441. If the monies for the loan have already been paid out before the control is imposed, the
sanctions as applied to that loan will be meaningless. The payout might not have been completed,
however, possibly because of a staggered schedule. A new control could prevent completion of the
payout and thus create problems under the loan contract. If this occurs, the bank should be
compensated for its damages, as an exporter or importer is compensated for damages caused by
sanctions.
In any case, the drafters should be careful not to write the credit control so as to prevent foreign
debtors from repaying their loans. Letting them off the hook is contrary to the purpose of the
sanction.
442. Foreign countries are especially sensitive to U.S. efforts to claim jurisdiction over local
banks or other financial entities in their territory, viewing it as a special challenge to their
sovereignty. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 253, at 178; see also Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v.
Bankers Trust Co., 26 I.L.M. 1600 (Q.B. Comm'l Ct. Sept. 2, 1987). For a discussion of this recent
U.K. case on the Libyan sanctions, see supra note 295.
443. For example, there was considerable uncertainty about the amount of funds frozen and
about some banks' use of "setoffs" to pay off Iranians' outstanding loans with the deposits of
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Whether the President should be given this authority to freeze for-
eigner's deposits and other funds in the possession of U.S. entities in non-
emergency situations is a close question. On the one hand, the asset
freeze appears to have been the most important of the Iranian sanctions.
Earlier freezes under TWEA also appear to have been effective. On the
other hand, concern about future freezes could deter foreign govern-
ments or private foreign entities from depositing funds in U.S. banks,
here or abroad. As a result, these banks will not only lose deposits, but
more importantly may lose customer relationships that generate other
business.
While difficult to measure precisely, there have been costs to past
freezes. After a careful study, one expert concluded that "little harm
seems to have come from the [Iranian freeze], owing primarily to its lim-
ited application and duration." 4 " He then warns, however: "Over the
longer term,... should Washington be seen as developing an addiction
to asset freezes after all... significant diversification into other countries'
institutions and currencies could yet occur, and that could indeed be
costly for the competitiveness of American banks. '" 445
If the President is given new authority to freeze assets, its use should
be restricted in a manner similar to how the new authority over general
international lending is restricted" 6-including tough criteria for invok-
ing the authority, consultation and reporting requirements, a sunset pro-
vision, limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction, and a contract sanctity
provision.
As for contract sanctity, the President would presumably invoke the
waiver clause and regulate existing deposits." 7 Just as U.S. exporters or
importers would be covered by contract sanctity provisions discussed
earlier,448 U.S. banks should be allowed compensation for provable dam-
Iranians. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 253 177-92; Carswell & Davis, supra note 39, at 201-07;
see also supra Part IV.
As for Libya, the extraterritorial reach of the controls was successfully challenged in the United
Kingdom. See supra note 295.
444. B. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST? INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 169 (1986). Arab countries moved some of their deposits out of American banks during
1980-81, but they increased their holdings of U.S. government and corporate securities. And in
1982-83, the growth of Arab deposits resumed. Id. at 170. See Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the
Iran Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 247, 263 (Winter 1981/82) (discussing effect of Iranian blocking
of OPEC deposits).
445. B. COHEN, supra note 444, at 171.
446. As with the discussion of possible controls on general lending, the alternative to broad
presidential discretion under a new law might be to require that there be special, ad hoc legislation or
resort to IEEPA.
447. Existing deposits would obviously be the principal funds frozen. It is unlikely that
foreigners who are the target of a freeze will deposit additional assets in U.S. banks once there is a
freeze.
448. See supra text accompanying notes 385-97.
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ages that a freeze causes to existing business relationships. These dam-
ages would presumably be very small, since they would only be
incidental to the freeze on deposits. The actual deposits would be those
of foreign entities who would not be compensated because that would be
contrary to the purpose of the sanction and the use of the waiver clause,
which is to put economic pressure on the target country. 449
In short, in the absence of a declared national emergency, the Presi-
dent should receive new authority to limit import financing as well as
export financing. In addition, there are arguments for Congress provid-
ing him with carefully crafted new authority to regulate general interna-
tional lending by U.S. financial institutions, and possibly to freeze
foreigner's assets in the possession of U.S. entities.
4. Making IEEPA Less than an Everyday Occurrence
If the changes recommended above for nonemergency statutes are
adopted in any substantial way, then the already strong case for amend-
ing IEEPA becomes even more compelling. Expanding the President's
authority and making it more balanced for nonemergency situations will
give the President less genuine need to resort to IEEPA's sweeping emer-
gency powers. On the other hand, the President might be tempted to use
the IEEPA powers to avoid some of the restrictions proposed to limit the
abuse of nonemergency powers-such as contract sanctity and the sunset
provision.
The key problems are to limit the ease of initial resort to JEEPA in
minor foreign policy disputes, and to prevent its continued use after a crisis
has passed.
The most important recommendation is to add a sunset provision to
IEEPA. Congress should have to approve, by joint resolution, the decla-
ration of a national emergency and the use of emergency powers after a
certain period of time, and then at regular intervals. As the Lebanon
experience under the War Powers Resolution demonstrates, a sunset pro-
vision can play a constructive role in building consensus in U.S. policy
and in ensuring a congressional voice in the policymaking process. The
sunset provision can be viewed as a substitute, albeit an imperfect one,450
449. See supra text accompanying note 397.
450. From the viewpoint of Congress, the legislative veto was a better tool because it left
discretion in Congress as to whether there would be an actual vote on the concurrent resolution
challenging the President's decision. Congress could avoid voting and simply allow the emergency
to continue. Note that Congress generally prefers procedural devices that allow it to avoid yes-or-no
substantive votes. See Aspin, Congress versus the Defense Department, in THE TETHERED
PRESIDENCY 252-63 (T. Franck ed. 1981).
The sunset provision, on the other hand, requires Congress to vote if it wants to approve the
President's action, thus going on record. Congress could end the emergency by not voting (as well as
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for the now-defunct legislative veto provision ih the National Emergen-
cies Act and IEEPA.
The initial time period for the sunset provision could be six
months-the initial period prescribed by the legislative veto provision.
This should give Congress ample time to observe how the President is
handling a crisis and whether he is appropriately consulting with Con-
gress and seeking legislative action. Alternatively, the time period could
be sixty to ninety days, similar to the War Powers Resolution and the
agricultural embargo provision of the amended Export Administration
Act. This shorter period, however, might place unreasonable demands
on the decisionmaking processes of Congress.
The regular renewal periods should probably be six months or one
year in duration. The National Emergencies Act and IEEPA had pro-
vided for votes on concurrent resolutions at six-month intervals.
The exact lengths of the initial period and the renewal periods will
obviously influence how quickly and how often Congress reviews the
President's decision, and could well affect the pace of the President's
actions. More important than the exact time periods, however, is that
the President will recognize that his authority is subject to congressional
review in all but the shortest emergencies. Consequently, the President
will presumably be more careful to consult with Congress from the
beginning, and to develop policies that reflect a national consensus.
Further amendments to IEEPA are advisable, though they are less
important than a sunset provision. The second most important step is
adding contract sanctity provisions. As with export or import controls in
a nonemergency situation, existing trade contracts and export licenses
should be honored unless there is a "breach of the peace" that requires
their immediate termination. In that case, the U.S. government should
compensate the injured U.S. exporter or importer.
There should also be a contract sanctity provision regarding private
financial transactions. IEEPA's present authorities allow the President
to prohibit trade financing and general lending agreements, and to freeze
foreigner's deposits. For such financial controls, the same contract sanc-
tity provisions proposed for the nonemergency laws should apply. Con-
tract sanctity provisions are not inappropriate for emergencies. All other
considerations should not be discarded just because the President
declares a national emergency. The rationales supporting the contract
sanctity clause in the export laws-trying to improve the reputation of
Americans as reliable business partners, and protecting U.S. entities from
sudden losses-are also valid in the emergency context. Furthermore,
by voting no on the resolution), but the effect of ending the President's emergency would be a very
visible challenge by Congress, even if there were no vote.
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providing compensation when the President curtails or terminates
existing contracts or licenses pursuant to the waiver clause should help
deter casual resort to waivers.451
A final rationale for the contract sanctity provision is unique to the
IEEPA situation. If the provision is excluded, the President may be
encouraged to resort to the IEEPA powers to avoid the clause in the
nonemergency laws. IEEPA should not be an easy way out.
Also, rather than simply directing the President to consult with
Congress "in every possible instance," IEEPA should be amended to
make consultation mandatory and to detail its scope. Of course, consulta-
tion, particularly of an extensive sort, might be difficult in a fast-breaking
crisis. However, IEEPA deals with economic powers, not with use of the
military. The President should at least be able to get the advice of a few
congressional leaders before he uses these powers.452
Moreover, the vague criteria for invoking IEEPA-"any unusual
and extraordinary threat"--could be made more precise. The criteria
could explicitly define emergencies as "rare and brief," and state that use
of IEEPA should be "terminated as soon as the threat has receded or as
soon as necessary special legislation can be passed by Congress." Such
statutory language would put the President on notice not to use IEEPA
casually. Precise language, however, may be difficult to draft, since the
statute was intended to cover a wide range of genuine emergencies, and
to afford the President considerable latitude in dealing with them.
Even if more precise language could be added, enforcement remains
a problem. As noted earlier, courts are very hesitant to question a presi-
dential decision that a national emergency exists.453 The real constraint
on the President is Congress. If there is a sunset provision that requires a
congressional vote for the controls to continue, the precise statutory lan-
guage could be important in the debate over whether to extend the Presi-
dent's emergency powers.
451. See supra text accompanying notes 385-97.
452. For example, in the Iranian situation when Iran tried surreptitiously to withdraw its
deposits from U.S. banks and a speedy U.S. response was needed, President Carter nevertheless
consulted with congressional leaders before he declared a national emergency and froze Iranian
assets. Carswell & Davis, supra note 253, at 176; see also Ribicoff, supra note 334, at 382-84.
The principal purpose behind any consultation requirement is to ensure that the President has
carefully considered his actions and that he realizes the long-term benefits of obtaining the advice of
congressional leaders. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 86, at 75-76. However,
consultation provisions, such as in the War Powers Resolution, have proven to be of only limited
usefulness. Id. at 71-76. The recent failures by Reagan administration officials to abide by various
consultation provisions during the 1985-86 arms sales to Iran raise further questions about the
provisions. As discussed above, a sunset provision should increase considerably the President's
incentives to consult with Congress. See supra text accompanying notes 398-406.
453. See supra text accompanying notes 296-314. But see also supra text accompanying notes
370-73 (discussing how to improve the possibility of judicial review).
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These recommendations are designed to deal with IEEPA's princi-
pal defects by reducing the chances that the President will casually resort
to the Act's powers or continue to rely on them after a crisis has passed.
Steps should also be taken to deal with excessive and counterproductive
claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction under IEEPA. The measures dis-
cussed for nonemergency laws should also be adopted here-such as
actual limits on the President's jurisdictional authority over general
international lending and freezing assets. These measures are not only
reasonable, but their application to IEEPA would also discourage use of
the statute to evade the restrictions contained in the nonemergency
laws.45
4
In short, the need to amend IEEPA cannot be ignored. Addition of
a sunset provision is the most important first step.
D. Conclusion
Economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes are here to stay.
Indeed, various reasons-many good-have led to increased use of these
sanctions, with no slackening in sight.
It is important to begin considering possible sanctions and the
underlying U.S. laws in a comprehensive fashion, rather than looking
myopically at only a few possible vehicles for sanctions, such as U.S.
foreign assistance or exports.
Comprehensive analysis of existing U.S. laws reveals a haphazard
situation. These laws can skew the President's choice of sanctions or
encourage him to resort off-handedly to sweeping emergency powers.
The present legal "framework" is obviously not the only possible
arrangement, and U.S. national interests can be better served. Most
compelling is the need to correct the present disparity between the Presi-
dent's broad nonemergency authority over exports and his very narrow
authority over imports and private financial transactions. The Presi-
dent's powers over the latter two activities should be substantially
increased, while his authority to stop exports should be trimmed.
These changes will require a careful mix of statutory provisions to
avoid encouraging excessive use of sanctions. Especially difficult is the
problem of how to provide the President new authority over certain pri-
vate financial transactions. Nevertheless, substantial improvements are
possible by hedging any new presidential authority with restrictions such
as sunset provisions and contract sanctity clauses.
These changes should be undertaken with an eye toward reducing
454. The proposals above for amending IEEPA constitute an admittedly ambitious agenda, but
one justified by the analysis here. Trying to further limit the use of IEEPA would not only fail to
obtain the necessary congressional support in the foreseeable future, but it would also raise serious
questions about limiting the flexibility that the President needs in a genuine national emergency.
1987] 1277
1278 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
the President's incentives to invoke emergency powers. Indeed, his ability
to use IEEPA should be cut back.
Whatever one thinks of the United States employing economic sanc-
tions, they are an unavoidable reality. Now is the time to bring order
and wisdom to the underlying U.S. laws.
